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Abstract
The recent US and European nancial crises have witnessed the demise of a multitude
of rms in both continents, with the headlines of the newspaper lled up by the default
experience of several key industrial realities. Both in the US and Europe, the policy au-
thorities have been obligated to re-think in depth the design of their bankruptcy laws.
Despite the top priority of the matter in hand, the policy makers have lacked a consistent
framework able to quantify the economic impact of the bankruptcy reforms. My research
enquiry enters here. In the three chapters of my thesis I investigate the phenomenon of
corporate default, with a particular focus on the macroeconomic consequence of changes
in the corporate bankruptcy law.
Chapter 1 studies the general equilibrium implications of changes in the corporate
bankruptcy law. I address this question by building and characterizing a general equilib-
rium rm dynamics model in which the default option replicates salient features of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code: distressed rms can voluntarily le either for liquidation (Chap-
ter 7) or reorganization (Chapter 11). The model is consistent with several regularities
on corporate bankruptcy and rm dynamics. I nd that changes in the bankruptcy law
design have economically signicant general equilibrium eects on output, consumption
and TFP, through rms’ selection.
Chapter 2 documents a novel channel through which pro-creditor bankruptcy re-
forms can backre. The theory arises from the observation of the fact that rms le for
bankruptcy reorganization (Chapter 11) not only to restructure debt but also to restruc-
ture labour contracts. When workers extract rents, restructuring labour contracts helps
distressed rms to regain economic soundness. Shareholders weigh the cost of restruc-
turing labour contracts against their claims on the value of the rm. In this environment,
bankruptcy reforms face a trade-o. A more creditor-friendly law raises recovery val-
ues of successful reorganizations. Yet, it reduces shareholders’ claims and discourages
the restructuring of labour contracts: reorganizations are more likely to fail and rms get
liquidated. As a result, pro-creditors reforms can cause expected recovery values to fall
and raise the cost of debt. I characterize this trade-o in a static model and show that
the optimal level of creditor rights decreases with the bargaining power of workers. To
test the theory, I exploit the heterogeneity in the U.S. states unionization coverage, and a
shift towards a more creditor-friendly Chapter 11 in 1998. I then develop a rm dynamic
model and calibrate it to the pre-1998 period. The model can account for the larger fall in
the relative use and likelihood of success of Chapter 11 in regions where workers extract
more rents.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Omar Rachedi) studies the series of US annual corporate
default rates from 1950 until 2012. We document the presence of one structural break in
the unconditional mean, which is dated in 1986. Meanwhile credit spreads hardly moved.
iv
We present a dynamic equilibrium model where the development of credit markets ac-
counts for this empirical evidence. Financial development increases both the default rate
and rms’ expected recovery rates. These two eects oset each other and translate into
constant credit spreads. In the model nancial development explains 64% of the rise in
default rates and predicts just a 2 basis point increase in the credit spreads. Furthermore,
the model accounts for a number of trends that characterized public rms over the last
decades: the fall in the number of rms distributing dividends, the rise in the degree of
dividend smoothing, and the increase in the volatility of public rms.
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chapter 1
A Quantitative Theory of
Corporate Bankruptcy
1.1 Introduction
What are the general equilibrium implications of changes in the corporate bankruptcy law
design1? To answer this question I build a general equilibrium rm dynamics model2 in
which the default option replicates salient features of the U.S. court-supervised3 bankruptcy
procedures: distressed rms can voluntarily4 le either for liquidation (Chapter 7, Ch
7) or reorganization (Chapter 11, Ch 11). In liquidation (cash auction procedures) the
bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to shut the rm down, sell its assets in a cash-auction,
distribute the proceeds to the creditors and dissolve the corporation. In reorganisation (ne-
gotiation procedures) debtors and creditors agree upon a restructuring plan that allows
the rm to recover its nancial soundness and the creditors to be partially refunded.
To discipline the model, I collect facts that relates rms characteristics with ling de-
cisions and creditors recovery values (Bris et al. [2006]). All else equal: small rms tend
to le for liquidation (Ch 7), while big rms tend to le for reorganisation (Ch 11); more
leveraged rms tend to le for reorganisation (Ch 11); creditors’ losses are lower in reor-
ganization (Ch 11) than in liquidation (Ch 7); creditors’ losses increase in leverage. Ulti-
1The bankruptcy law design represents the legal ways by which rms can repudiate on their debt obli-
gations.
2This paper adds to the vast literature on rm dynamics pioneered by Hopenhayn [1992], in which the
author extends the long run industry equilibrium theory by introducing a concept of stationary equilibrium
which allows him to investigate the phenomena of entry, exit and heterogeneity in the size and growth rates
of rms.
3The analysis abstracts from out-of-court bankruptcy workout and pre-packaged bankruptcy (which
combines features of an out-of- court restructuring with some of the features of a traditional Chapter 11).
4This analysis neglects involuntary bankruptcy petitions governed by Section §303 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Nonetheless, the prospect of creditor liability for costs, attorney’s fees, damages, and possibly puni-
tive damages makes involuntary petitions one of the lesser-used creditor tools. In particular, involuntary
bankruptcy is most often used when unsecured creditors suspect fraud on the part of a company, such as
when a Ponzi scheme is discovered, or for some other extraordinary reason. Otherwise, creditors will typ-
ically pursue collection of their own claims directly, including through litigation in state or federal court.
That might end up forcing the company into bankruptcy, but technically it would be a bankruptcy of the
voluntary kind. In the data set considered in this paper, 161 out of the 166 les are ‘voluntarily’ bankruptcy
petitions.
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mately, I document that recovery values under Ch 11 are independent on the initial level
of debt (using the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database).
In the theoretical analysis, I show that the model can analytically account for some
facts. I then calibrate the model to the US economy from 1979-2012, and show that the
model can quantitatively account for the remaining facts. To do so, I merge rms’ level
accounting data from Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual with bankruptcy
information from the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.
The main gearwheel of the mechanism is the selection of rms. Changes in the cor-
porate bankruptcy law design directly aect the cost of the debt service and therefore
protability. By doing so, they indirectly aect rms decision to exit, liquidate or reor-
ganize, triggering selection. From this point of view, a novel contribution of the paper
is to investigate the eects of changes in the bankruptcy law design on the cross section
distribution of rms.
In the quantitative analysis, I perform four counterfactuals to study the general equi-
librium implications of changes in the corporate bankruptcy law design.
First, I investigate what would have happened if Ch 11 had never been introduced in
the 1978 reform of the Corporate Bankruptcy Code (Section 1.8.1). Results are striking:
median TFP increases by 1.44%, net output falls by 1% (similarly consumption, by 0.7%).
Second, I quantify the relevance of a particular feature of Ch 11: the debtor in pos-
session nancing - the right to borrow during reorganization (Section 1.8.2). The practice
of debtor-in possession (DIP) nancing boomed with the development of the junk bond
market during the 1990s (Miller [2007]), but it was hit drammatically by the onset of the
nancial crises, when the high-yield bond market froze (Martin et al. [2009]). To study the
general equilibrium implications of this event, I compare the baseline economy with one
where rms cannot borrow during reorganization. Ch 11 becomes less attractive (Ch 11
defaulters drop by 70%). Default becomes more costly: median Ch 11 recovery values drop
by 34%, and the equilibrium average interest rates increase by 6 basis points. Despite TFP
does not vary much (drop of 0.13%), output and consumption fall signicantly (∼ 0.5%)
due to the churning of large productive rms.
In the last two exercises I attack two of the main organizing questions of the last two
decades of corporate bankruptcy literature: Do we need Ch 11 when Ch 7 is ecient
(Section 1.8.3)? What is the optimal level of creditor rights (Section 1.8.4)?
The rst question traces its root back to Baird [1986]: if raising cash for bids were
easy and there were enough competition among bidders, the liquidation procedure would
be a valid alternative to reorganization. The model supports Baird [1986]’s claim. When
the cash-auction procedure is ecient - modelled as a zero cleareance loss upon asset
sales in liquidation - there is a healthy drop in the relative use of the Ch 11 procedure (-
80%). Firms need to be more productive to reorganize and more rms get liquidated. This
eect triggers a positive churning, that boosts median rms TFP (1.3%), output (1.1%) and,
ultimately, consumption (0.6%). On the top of that, I show that shutting down Ch 11 when
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Ch 7 is ecient is less costly.
The last exercise addresses a long-lasting question in the corporate bankruptcy liter-
ature: what is the optimal level of creditors’ rights? Quoting Aghion et al. [1994], a good
bankruptcy law ‘eciently’ balances two goals: 1) the one of maximising the bonding
value of the debt obligation (ex-ante eciency), by adequately punishing the defaulter; 2)
the one of maximising the social value of the rm (ex-post eciency), by minimising the
number of inecient liquidations. In the attempts of isolating an optimal balance5 to this
trade-o, the theoretical literature has either sacriced a general equilibrium perspective
- by restricting its attention to partial equilibrium environments6 - or7 failed to provide
a quantitative advice to the legislator. This exercise complements the literature on both
dimensions. From a general equilibrium point of view, an increase in creditors’ rights -
modelled as a decrease in the bargaining power of rms - has positive macroeconomic
eects: a 10% decrease in the rms’ bargaining power, increases output by 0.9%.
Generally speaking, this paper adds to the macroeconomic literature that studies the
impact of nancial frictions on rm dynamics8, macroeconomic aggregates and total fac-
tor productivity9. Most of these papers appraise default as nancial frictions and, ac-
cordingly, model it in a very reduced form way. Conversely, I take seriously the phe-
nomenon of corporate default, and in the spirit of Chatterjee et al. [2007] I use the lens of
the bankruptcy law to characterise the default options of the rms. By doing so, instead of
indirectly pinning down the nancial frictions in the economy by targeting some aggre-
gate feature of the economy, I directly gauge them down using estimates of the creditors
recovery rates on corporate bankruptcy default.
Together with Corbae and D’Erasmo [2015], this paper rstly investigate in a rm dy-
namic model á la Hopenhayn10 the macroeconomic implications of changes in the U.S.
corporate bankruptcy law - where an increase in the bargaining power of the creditors
yields higher recovery values, upon reorganization. Corbae and D’Erasmo [2015] study
the implication of a longly debated bankruptcy reform suggested by Aghion et al. [1994]
and recently proposed by the American Bankruptcy Institute. As a result, they document
- among other aspects - an increase in consumption (2.32%), output (1.99%) and measured
TFP (1.03%) after the adoption, due to cheaper borrowing, and better allocation of re-
5According to the weight which is put on each one of the two goals the bankruptcy law design classies
as more pro-debtor (softer) or more pro-creditors (tougher).
6As instance, focusing on particular asymmetric information environment, capital structure of the rms,
degree of under-waterness of the rm. See Knot and Vychodil [2005] for a review.
7To the best of my knowledge, Biais and Mariotti [2009] represents the only work that studies the
general equilibrium implications of changes in the bankruptcy law design.
8Among others, Cooley and Quadrini [2001], Jermann and Quadrini [2008], Jermann and Quadrini
[2012].
9Among others, Moll [2014], Midrigan and Xu [2010].
10This paper adds to the vast literature on rm dynamics pioneered by Hopenhayn [1992], in which the
author extends the long run industry equilibrium theory by introducing a concept of stationary equilibrium,
which allows him to investigate the phenomena of entry, exit and heterogeneity in the size and growth rates
of rms.
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sources in the economy.
In line with the ndings of Midrigan and Xu [2010]11, this paper complements the
previous literature on endogenous equilibrium default 12, by gauging the importance of
the extensive margin of entry/exit channel.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the salient features of the U.S.
bankruptcy procedures. Section 1.3 reviews the empirical evidence on U.S. corporate
bankruptcies. In Section 1.4 I introduce the model and in Section 1.5 I dene and char-
acterise the equilibrium. Section 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 perform the quantitative analysis and
Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution authorizes the Congress to enact
uniform federal laws on the subject of Bankruptcies. Under this grant of authority, the
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a system of rules aimed at regulating
insolvent incorporated rms. Pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, corporations can
take debt relief under two court-supervised procedures: liquidation and reorganization.
Liquidation is a cash auction on the assets of the insolvent rm. The assets of the rm
are sold to reimburse the creditors in a precise order: secured creditors, unsecured credi-
tors and, eventually, the debtors. This procedure corresponds to the Chapter 7 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the reorganization procedure disciplines the negotiation pro-
cess between the debtor and its creditors upon a debt haircut and restructuring plan. This
procedure corresponds to the Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code.
1.3 Empirical Evidence
I discipline the theory using a series of facts that relates rms characteristics with ling
decisions and creditors recovery values.
First, I isolate a parsimonious set of facts from the analysis of Bris et al. [2006]13. Ceteris
paribus,
11Midrigan and Xu [2010] show that large dierences in GDP per capita across countries can be accounted
for the presence of nancial frictions which misallocate resources (intensive margin channel), and distort
entry and technology adoption decisions (extensive margin channel). The main nding of their paper is that
the second channel is the one that seems to empirically matters.
12For instance, Arellano et al. [2012] show
13The study covers all the corporate bankruptcies led in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts of Arizona
and Southern New York from 1995 to 2001, made available to the Pacer (Public Access to Court Electronic
Records) service. After cleaning the datasets from cases routinely dismissed or transferred to other courts,
bankruptcy of subsidiaries, pre-packs bankruptcy (lasting as little as 2 weeks) 286 rms survives: 225 reor-
ganization cases (Chapter 11) and 61 liquidation cases (Chapter 7) Bris et al. [2006] p.1256-1257. According
to the authors this is the largest and most comprehensive sample of corporate bankruptcies assembled for an
academic paper, Bris et al. [2006] p.1255.
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• Fact 1. Tiny rms tend14 to le for liquidation (Ch 7), big rms tend to le for
reorganisation (Ch 11).
• Fact 2. More leveraged rms tend to le for reorganisation (Ch 11).
• Fact 3. Creditors’ losses are lower in reorganization (Ch 11) than in liquidation (Ch
7).
• Fact 4. All else equal, creditors’ losses increase in leverage
Fact 1 and 2 organize the evidence which relates the choice of the bankruptcy procedures
to the characteristics of the rms. First of all, the propensity to le for reorganisation
increases with the rm’s size: defaulting rms with assets lower than 100000$ tend to
le for liquidation (Ch 7), while bigger rms ($100K-$1M), tend to le for reorganization
(Ch 11). Secondly, rms leverage matters: upon default, highly levered rms le for re-
organisation15 (Fact 2). Fact 3 and 4 relates creditors losses16 to the type of bankruptcy
procedure and rms’ characteristics, respectively: creditors fare signicantly better in Ch
11 reorganisation rather than in Ch 7 liquidations17 (Fact 3); creditors recover less from
rms that are more underwater (Fact 4).
Second, using the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-2012 I docu-
ment the following fact. Other things equal,
• Fact 5. Ch 11 creditors’ recovery values do not depend on the outstanding liability
at ling date.
In what follows I device a model that explains these facts either analytically (Fact 3, Fact
4, Fact 5, Section 1.5.1) or quantitatively (Fact 1, Fact 2, Section 1.7).
1.4 The Model
The economy is populated by rms, credit intermediaries and a household.
There is a continuum of rms. Firms are run by risk neutral managers which maximize
the expected discounted stream of dividends. They combine capital and labour using a de-
creasing returns-to-scale technology, and experience uninsurable persistent idiosyncratic
productivity shock. Firms articulate in two types: incumbents and entrants.
14In a probit sense.
15Bris et al. [2006] p.1259.
16Creditor losses are measured as the total pre-bankruptcy claim (normalised to 1) minus the recovery
rate. The recovery rates is computed as the percent of the initial claim that is distributed by the court to the
corresponding creditor in the case closure.
17Bris et al. [2006] report a median loss of 21% on the original claim under Chapter 11 versus a median
loss of almost everything under Chapter 7 (Bris et al. [2006] p.1288).
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The incumbents are the producing rms in the economy. They dier for the xed cap-
ital scale of production, the xed productivity and their histories. Incumbents nance
investment and dividends using internal and external funds: retained prots, one-period
non-contingent loans and equity issuance. Incumbents can choose to exit by repaying the
debt or default on it. In accordance with the U.S. Bankrupcty Code, rms can renege on
their debt obligations by ling for liquidation (Ch 7) or reorganization (Ch 11). If a rm
les for liquidation, it relinquishes all its assets and prots (net of a liquidation loss) to
the creditor and exits from the market. If a rm les for reorganization, it (nash-)bargains
with the creditors over a debt reduction. If they nd an agreement, the rm pays back the
debt net of a haircut. During the bankruptcy procedure - which for simplicity lasts only
one period - the rm incurs in a xed cost.
In each period there is a positive mass of potential rms entering the economy with
an initial level of assets and starting production with a time-to-build lag. After drawing
a capital-scale, a permanent productivity level and an idiosyncratic productivity shock,
potential entrants decides whether to actually enter or not. Actual entrants nance the
capital scale by using assets, equity issuance, or debt. The capital scale remains xed over
the rm’s life.
Firms have access to a competitive nancial sector. Each nancial intermediary oers
a menu of loan sizes and interest rates to rms wherein each loan makes zero expected
prots.
In conclusion, there is a representative household that owns the rms. The household
saves in the credit market and supplies inellastically labour to the rm. It consumes out of
the wage income, returns on savings and the aggregate amount of dividends distributed
by the rms.
1.4.1 The Production Technology
Firms use capital, k ∈ K = [kmin, kmax] ⊂ R+, and labour n ∈ N = [nmin, nmax] ⊂ R+ to
produce an homogeneous consumption good y ∈ Y ⊂ R+ using a decreasing returns-to-
scale (DRS) production technology,
y(x, n; k, z) = (zx)(1–αη)(k1–αnα)η
where: η is the decreasing return to scale parameter18; α is the value-added share of
labour; z ∈ Z = [zmin, zmax] is the xed productivity of the rms (drawn upon entry) and
x ∈ X = [xmin, xmax] ⊂ R+19 is an uninsurable idiosyncratic shock. The idiosyncratic
productivity follows a stochastic process dened on the measurable space (X,B(X)) with
18Following Lucas [1978], the parameter (1 – η) is sometimes referred to as the span of control.
19In case xmin = 0 then it is possible that y = 0 in some periods. This creates some problem for the
existence of the invariant distribution. Following Stokey et al. [1990b] and in line with the literature, I
assume xmin > 0.
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transition function Q(x, dx′), where B(·) denotes the Borel algebra on X. As standard in
the literature, I further assume that Q(x, dx′) is continuous on (x, x′), is decreasing in a
rst order stochastic dominance sense on x20, and satises the strong Feller property.
The normalization parameter (·)1–αη on the actual productivity level, zx, ensures that
rm’s prot function after wage compensation pi(x; k, z) is linear on zx,
pi(x; k, z) ≡ max
n
(zx)(1–αη)(k1–αnα)η – wn = zxΘ [,α, η,w(µ)] kγ (1.1)
where
Θ [,α, η,w(µ)] =
[
(1 – αη)
(
αη
w(µ)
) αη
1–αη
]
γ = (1 – α)η1 – αη
and by FOC,
n∗(x; k, z) = zx
(
αηk(1–α)η
w(µ)
) 1
1–αη
(1.2)
As a result, at the optimal level of labour n∗ output equals:
y(x; k, z) = zx
(
αη
w(µ)
) αη
1–αη
kγ (1.3)
The capital scale stays constant over life. Since capital depreciates at rate δ, investment
equals i = δk21. Notice that as a consequence of the DRS technology, the depreciation
process is more expensive for large rms. As a consequence of these assumptions on
the physical technology, big rms have higher productivity in equilibrium (as in Melitz
[2003]).
1.4.2 The Financing Technology
Incumbents nance investment using retained prots, one-period non-contingent loans
and equity issuance22. Entrants cannot resort to retained prots. Let
g(d) =
[
I{d≥0} + ιI · I{d<0}
]
· d
denote the ow of dividends/equity issuance d ∈ D = [d, d¯] ⊂ R23 to/from the household,
with I{y} denoting an indicator function that takes value 1 when y is true. Firms can issue
equity by setting d < 0 and incurring in an additional proportional cost ιI . Following the
20This is a property satised by many processes, especially the rst order autoregressive process. The
higher is the idiosyncratic productivity today, the more likely that it will be higher tomorrow.
21The result follows from the law of motion of capital k′ = (1 – δ)k + i and the fact that k′ = k.
22To maintain tractable the state space, I do not consider the outright hierarchical layers of ownership
(bonds, debentures, preferred equity, common equity) but just a neat pattern of layered debt and equity.
23The interested reader can refer to p. 39 for the precise denition of d, d¯.
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literature, equity issuance is expensive (ιI > 1). This generates nancing decisions that
are in line with the pecking order theory: rms prefer retained prots and debt to equity.
Indeed, the presence of a default option yields a substantial departure of the loan-
market arrangement from the Arrow-Debreu world. In turn this departure formalizes in
the device ofrm specic one-period non-contingent loan contracts,
(
b′, x, k, z, qb′(x, k, z)
)
,
where q : X× K× Z→ Q is the real (vector-)valued pricing function in the space of con-
tinuous and bounded functions C [0,1]b , with Q = [0, qmax]
|B| ⊆ R|B|, 0 ≤ qmax ≤ 1. In
particular, a rm with characteristics (x, k, z) is allowed to save (b′ < 0) or borrow (b′ > 0)
at the price qb′(x, k, z) the amount b′ ∈ B = {bmin, . . . , bmax} ⊂ R where B is a nite set
with cardinality |B|, and with bmin < 0 and bmax > 0. This specication highlights the
dependence of the loan price on three rms’ key characteristics: 1) the actual productivity
zx, 2) the size of assets, k, and 3) the size of the loan, b′. In presence of persistent idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks, if the actual x is high, next period productivity is likely to be
high24 too. In this case, the probability of default decreases, raising the price of debt. For
the same reasoning, a higher permanent productivity z reduces the cost of debt service.
Similarly, rms with more capital have a larger collateral, which tempers creditors’ losses
upon default and therefore price levels. Finally, larger loans increase the probability of
default and reduce the loan price (higher interest rates).
To conclude, entrants face the same loan contracts.
Hereafter I refer to (d, b′) as ordinary decisions to distinguish them from the extra-
ordinary decisions represented by exit and default policies. Firms can choose to exit φX =
1. Upon exit they can choose whether to repay the debt φD = 0 or le for default, φD = 1.
Let Bb(x; k, z), the cash-ow correspondence of an incumbent (b, x, k, z) that chooses
not to default as
{
(d, b′) ∈ D× B : d – qb′(x, k, z)b′ + k ≤ pi(x; k, z) – χo + (1 – δ)k – b
}
(1.4)
The next section explores the set of restrictions imposed by law on Bb(x; k, z) when
rms choose to default (φX ,φD) = (1, 1).
1.4.3 The Bankruptcy Law
The bankruptcy law is a technology that formalizes the legal ways by which rms can
repudiate on their outstanding debt. According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, rms can
le either for liquidation or for reorganisation. Accordingly, I model the default decision
as a pair of indicator functions: (φD,φR). φD captures the willingness to default (φD = 1)
or not (φD = 0). Conversely, the second indicator function determines the form of default:
φR = 1 if a rm selects bankruptcy reorganization and φR = 0 if it selects bankruptcy
liquidation.
24If productivity shocks were i.i.d., the interest rate would not depend anymore on the current x.
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In the model, a bankruptcy procedure is described as: 1) a set of stipulations SR ∈ R2 that
the law imposes on rms’ feasible choices; 2) a legal agreement on the amount of debt to be
repaid; 3) the implications it has for the existence of the rm as a going concern. Hereafter
SRφD ,φR ∈ R
2 denotes the set of restrictions imposed by law on the feasible ordinary choices
of the rm, conditional on the default decision (φD,φR).
Then, I can characterize the budgetary implications of the bankruptcy choice (φD,φR)
as the intersection between the cash-ow budget constraint of an incumbent which does
not want to default (1.4) and the restrictions SRφD ,φR imposed by the law on (d, b
′)25,
BφX ,φD ,φR (b, x; k, z) = Bb(x; k, z) ∩ SRφD ,φR ⊆ D× B
By denition, B0,0,0(b, x; k, z) ≡ Bb(x; k, z) in (1.4).
Bankruptcy Liquidation
When a rm les for bankruptcy liquidation, it does not produce, it is prohibited to con-
duct any ordinary and extraordinary activity26, SR1,0 = ∅. Hence,
B1,1,0(b, x; k, z) = ∅ (1.5)
The creditors seize the collateral of the rm, which consists of both prots and unde-
preciated capital
R7(k) = (1 – ψ)(1 – δ)k (1.6)
suering a liquidation clearance loss ψ ∈ (0, 1), which captures in reduced form the
well-documented presence of frictions in the cash-auction procedure27. In conclusion,
once the rm is liquidated, it exits the market.
25Provided that the loan-market arrangements accommodate the enriched environment, see Section 1.4.2.
26The judge appoints a trustee to work on the interests of the creditors.
27As instance, the nancing problem and the lack of competition problem (See Aghion et al. [1994]). The
rst problem relates to the diculties in raising big amount of fundings in a brief amount time. The second
problem depends on the lack of competition on the bidding sides. See Shleifer and Vishny [2011] for an
amplication of the nancing problem in recessions due to the congestion of the secondary markets (re-
sales).
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Bankruptcy Reorganization
Upon ling for bankruptcy reorganization, a rm cannot distribute dividends28, cannot
save29 suers legal and administrative costs, χb30, and obtains a debt haircut. These re-
strictions formalize31 in:
B1,1,1(b, x; k, z) = SR1,1(b, x; k, z)
=
{
(d, b′) ∈ D– × B+ : δk ≤ pi – (χo + χb) – α∗b(x, k, z) · b + (–d)︸︷︷︸
Eq.Iss.
+ qb′(x, k, z)b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
DIP Financing
}
(1.7)
Notice, rms can borrow during reorganization. The extension of credit to the reorganize
company (regulated by §364) represents a key feature of the Ch 11 procedure, sometimes
referred to as debtor-in-possession nancing (DIP nancing).
In reorganization, creditors receive
R11(b, x; k, z) = α∗b(x, k, z) · b (1.8)
where α : X × K × Z → A with A = [0, 1]|B| ⊆ R|B|, is the real (vector-)valued recovery
rate function. In particular, α∗b(x, k, z) is the recovery rate which is negotiated upon in the
nash bargaining between the rm (b, x, k, z) and the creditors, as explained in details in
Section 1.4.5.
1.4.4 The Decision Problems
The timing of the model unfold as follows: i) incumbents observes the realization of the
productivity shock and ii) decide whether to continue or to exit; iii) In case they exit
(φX = 1) they can choose whether to repay the debt or ling for default (φD = 1); iii.a) if
they le for liquidation ((φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 0)) they do not produce and exit the market;
iii.b) if they le for reorganization ((φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1)), they produce, bargain over
the debt haircut and take nancing decisions jointly with the creditors; if they continue
(φX = 0), then iii.c) they produce and make dividend, investment, nancing decisions;
iii.d) if they exit, they reimburse the creditors with the depreciated capital and distribute
the rest as a dividend.
28The purpose of Ch 11 is to give time for restructuring the business and focusing investment towards
protable products. Therefore, diversions of funds - e.g. in the form of distribution of dividends - are ruled
out.
29These rst two stipulations model the fact that - in order to protect the creditors claims - most
bankruptcy laws do not allow rms to divert funds (by distributing dividends or save). In the U.S., the
privilege of creditors’ claims over the ones of the ling shareholders is invoked by the Absolute Priority
Rule.
30Chapter 11 expenses have two components: debtors’ expenses and unsecured creditors’ committee
expenses.
31Y– = Y \ R++, and Y++ = Y \ R–.
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The Incumbents
A rm is identied as a 4-upla, (b, x; k, z) ∈ B×X×K×Z. Let the (vector-)valued function
v : X× K× Z→ R|B| in the space of continuous (vector-)valued functions V , denote the
expected discounted ows of prots of a rm with characteristics (b, x; k, z). Hence, let
the (vector-)valued maximum operator (Tv)(x; k, z) =
{
(Tv)(b, x; k, z) : b ∈ |R|B|
}
describe
the optimization problem of the rms whose expected discounted prots are evaluated
according to v ∈ V . Then, ∀b ∈ B and for all v ∈ V we have
(Tv)(b, x; k, z) = max
φX
{
VC(b, x; k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation
, max
φD
{
VX (b, x; k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit
, max
φR
{
VR(b, x; k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reorganization
,VL(b, x; k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquidation
}} }
(1.9)
where
VX (b, x; k, z) = (1 – δ)k – b
denotes the value at exit,
VC(b, x; k, z) = max
d,b′∈D×B
g(d) + β ·
∫
X
vb′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′) (1.10)
s.t. d – qb′(x, k, z)b′ ≤ pi(x; k, z) – χo – δk – b (1.11)
denotes the value of continuation, and where I normalise the value of a liquidation
VL(b, x; k, z) = 0.
The reorganization value VR(b, x; k, z) is determined in the nash bargaining procedure
between debtors and creditors, discussed in the next section.
Theorem 1.4.1. i) There exists a unique v∗ ∈ V such that: v∗ = (Tv∗). V is the set of con-
tinuous and bounded functions which satises the monotonicity properties A2-A3 (Appendix
1.A.1, p. 33). ii) The optimal correspondence B∗φX ,φD ,φR (b, x, k, z) is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
1.4.5 The Reorganization Problem
In bankruptcy reorganization, a rm bargains with the nancial intermediaries over the
due recovery rate on the defaulted loan.
Let θ ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of the rms, which is homogenous across
rm types. Let α∗(x, k, z) = {α∗b(x, k, z) ∈ [0, 1] : b ∈ B} ⊂ R|B|, with α∗ : X × K × Z →
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A ≡ [0, 1]|B| ⊂ R|B| be a real (vector-)valued correspondence,
α∗b(x, k, z) = arg max
a∈[0,1]
{
Sf (a; b, x, k, z)θ Sc (a; b, x, k, z)1–θ
}
(1.12)
s.t. Sf (a; b, x, k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus of the Firm
≥ 0, Sc (a; b, x, k, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus of the Creditors
≥ 0 (1.13)
where Sf (a; b, x, k, z) : A×X×K×Z→ R|B| denotes the surplus of a rm which defaults
and les for reorganization (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1),
Sf (a; b, x, k, z) = max
(d,b′)∈D–×B+
g(d) + β ·
∫
X
vb′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)
s.t. d︸︷︷︸
Eq.Iss.
– qb′(x, k, z)b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
D.I.P. Financing
≤ pi(x; k, z) – (χo + χb) – ab – δk (1.14)
and Sc (a; b, x, k, z) : A×X×K×Z→ R|B| denotes the surplus of the credit intermediaries,
dened as the recovery value under reorganization a · b net of the recovery value in case
of liquidation (1.6)
Sc (a; b, x, k, z) = a · b – R7(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Best Interest of Creditors Test
(1.15)
This specication of the surplus of the credit intermediaries formalizes a crucial re-
quirements32 for the court to approve the reorganisation plan. Pursuant to §1129 of Chap-
ter 1133 impaired class of claims or interests ‘will receive or retain under the plan on ac-
count of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the eective date of the plan, that
is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date’34.
It is important to notice that rms and creditors make jointly nancing, bargaining and
dividend decisions in the attempt of maximising the over-all surplus. The possibility of
issuing debt under bankruptcy reorganisation - known as debtor in possession nancing
- has represented an important novelty of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform.
Theorem 1.4.2. There exists a unique α∗, with α∗b(x, k, z) ∈ C [0,1]b (X× K× Z) ∀b ∈ B,
which solves (1.12).
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
In conclusion, let the value function of a rm ling for reorganizationVR : X×K×Z→
32Sometimes referred to as the ‘best interest of creditors’ test.
33Bankruptcy Code, p. 441.
34Clearly, the fact that the outcome of nancial contract reorganization does depend on the liquidation
values of the underlying assets is consistent with the empirical evidence of Benmelech and Bergman [2008].
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R|B| be
VR(b, x; k, z) ≡ Sf (α∗b(x, k, z); b, x, k, z)
1.4.6 The Credit Intermediaries
In the economy there is a competitive nancial sector. Each risk neutral credit intermedi-
ary oers a set of rm-specic contracts
(
b′, x, k, z, qb′(x, k, z)
) ∈ Ω (b′, x, k, z).
Let q : X × K × Z → Q = [0, qmax]|B| ⊂ R|B| be a real (vector-)valued function in
the space C [0,qmax]b (X× K× Z) of continuous functions bounded between [0, qmax], with
0 ≤ qmax < 1. Then, we can dene L : Q ≡ [0, 1]|B| ⊂ R|B| → R|B| as the real (vector-
)valued pricing correspondence (Lq)(x, k, z) = {(Lq)(b′, x, k, z) : b′ ∈ B} ∈ R|B|,
(Lq)(b′, x, k, z) =
1
1 + r b
′ ≤ 0
1
b′(1 + r)Ex′|x
(1 – (1 – φX ) · φD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Default
· b′ + φD︸︷︷︸
Default
(
φR︸︷︷︸
Ch 11
· R11(b, x; k, z) + (1 – φR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ch 7
R7(k)
) b′ > 0
(1.16)
with φi = φi(b′, x′; k, z) i = D, R. In words, rms earn the risk-free interest rate, r , on their
savings (b′ ≤ 0). Conversely, loans’ prices depend on the endogenous probability that the
rm will meet its debt obligation and the recovery rates upon default. In turn the recovery
rates depend on the bankruptcy procedure.
Entrants
There is a large number, M , of ex-ante identical potential entrants that decides whether
to pay or not a xed entry cost, χE.
By paying the entry cost, the potential entrants draw their idiosyncratic permanent pro-
ductivity, z, permanent capital scale, k, and the physical productivity shock, x, from the
probability measure space (X × K × Z,B(X × K × Z),Gx,k,z) where Gx,k,z denotes the
joint probability measure35. Upon the realisation of their idiosyncratic (x, k, z), potential
entrants decide whether to actually enter (φE = 1) or not (φE = 0). If they decide to enter,
then they nance their capital scale, k, by accessing rm specic not contingent external
debt contracts (b′, x, k, z) ∈ Ω(x, k, z)36 and, ultimately, by issuing equity. The problem of
35In the benchmark model I assume that the permanent productivity and the capital scale are drawn inde-
pendently. In the quantitative analysis I relax this assumption and consider the eect of dierent correlation
between the two.
36Notice how the bankruptcy law aects rms entry decision by changing the feasible set of external
nancing opportunities.
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a potential entrant, can therefore be described as
V E = max
φE
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
φE
[
max
b′∈B
g(d) + β
∫
X
vb′ (x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)
]
Gx,k,z(dx, dk, dz)
s.t. d + k ≤ qb′ (x, k, z)b′ (1.17)
g(d) = dI{d≥0} + (ιE · d)I{d<0} (1.18)
Then, by assuming free entry, in equilibrium rms will enter until
VE(w) ≥ χE (1.19)
with equality if in steady state M > 0. Henceforth I will refer to the previous equation
as the free entry condition (FEC). Similarly to Hopenhayn [1992] rms face a xed cost
of entry, but dierently from the seminal paper there is an additional cost of debt ser-
vice, qb′(x, k, z)b′, which is heterogeneous across rms over the (x, k, z) dimensions and
depends on the bankruptcy law.
In conclusion, given the DRS production technology and the proportional investment
cost, δk, rms drawing a high capital scale will be able to nance it only if accompanied
by a draw of a high permanent productivity. In dierent words, in the model economy
larger rms are going to be the most productive ones.
Invariant Distribution
For each (k, z)-type incumbent rm we can dene a transition function GI ,k,z : (B× X)×(
2B × B(X)
)
→ [0, 1] from the state (b, x) to the state Z = Zb′ × Zx′ as
GI ,k,z((b, x),Z ) =
[
1 – φk,zX (b, x)(1 – φ
k,z
D (b, x)φ
k,z
R (b, x))
]
Ik,z
b′ (b,x)∈Zb′
∫
Zx′
Q(x, dx′)
where Zb
′
,Zx
′
are the projections of Z ∈
(
2B × B(X)
)
. This transition function captures
the probability that rms in (b, x) - that do not exit or choose to reorganize - migrate to Z .
Let GE,k,z : X × (B(X)) → [0, 1] be the transition function of a (k, z)-type entrant,
dened as
GE,k,z(x,Z ) = Ik,z
b′ (x)∈Zb′
∫
Zx′
Q(x, dx′)
Let µ a probability measure in the space Λ
(
B× X× K× Z, 2B × B(X× K× Z)
)
of prob-
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ability measures. Then, I can dene the operator (Ψµ):
(Ψµ)(Z ) =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
GI ,k,z((b, x),Z ) µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
+ M
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
GE,k,z(x,Z ) Gx,k,z(dx, dk, dz) (1.20)
1.4.7 The Household
The economy is populated by a unit measure of innitely-lived, identical households, with
preferences over streams of consumption - represented by an istantaneous Bernoulli util-
ity function u(C) - which discount the future at the same rate of the rms, β.
In each period the household is endowed with one unit of time that supplies inelastically.
It further decides how much to consume, C, and how much to lend to the nancial inter-
mediary B′, by solving
VH (B;µ) = max
{C,B′}
u(C) + βVH (B′) (1.21)
s.t. C + qmaxB′ = w(µ) + D + B
where D is the aggregate dividend, and qmax =
1
1 + r , where r is the risk free interest rate.
Then in steady state:
β = qmax =
1
1 + r
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1.4.8 The Aggregates of the Economy
The producing rms in the economy are the incumbents that do not exit or that le for
Ch11 reorganisation37. Hence, the aggregate net output is given by:
Y =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] y(x; k, z)µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
+
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
φX (1 – φD) · (1 – δ) · k µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
–
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] · χo︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maintainance cost of operation
+φXφDφR · χb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Legal cost
µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
–
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] [ιI – 1] · I{d∗<0}µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
– M
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
φE[ιE – 1] · I{d∗<0}Gx,k,z(dx, dk, dz) – M · χE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry cost
(1.22)
The aggregate investment is given by:
I =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] δk µ(b, dx, dk, dz) + M
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
φEkGx,k,z(dx, dk, dz)
(1.23)
and by resource constraint, aggregate consumption is given by:
C = Y – I (1.24)
In equilibrium, by monotonicity of utility function the constraint holds with equality.
Not liquidating incumbents distribute an aggregate dividend/equity issuance:
D =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
[1 – φXφD (1 – φR)] g
(
d∗(x; k, z)
)
µ(b, dx, dk, dz)
+ M
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
φEg
(
d∗(x; k, z)
)
Gx,k,z(dx, dk, dz) (1.25)
Let ab′,x,k,z denote the aggregate amount of rm specic contracts
(
b′, x, k, z, qb′(x, k, z)
)
37Entrants and liquidating rms do not produce.
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issued,
ab′,x,k,z = qb′(x, k, z)b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amount of Loan granted

∫
K×...
Ib′,x,k,zµ(b, dx, dk, dz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Measure Incumbents asking
+M
∫
φEIb′(x,k,z)=b′Gx,k,z(dx, dk, dz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Measure Entrants asking

Then, the total aggregate demand of loan demand in the economy is
Bd =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
ab′,x,k,zµ(b, dx, dk, dz) (1.26)
And in conclusion the aggregate demand of labour equals
Nd =
∑
B
∫
K
∫
Z
∫
X
n∗(x; k, z)µ(b, dx, dk, dz) (1.27)
where n∗(·) is dened in (1.2).
1.5 Equilibrium
Denition. A steady-state competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {w∗, q∗,α∗}, a measure
µ∗, a mass of potential entrants M∗, the incumbents policies {φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗}, the
entrants policy functions {φE,∗, b′,∗e , d∗e }, and the household decisions (C∗,B′,∗) such that:
1. given (w∗,α∗, q∗, v∗), then
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
solve the incumbents problem
(1.9)
2. given (w∗,α∗, q∗, v∗) and
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e } solve the en-
trants problem (1.17)
3. given (w∗,α∗, q∗,µ∗),
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, and B′,∗, thenC∗ solves
the household problem (1.21)
4. given (w∗, q∗, v∗,µ∗), and
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then α∗ is the nash bargain so-
lution (1.12)
5. given (w∗, q∗,α∗),
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then q∗ satises the zero-prot condi-
tion (1.16)
6. given (w∗, q∗,α∗, v∗),
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, then w∗ satises
FEC (1.19)
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7. given (w∗, q∗,α∗, v∗),
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, thenµ∗ = Ψ(w∗,α∗,v∗,q∗)M ,
∀M
8. given (w∗, q∗,α∗,µ∗),
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, and C∗
8.1. M∗ is such that labour market clears, N s = Nd (M∗), where Nd dened in (1.27)
8.2. B′,∗ is such that the loan market clears, Bd = B′,∗, where Bd dened in (1.26)
1.5.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Theorem 1.5.1. Let α∗ ∈ C [0,1]b (X× K× Z) be the solution to the Nash Bargaining prob-
lem (1.12). Then for any (b, x, k, z) ∈ B× X× K× Z, if the nash bargaining surplus
S(x, k, z) ≡ pi(x; k, z)–δk–(χo+χb)+qb∗′(x, k, z)b∗′+
β
ι
·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)–R7(k) ≥ 0
then an interior solution α∗b(x, k, z) exists and equals:
α∗b (x, k, z) =
R7(k)
b
+ (1 – θ) · S(x, k, z)
b
(1.28)
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.
The following corollary follows from inspection of (1.28).
Corollary 1.5.2. Given k, Ch 11 recovery values α · b are greater (equal) to Ch 7 recovery
values, R7(k) (Fact 3).
Proof. In an interior solution S(x, k, z) ≥ 0. Then the result follows by inspection of (1.28).
Fact 3 posits that, ceteris paribus, creditors’ losses in reorganization are lower than
in liquidation. Corollary 1.5.2 rationalizes this result as a by-product of the mathematical
formalisation (equation (1.15)) of §1129 of Chapter 1138, sometimes referred to as the ‘best
interest of creditors’ test. This section requires - as a necessary condition for the judge
to approve the reorganisation plan - that the amount received by the impaired classes
of creditors under Chapter 11 reorganisation to be no less than the amount they would
receive if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.
38Bankruptcy Code, p. 441.
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Figure 1.1: Ch 11 Recovery Value and Debt (Unsecured): Orthogonal Components
Note: The vertical and horizontal axis reports, respectively, the components of chapter 11 recovery value α · b (real total distri-
butions to unsecured non-priority creditors, at confirmation prices) and outstanding debt b (real total unsecured, non-priority
claims, at filing prices) that are not explained by: Average Net Income (average of real net income for last year ending before case
filing and after case disposition), Days in Reroganization, Share of Claims to Secured Creditors over total Assets Petition at filing.
Corr. reports the correlation among the residuals. Source: UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-2012.
Corollary 1.5.3 formalizes another important testable implication of Theorem 1.5.1.
Corollary 1.5.3. α∗b(x, k, z)b is independent of b: the amount to repay does not depend on
the total level of debt, or leverage, but only on (x, k, z) (Fact 5).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.
Once in reorganization, recovery values depend on the ability to generate future sur-
pluses and do not depend on the outstanding debt. This result follows from the forward
looking nature of the bargaining process.
To test this prediction (Fact 5), I collect data from the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database, 1980-2012 and run the OLS cross-sectional regression
(α · b)i = β0 + βb
.108
(.09)
· bi + βI
.487
(.181)
· Average Net Incomei + βX · Xi + 
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where α · b is the real total distributions to unsecured non-priority creditors, b is the
real total unsecured, non-priority claims, Average Net Income is the average of real net
income for last year ending before case ling and after case disposition, and
X = {Days in Reroganization, Share of Claims to Secured Creditors},
is a set of regressors that capture the complexity of the reorganization procedure.
Despite Ch 11 recovery values are highly correlated with the unsecured debtors claim
(0.72), the correlation disappears once we control for rms’ income (and variables that
proxies for reorganization complexity). Figure 1.1 uses the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
to highlights the weak (and statistical insignicant) partial eect of unsecured debtors
claim on the Ch 11 recovery value α · b.
Corollary 1.5.4. Ch 7 and Ch 11 recovery rates decrease with the amount of outstanding
debt (Fact 4).
Proof. By denition, Ch 7 recovery values R7(k) (equation (1.6)) are independent on the
level of debt. By corollary 1.5.3, Ch 11 recovery values α∗ · b are independent on the level
of debt (in an interior solution for α∗ · b). The result follows, by dividing these quantities
by b.
While the fact that Ch 7 recovery rates are decreasing in debt does not come as a sur-
prise, the fact that Ch 11 recovery rates decrease in debt results from the forward looking
nature of the reorganisation process.
Ultimately, Corollary (1.5.3) unveils an important implication of the forward looking
nature of the reorganisation process. Firms with dierent outstanding debt, b, but same
productivity and assets (x, k, z) repay the same amount α∗b. It follows that their value is
independent on the outstanding debt, as captured by the following corollary.
Corollary 1.5.5. If there exists an interior solution for α∗ · b, the value of the rm in reor-
ganisation VR(b, x; k, z) (eq. (1.14)) is independent of b.
Proof. By inspection of (1.14), the value function of a rm who seeks to reorganiseVR(b, x; k, z)
depends on b through α∗b(x, k, z) · b. Since by Corollary 1.5.3 α∗b(x, k, z) · b is independent
on b (in an interior solution) the result follows.
Fact 1 and 2 are equilibrium results, which are quantitatively accounted for in Section
1.7.
1.6 Calibration
The economy is calibrated over the period 1979-2012. One period in the model corre-
sponds to one year. The model has 23, parameters: physical technology (α, η, δ, χo),
1.6 Calibration 21
nancing technology, ιI , bankruptcy technology (ψ, θ, χb), entrants (χE, ιE), discount-
ing (β, r), labour supply, N , and uncertainty {(µ¯ln x , ρln x ,σ), (µG(x),σG(x)), (µG(z),σG(z)),
(κk , kmin) , pX }, whose parameters are discussed, in details, in the next section.
I use estimates or impose restrictions on 12 parameters and structurally estimate the
rest.
1.6.1 Uncertainty
To calibrate the model, let us impose more structure on the uncertainty governing the
model economy.
The log-idiosyncratic productivity shock ln xt follows an AR(1) process
ln xt+1 = ρx ln xt + t+1, t+1 ∼ N
(
0,σ2
)
(1.29)
I approximate the process by a discrete-state Markov chain (9 points), using Gauss-Hermite
nodes and weights and applying the Tauchen and Hussey [1991] weights correction in or-
der to account for the persistency.
For what concerns the uncertainty at entry, Gx,k,z , I make the following assump-
tions: the permanent and persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks are drawn from
log-normal distributions, Gz(µG(z),σG(z)) and Gx (µG(x),σG(x)); the xed capital scale is
drawn from a pareto distribution Gk((κk , kmin). By assuming independence across these
dimensions, I have Gx,k,z = Gr · Gx · Gk · Gz .
1.6.2 Restricted Parameters
I start with the physical technology. Following Gilchrist et al. [2013], I set the value-
added share of labour in the production function α = 0.7, and the estimated decreasing
return to scale parameter η = 0.8539. The real risk-free rate and the annual risk-manager
discount factor are set to r = 0.04 and β = 11 + r = 0.9615, as standard in the literature.
Hence, I normalize the labour supply N s = 1. For what concerns the nancing technol-
ogy, I assume that entrants and incumbents face the same equity issuance cost, ιI = ιE.
I then set ψ to capture the percentage of post-bankruptcy asset value which is lost in the
cash auction procedure due to legal40 expenses or re saling. This operation involves two
complications. The rst one regards the estimate of post-bankruptcy assets, which are
dened as the percent recovery rates by creditors times amount owed to creditors, plus
total legal fees disclosed and reimbursed by the court.
39These parameters are consistent with the literature (e.g. Barseghyan and DiCecio [2011]). In turn,
this parameters specication imply a decreasing returns to scale parameter over physical capital γ = 0.63
consistent with the lower bound of reasonable parameters for the class of Cobb-Douglas production function
(e.g. Arellano et al. [2012]).
40Namely, trustee expenses, accountant expenses, debtor attorney expenses.
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Table 1.1: Parameters of the Model
Physical Technology
α 0.70 Value-added share of labour Gilchrist et al. [2013]
η 0.85 Production Function Returns to Scale Gilchrist et al. [2013]
Financing Technology
ιE ιI Equity issuance cost entrants Restrictions
Bankruptcy Technology
ψ 0.83 Liquidation Legal Cost Bris et al. [2006]
Economy
β 0.96 Subjective Discount Factor FOC
r 0.04 Real Risk-Free Interest Rate FRED
N s 1.00 Labour Supply Normalization
Uncertainty
µ¯ln x 0 Unconditional mean of ln xt Standard
µG(x) 0 Expected persistent productivity ln xt Restriction
σG(x) σ/
√
1 – ρ2ln x Standard deviation of persistent productivity ln xt Restriction
µG(z) 0 Expected permanent productivity ln zt Restriction
σG(z) σ/
√
1 – ρ2ln x Standard deviation of permanent productivity ln zt Restriction
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The reason is that the nal Chapter 7 bankruptcy declaration omits direct seizures of
assets by secured creditors, and therefore impairs the estimation of Chapter 7 creditor
recovery rates. Bris et al. [2006] circumvent this problem providing a pessimistic and
optimistic statistics. Second, in the model there is no distinction between pre-bankruptcy
assets (i.e. assets declared in the initial bankruptcy petition ling as ‘value of assets’) and
post-bankruptcy assets, since the Chapter 7 procedure takes a single period. To control
for these issues, using a brute force approach, I obtain ψ = 0.83 as the arithmetic average
between the median expense to post-bankruptcy asset ratio under optimistic (9.6%) and
pessimistic (100%) estimates41 weighted for the median post-pre bankruptcy assets ratio
Apost
Apre
∣∣∣
X
under optimistic (38%) and pessimistic (0.8%) estimates42 as shown in the formula
(1 – ψ) =
Apost
Apre
∣∣∣
Pess
(1 – ψPess) +
Apost
Apre
∣∣∣
Opt
(1 – ψOpt)
2 =
0.008(1 – 1) + 0.38(1 – 0.096)
2
For what concerns the uncertainty at entry, the initial idiosyncratic productivity
shocks x′ are drawn from the long-run log normal distribution, Gx (0,σ/
√
1 – ρ2x ). Hence,
I assume Gz = Gx , and I discretize the permanent idiosyncratic productivity into 3 levels
associated to the conditional expectation of z falling in one of the following intervals:
[0, x20th], [x20th, x80th], [x80th,∞], where xqth, denotes the qth percentiles. By so doing I
tie the cross-sectional distribution properties of the permanent eciency with the long-
run property of the eciency process estimated in the data.
Table 1.1 reports the parameters restrictions.
1.6.3 Estimated Parameters
I estimate 11 parameters by minimizing the weighted sum of squared residual between a
set of moments computed in the model, m(θ), and in the data, mˆ. I choose 34 moments that
are a priori informative43 about the rms distribution and the phenomenon of corporate
bankruptcy default. Table 1.2 reports the results of the estimation.
1.7 Quantitative Results
In order to test the calibration accuracy, I use the model to replicate the analysis per-
formed by Bris et al. [2006]. I simulate an economy populated by 45397 rms with the
same characteristics of the long run invariant distribution. The number of rms is chosen
such that in steady state I have 286 rms defaulting (0.63% default rate), as in the sample
41Bris et al. [2006], p. 1280.
42Bris et al. [2006], p. 1265.
43Heuristically speaking the moments are informative about the unknown parameter if they are sensitive
to its changes.
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Table 1.2: Simulated Method of Moments Estimation
Target Data Model Parameter Description
Ei[ Exit Rate ] 0.0712 0.0312 pX 0.02 Exogenous Prob Exit
Ei[ Default Rate ] 0.63 % 0.13 % χo 198046.88 Maintenance Cost
Ei[CL/B] 0.16 0.9901 χb 129296.88 Legal Costs
qi,50[α∗] 0.5309 0.6155 θ 0.92 Firms Bargaining Power
Ei[Y /A] 0.32 2.3584 kmin 8632.81 Lower Bound k
σi[B/A| Incumbents] 0.2030 0.2751 κk 0.58 Pareto Exponent Gk
Ei[B/A | Entry] 0.2064 0.9513 ιI 0.60 Equity Issuance Cost Entrants
Ei[V /A | Entry] 4.7208 5.1426 χE 365234.37 Entry Cost
Ei[B/A| Incumbents] 0.1873 0.8661 δ 0.02 Depreciation Rate
σi[B/A | Entry] 0.2435 0.3853 σ 0.17 Volatility of innovation of ln(x)
qi,50[B/A| Incumbents] 0.1247 0.7972 ρln x 0.81 Persistency of ln(x) AR(1)
Note: The rst and second column report the structural parameters of the model and their description. The third column reports
the targeted statistics: E[·] denotes time series averages, while Ei[·], σi[·] and qx,i[·] denote the time series averages of, respectively,
cross-sectional averages, standard deviations and cross-sectional x-percentiles. The Data column reports the moment computed
in the data (rms ratios are trimmed at 1 and 99 percentiles). Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-
2012. The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) nancial (NAICS 52) and public administration (NAICS 92) corporations, American
Depository Receipts (ADR).
documented by Bris et al. [2006].
Hence, as in Bris et al. [2006], I run a probit on the choice of the chapter (dummy equals 1
in case rms choose to le for Chapter 11) over the size of the rms K and leverage B/K ,
and an OLS regression on the creditor total recovery rates over K , B/K and the chapter
choice, Ch 11.
Table 1.3 reports the results. The model is consistent with the fact that bigger and more
leveraged rms tend to le (in probit sense) to chapter 11 (Fact 1 and Fact 2). Moreover,
total recovery rates are higher under Chapter 11 than Chapter 7 (Fact 3) and decreasing
in leverage (Fact 4). Dierently from the data, recovery rates increase in the rm’s size.
1.8 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I perform four exercises. First, I use the model to assess the macroeconomic
implications of the introduction of the reorganization procedure (Section 1.8.1). Second,
I deepen the analysis and look at the economic relevance of a particular feature of the
reorganization process: the debt in possession nancing (Section 1.8.2). I then conclude
by addressing two of the main organizing questions of the last two decades of corporate
bankruptcy literature: What is the optimal level of creditor rights (Section 1.8.4)? Do we
need Ch 11 in a world where Ch 7 is ecient (Section 1.8.3)?
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Table 1.3: Determinants of Chapter Choice and Creditors’ Losses
Choice of Chapter Creditors Recovery
Ch 11 Tot. Recovery Rate
K 7.27 0.105
(0.22) (0.002)
B/K 0.28 -0.027
(0.04) (0.001)
Ch11 - 0.341
(0.002)
1.8.1 The Economic Value of Ch 11
The reorganization process represents the main novelty of the 1978 Corporate Bankruptcy
Code. In this section I use the model to study what would have happened if Ch 11 had
never been introduced. To do so, Table 1.4 compares the calibrated economy, with an
economy without Ch 11. First of all the economy records an important substitution of the
bankruptcy procedure: Ch 7 default rates more than triple.
The cost of debt increases by 5 basis points. Firms demand less labour, causing a contrac-
tion in the number of incumbent rms –1.2%. Because of selection, rms at entry have
to be more productive: median TFP increases by 1.44%. Net output falls by 1%, similarly
consumption 0.7%.
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Table 1.4: Steady state comparison with an Economy without Ch 11
Steady state comparison with an Economy without Ch 11
%
Bankruptcy Composition
Fraction of Ch 7 defaults 250
Debt Schedules
Average Debt Prices -0.06
Firms Distribution
Measure of Incumbents -1.19
Median Employee (per rm) -2.6
National Income Accounting
TFP 1.44
Output (Y) -1.07
Consumption (C=NY-I) -0.72
1.8.2 The Debtor in Possession Financing
The debtor-in-possession nancing (i.e. the right to borrow during reorganization, §364)
was rstly introduced with the 1978 US Corporate Bankruptcy Code. Since then, the prac-
tice has experienced an unprecedented growth, fostered by a vested interest of nancial in-
stitutions on high-yields investment opportunities and the development of the junk bond
market44. Up to the nancial crises, when the high-yield bond markets froze (Martin et al.
[2009]).
This section investigates the general equilibrium implications of shutting down the
debtor-in-possession nancing channel. Table 1.5 compares the calibrated economy with
an economy where rms cannot borrow in reorganization. The reorganization procedure
becomes less attractive than the liquidation alternative: the fraction of Ch 11 default-
ers drops by 70%, while the one of Ch 7 defaulters increase by 25%. As a result, default
becomes more costly: median Ch 11 recovery values drop by 34%, and the equilibrium
average interest rates increase by 6 basis points. Firms demand less labour, at any quin-
tile of the distribution (median -1.2%), causing a reduction in the measure of incumbent
rms (-0.4%). Overall, the steady state level of output and consumption drop signicantly
44“The discovery that vast prots could be made by buying distressed debt began to resonate with Wall
Street. You could buy claims at a steep discount from frustrated creditors and, hopefully, within a relatively
short period, realize double digit returns” (cit, Miller [2007]).
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(∼ 0.5%), accompanied by a drop in average total factor productivity (0.13%), due to the
churning of large productive rms.
Table 1.5: Steady state comparison with an Economy without DIP nancing
Steady state comparison with an Economy without DIP nancing
%
Bankruptcy Composition
Fraction of Ch 11 defaults -68
Fraction of Ch 7 defaults 25
Debt Schedules
Median Ch 11 Recovery Rates -34
Average Debt Prices -0.06
Firms Distribution
Measure of Incumbents -0.39
Median Employee (per rm) -1.20
National Income Accounting
Output (Y) -0.49
Consumption (C=NY-I) -0.44
1.8.3 The Economic Value of Ch 7
If raising cash for bids was easy and there was enough competition among bidders, the
liquidation procedure would be a valid alternative to the reorganization ones (Baird [1986],
Aghion et al. [1994]). Unfortunately, these conditions are often not met.
To study the general equilibrium implications of changes in the eciency of the liq-
uidation procedure, Figure 1.3 plots aggregate output in function of the clearance loss in
cash auction procedures, ψ. When ψ = 0 output [consumption] is 1.1% [0.64%] higher,
suggesting economically relevant gains from reducing frictions in the cash auction pro-
cedure. Table 1.6 explores the rms’ dynamics forces behind this result. First of all, there
is a signicant drop in the relative use of the Ch 11 procedure (-80%). Less reorganization
meets the requirements imposed by the best interest of creditors test (by §1129, creditors
should recover in Ch 11 at least as much as under Ch 7), and more rms get liquidated.
Firms need to be more productive to reorganize. This result in a positive churning eects,
that boosts median rms TFP (1.27%)
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Table 1.6: Steady state comparison with an Economy with ψ = 0
Steady state comparison with an Economy with ψ = 0
Ch 11 No Ch 11
% %
Bankruptcy Composition
Fraction of Ch 11 defaults -81.20 -100
Debt Schedules
Median Ch 11 Recovery Rates 35.10 -
Firms Distribution
Measure of Incumbents 1.72 -0.98
Median Employee (per rm) -2.60 0.94
National Income Accounting
TFP 1.27 0.70
Output (Y) 1.07 -0.06
Consumption (C=NY-I) 0.64 -0.20
In addition, the model supports Baird [1986]’ claim that in a world where the liquida-
tion process is ecient Ch 11 loses economic relevance. To see this, column two of Table
1.6 reports the eect of shutting down Ch 11 in an economy where ψ = 0. The loss in
terms of output and consumption are negligible [and gains in terms of TFP] are negligible
with respect to the ones displayed in the baseline economy (ψ = 0.83, Table 1.4), suggest-
ing that in an economy with small frictions in the cash auction procedure Ch 11 loses part
of its role. Notice that the last estimate is a conservative measure of the value of Ch 7.
Bidders in the model cannot bid for the going-concern value of the rm, and the recovery
value under Ch 7 arise from selling the assets (that are not re-use in a new rm).
To sum up, we draw the conclusion that improvements in the eciency of the liquida-
tion procedure have economically relevant general equilibrium consequences that dwarf
the role of the reorganization procedure.
1.8.4 The Creditor Rights Protection
In the years following its enactment, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code was subject to a harsh
criticism from the credit institutions for its pronounced pro-debtors character.
In this section I investigate the quantitative implications of changes in the bargaining
power of the rm on the economy to shed light on this debate. An increase in the bargain-
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ing power of the rm lowers the expected creditors recovery, making more expensive for
the rms to borrow. All the rest equal, the reduction in the cost of the debt service has a
twofold eect. On one side it makes more dicult for inecient rms to stay, producing
upward pressure on aggregate TFP. On the other side, it produces an endogenous credit
rationing: aggregate debt drops and as a consequence there is shrink in the amount of
rms in the economy. Meanwhile, the reduction in protability reduces the measure of
rms who is willing to enter. All together these dynamics produce a decrease in the wage,
which in turn puts downward pressure on aggregate TFP. To attach some gure to this
reasoning, Figure 1.2 plots the aggregate output in the economy for dierent values of the
bargaining power θ. A 10% decrease in the rms’ bargaining power, increases output by
0.9%. Notice that when the rms’ bargaining power is low enough, output becomes less
sensitive to changes in the creditors rights protection.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper I build and characterize a general equilibrium rm dynamics model in which
the default option replicates salient features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: distressed rms
can voluntarily le either for liquidation (Chapter 7) or reorganization (Chapter 11).
In the theoretical analysis, I show that the model rationalizes the fact that recovery
values under Ch 11 are independent on the initial level of debt (Fact 5), the fact that cred-
itors’ losses are lower in reorganization than in liquidation (Fact 3), and the fact that, all
else equal, creditors’ recovery rates decrease in leverage (Fact 4).
I merge rm’s level accounting data from Compustat North-America Fundamentals
Annualand bankruptcy information from the UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database,
database, and calibrate the model to the U.S. economy from 1979-2012. The model is con-
sistent with the fact that small rms tend to le for liquidation, while big rms tend to le
for reorganisation (Fact 1), and the fact that - ceteris paribus - more leveraged rms tend
to le for reorganisation (Fact 2).
In the quantitative analysis, I use the model to perform four policy counterfactual
experiments.
In the rst exercise, I investigate what would have happened if Ch 11 had never been
introduced in the 1978 reform of the Corporate Bankruptcy Code (Section 1.8.1). Results
are striking: median TFP increase by 1.44%, net output falls by 1% (similarly consumption,
by 0.7%).
In the second exercise, I quantify the relevance of a particular feature of the Ch 11
reorganization procedure: the debtor in possession nancing - the right to borrow dur-
ing reorganization, (Section 1.8.2). The practice of debtor-in possession (DIP) nancing
boomed with the development of the junk bond market during the 1990s (Miller [2007]).
Nonetheless, with the onset of the nancial crises the high-yield bond market froze, dras-
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Figure 1.2: Aggregate output over cash auction clearence loss, ψ
Figure 1.3: Aggregate output over bargaining power of firm, θ
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tically reducing DIP fundings (Martin et al. [2009]). To study the general equilibrium
implication of the junk-bond market freezing, I simulate an economy where rms cannot
borrow during reorganization. The model suggests a drop in the relative use of the Ch
11 procedure (Ch 11 defaulters drop by 70%. Default becomes more costly: median Ch
11 recovery values drop by 34%, and the equilibrium average interest rates increase by 6
basis points. Despite TFP does not vary much (drop of 0.13%), output and consumption
fall signicantly (∼ 0.5%) due to the churning of large productive rms.
In the last two exercises I address the following questions: Do we need Ch 11 in a world
where Ch 7 is ecient (Section 1.8.3)? What is the optimal level of creditor’s rights (Section
1.8.4)? The rst question, traces its root back to Baird [1986]: if raising cash for bids was
easy and there was enough competition among bidders, the liquidation procedure would
be a valid alternative to the reorganization Aghion et al. [1994]). The model supports Baird
[1986] claim. In world where the cash-auction procedure is ecient, there is a healthy
drop in the relative use of the Ch 11 procedure (-80%). Firms need to be more productive
to reorganize and more rms get liquidated. This eect triggers a positive churning, that
boosts median rms TFP (1.3%), output (1.1%) and, ultimately, consumption (0.6%). On the
top of that, shutting down the reorganization chapter when Ch 7 is ecient is less costly.
The last exercise, addresses a long lasted question in the corporate bankruptcy litera-
ture: what is the optimal level of creditors’ rights? The model suggests that, from a general
equilibrium point of view an increase in creditors’ rights - modelled as a decrease in the
bargaining power of workers - is only benecial. A 10% decrease in the rms’ bargaining
power, increases output by 0.9%.
The second chapter of this manuscript challenges this last result. In the paper "Bankruptcy
reforms when workers extract rents" I show that an increase in creditor rights ought not
to increase recovery values when workers extract rents.
By and large the paper highlights sizeable general equilibrium implications of changes
in the corporate bankruptcy law design.

Appendix
1.A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.4.1
The proof is organized as follows45. First, I dene the space V and show that is a complete
metric space (Lemma 1.A.1). Second, I show that (Tv) maps V into V (Lemma 1.A.2).
Third, I show that (Tv) is a contraction mapping in (V , || · ||) (Lemma ). Then, from the
contraction mapping theorem, the result follows (Theorem 1.4.1).
Since (k, z) is drawn at entry and constant for incumbent rms, the proof will proceed
for a given (k, z) ∈ K× Z. For notational simplicity, I will omit the dependence on (k, z).
1.A.1 V is a complete metric space
Proof. Let V dene the space of continuous vector-valued function v : X× K× Z → R|B|
with the following properties:
A1
v ∈ [vmin, vmax]|B| =
[
1
1 – β · ιI ·min
{[
pi(xmin) – χo – δk – bmax +
1
1 + r bmin
]
, 0
}
,
1
1 – β
[
pi(xmax) – χo – δk – bmin + qbmax (xmax)bmax
] ]|B|
where I use the fact that qbmin(x) =
1
1 + r ∀x ∈ X, 0 ≤ qbmax(xmax) ≤
1
1 + r , bmin ∈ B– and
bmax ∈ B+.
A2 Let b0 < b1 then vb0(x) ≥ vb1(x)
A3 Let x0 < x1 then vb(x0) ≤ vb(x1)
Lemma 1.A.1. V is a not empty, complete metric space endowed with the metric:
‖v‖ = max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|vb(x)|
Proof. The proof proceeds in steps.
• V is not empty. Pick any constant vector-valued function v¯ ∈ R|B| such that
v¯ ∈ [vmin, vmax]|B|. v¯ trivially satises the monotonicity conditions A2-A3. Hence
V is not empty.
45The proof draws on Chatterjee et al. [2007].
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• V is a metric space. Let v1, v2, v3 ∈ V and ρ : V × V → R with ρ(v1, v2) =
‖v1 – v2‖. Then:
i) ρ(v1, v1) = max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v1b(x)| = 0
ii) ρ(v1, v2) = max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v2b(x)| > 0
iii)
ρ(v1, v2) = max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v2b(x)|
= max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v2b(x) – v1b(x)| = ρ(v2, v1)
iv)
ρ(v1, v3) = max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v3b(x)|
= max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v2b(x) + v2b(x) – v3b(x)|
≤ max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v2b(x)| + |v2b(x) – v3b(x)|
≤ max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v1b(x) – v2b(x)|
+ max
b∈B
sup
x∈X
|v2b(x) – v3b(x)|
• V is a complete metric space. Let C the set of continuous and bounded vector-
valued functions f : X → R|B|. Then in order to prove that V is a complete metric
space is sucient to prove that V is a closed subset of C , and then apply (an ex-
tension of) the Exercise 3.6.b of Stokey et al. [1990a]. In order to prove that V is
closed we will prove that ∀{vm} ∈ V , with vm →‖·‖ v∗, then v∗ belongs to V . Let
{vn} ∈ V , hence each term vn of the sequence of vectors is continuous on X, and
satises A1-A3.
– v∗ satises Properties A1-A3. Since by A1 vn is bounded, then by Bolzano-
Weirstrass Theorem there exists a uniformly (on X) convergent subsequence
vnk →‖·‖ v∗, which trivially satises A1 (boundedness). Let b0 < b1. Since
vn satises A2 then: vnkb0 (x) ≥ v
nk
b1
(x). Since weak inequalities are preserved
under the limit v∗b0(x) ≥ v∗b1(x), and v∗ satises A2. With a similar reasoning
we can prove that v∗ satises the other monotonicity property A3.
– v∗ is continuous on X. v∗ is continuous if all its |B| components are continuous.
Hence the proof proceeds component-wise.
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Fix b ∈ B. Let
‖vb‖X = sup
x∈X
|vb(x)|
Pick a cauchy sequence {vb} ∈ V . Then for any given x ∈ X, let us look at the
sequence of real numbers {vnkb (x)} (evaluated at x). Then
|vnb (x) – vmb (x)| ≤ sup
x∈X
|vnb (x) – vmb (x)| ≡ ‖vnb – vmb ‖X
Since, by assumption {vb} is Cauchy, then {v
nk
b (x)} is a cauchy sequence of real
numbers. By completeness of real numbers, {vnkb (x)} converges to a limit point,
say, v∗b (x), v
nk
b (x) → v∗b (x). We need to prove v
nk
b →‖·‖X v∗b . Fix  > 0. Since
{vb} is a cauchy sequence, then there exists an N1() such that ∀m, n ≥ N1()46,
we have that |vnb (x) – vmb (x)| ≤

2, or equivalently ‖v
n
b – v
m
b ‖X ≤

2. Now for
any xed x ∈ X and ∀m, n ≥ N1(),
|vnb (x) – v∗b (x)| = |vnb (x) – vmb (x) + vmb (x) – v∗b (x)|
≤ ‖vnb – vmb ‖ + |vmb (x) – v∗b (x)|
≤ 2 + |v
m
b (x) – v
∗
b (x)|
Since vmb (x) → v∗b (x), for any given x there exists an N2(, x), such that ∀m >
N2(, x), we have |vmb (x) – v∗b (x)| ≤

2
47. Since x was arbitrary, there exists an
N2(), independent of x, such that ∀m > N2(), we have ∀x vmb (x) → v∗b (x).
Hence ‖vnb – v∗b‖X ≤ , ∀n > N1(). Since  was arbitrary, the result follows.
Now, ∀ > 0 there exists an N (), such that ∀nk > N () ‖vnkb – v∗b‖X <

3.
Since {vnkb } is a sequence of continuous function then ∀ > 0 there exists a δ()
such that ∀x, y ∈ X with ‖x – y‖E < δ()48 then |vnkb (x) – v
nk
b (y)| <

3.
Hence:
|v∗b (x) – v∗b (y)| = |v∗b (x) – vnkb (x) + v
nk
b (x) – v
nk
b (y) + v
nk
b (y) – v
∗
b (y)|
≤ |v∗b (x) – vnkb (x)| + |v
nk
b (x) – v
nk
b (y)| + |v
nk
b (y) – v
∗
b (y)|
≤ ‖v∗b – vnkb ‖X + |v
nk
b (x) – v
nk
b (y)| + ‖v
nk
b – v
∗
b‖X < 
Since b was arbitrary, then v∗ is continuous on all its components b ∈ B, and
therefore is continuous.
46Notice N1() does not depend on x.
47Notice the weak inequality is preserved when in the RHS we make vmb (x)→ v∗b (x).48Where ‖·‖E denote the Euclidean norm in the normed vector space S (Euclidean Space).
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It follows that V is a complete metric space.
1.A.2 T : V → V
Lemma 1.A.2.1. (Tv) is continuous. on X× B
Proof. Since a vector-valued function is continuous if and only if all its components are
continuous, the proof proceeds component-wise, ∀b ∈ B. Given (k, z) ∈ K × Z the rm
value under liquidation VL(·) and exit VX (·) are constant over X and therefore trivially
continuous. Hence, we just need to prove continuity of VC(·) (value under continuation)
and VR(·) (value under reorganization). Since if b ∈ B– (savings) VR(·) is not dened,
w.l.o.g. I will assume that b ∈ B– when considering φX ,φD,φR = (1, 1, 1).
Let me now introduce some notations. Let (Pv)(x) = {(Pv)(b′, x) : b′ ∈ B}, denote the
Markov operator
(Pv)b
′
(x) =
∫
X
vb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) = (Pv)b
′
(x) (1.A.1)
Given (φX ,φD,φR) let
Fb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) =
g
(
pi(x) – χo + qb′(x)b′ – δk – b
)
(φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0)
ι · [pi(x) – χo – χb + qb′(x)b′ – δk – αb(x) · b] (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1)
be the return function, where I used the fact that rm’s preferences are monotonic in d
to set the constraints in the continuation problem 1.10 and reorganization problem 1.12
binding. Then I can dene the objective function
ω
b′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) = F
b′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) + β(Pv)
b′(x)
Now, let
Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) =
[
pi(x) – χo – φX ,φDφRχb – δk – (1 – φX )b – φXφDφRα∗b(x)b
]
(1.A.2)
denote the net wealth of a rm. Then we can rewrite the budget correspondence
Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) =

{
(d, b′) ∈ D× B : d – qb′(x)b′ ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0){
(d, b′) ∈ D– × B– : d – qb′(x)b′ ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1)
(1.A.3)
or more compactly
Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) =

{
(d, b′) ∈ D× B : Hb,φX ,φD ,φR (x, d, b′) ≥ 0
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0){
(d, b′) ∈ D– × B– : Hb,φX ,φD ,φR (x, d, b′) ≥ 0
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1)
(1.A.4)
1.A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.4.1 37
where
Hb,φX ,φD ,φR (x, d, b
′) = (1 – φX + φXφDφR) ·
[
Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) + qb′(x)b
′ – d
]
(1.A.5)
Ultimately let p(b′, x) = [1, –qb′(x)]. Then, given y = [d, b′]′, I can dene the separating
hyperplane
Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) =

{
y ∈ D × B : p(b′, x) · y ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0){
y ∈ D– × B– : p(b′, x) · y ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
}
(φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1){
y ∈ D× {0} : p(b′, x) · y ≤ (1 – δ) · k – b} (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 0, 0)
(1.A.6)
The proof is organized as follows. First, I show that VC(·) and VR(·) are continuous on
X by Berge’s maximum theorem. Then, since the maximum of two continuous function
is continuous, (Tv)(b, x; k, z) is continuous on X for a given b ∈ B. The proof concludes
noticing that (Tv) is continuous on all its components, b ∈ B.
1. VC(·) and VR(·) are continuous onX (by Berge’smaximum theorem). Given (φX ,φD,φR) ∈
{(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}: 1) I show that the objective function ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) is continuous
on (x, b′) ∈ X× B for (φX ,φD,φR) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}; 2) I show that the correspon-
dence Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is not empty, compact-valued and continuous.
By Berge’s Maximum theorem, it follows that (Tv) is continuous on X.
• 1.1. The objective function ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) is continuous on (b
′, x).
Proof. Since B is discrete, ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (d, x) is trivially continuous on b
′. It re-
mains to prove that ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (d, x) is continuous on x.
Since v ∈ V and Q(x, dx′) satises the strong Feller Property49, then the
Markov operator (Pv) is continuous on x ∈ X.
By Theorem (1.4.2) αb(x) is continuous on x ∈ X. By inspection,
qb′(x)b′ = R7(k) ·
∫
X
IφX ,φD ,φR=(1,1,0)Q(x, dx
′) Ch 7 default
+
∫
X
αb′(x′)b′IφX ,φD ,φR=(1,1,1)Q(x, dx
′) Ch 11 default
+ b′ ·
∫
X
[
IφX ,φD ,φR=(0,0,0) + IφX ,φD ,φR=(1,0,0)
]
Q(x, dx′) Cont. / Exit
49The stochastic kernel Q(x, dx′) is strongly continuous (satises the strong Feller property) if∫
v(x′)Q(x, dx′) ∈ Cb(X) for any v ∈ Mb(X), space of bounded functions (Onésimo and Lasserre [1996]).
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qb′(x)b′ is continuous on x, since v is continuous, and Q(x, dx′) is continuous
on x and satises the strong Feller property (Q(x, dx′) is required to be strongly
continuous). As a result Fb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) is continuous on (x, b
′).
Then, the objective function ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) is continuous on (x, b
′) ∈ X ×
B.
• 1.2. Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is not empty, compact-valued and continuous.
Proof. Since (b′, d) = (0, 0) ∈ Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) for any x ∈ X, then Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
is not empty-valued.
Since X is a compact set and D × B is compact, the graph Bgraphb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) of
Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is bounded, and therefore Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is bounded.
Given (φX ,φD,φR), Since α∗b(·), q(·) are continuous on x we have that H (·)
(equation (1.A.5)) is continuous on (x, d, b′). Let {xn}→ x a convergent subse-
quence (which exists by the Bolzano-Weirstrass theorem). Since Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (·)
is not empty-valued, let us pick a sequence {(b′n, dn)}, such that (b′n, dn) ∈
Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (xn) ∀n. Since {xn} → x there is a bounded set Xˆ ⊆ X which con-
tains {xn} and x. Since Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (Xˆ) is bounded, {(b
′
n, dn)} has a convergent
subsequence {(b′nk , dnk )}→ (b′, d).
Since H (xnk , b
′
nk , dnk ) ≥ 0 for all nk , by continuity and the fact that the limit
preserves weak inequalitiesH (x, b′, d) ≥ 0 and therefore (b′, d) ∈ Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x).
Since x was arbitrary, Bgraphb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is closed and therefore Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is
compact-valued. Then since {(b′n, dn)} was arbitrary, Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is uhc.
The proof that Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is lhc on X follows by direct application of The-
orem 1.2 in Harris [1987] p. 1250. First for a given b′ ∈ B, let
Bb
′
b,φX ,φD ,φR (x) =
{d ∈ D : d ≤ f (x)} (φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0){d ∈ D– : d ≤ f (x)} (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1) (1.A.7)
be the projection of Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) on X for some b
′ ∈ B, where
f (x) ≡ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) + qb′(x)b′
The result follows by realizing that f (x) is continuous in x, and that b′ ∈ B
was arbitrary.
It follows that Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is continuous on X.
50Suppose f : X → Y is continuous on X and Y is compact subset of R. Dene Γ : X → 2Y by Γ(x) = {y ∈
Y : y ≤ f (x)}. Then Γ is continuous on X (Harris [1987]).
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Since for any b ∈ B, (φX ,φD,φR) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}, ωb
′,φX ,φD ,φR
b (x) is continuous
on X×B×D×B and Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) is a not empty, compact-valued and continuous
correspondence, by Berge’s maximum theorem, VC(·) and VR(·) are continuous on
X.
2. max
φX
{
VC(·), max
φD
{
VX , max
φR
{VR(·), 0}
}}
is continuous.
Proof. Let m(x) = max{f (x), g(x)}. Fix x0. If w.l.o.g f (x0) > g(x0) then m(x0) = f (x0)
and the continuity of m(·) on x0 follows trivially. Let us focus on the interesting case
where f (x0) = g(x0). Take  > 0, then there is a δf such that |f (x) – f (x0)| <  for
|x – x0| < δf . Similarly there is a δg such that |g(x) – g(x0)| <  for |x – x0| < δg . Let
δ = min{δf , δg}. Since m(x0) = f (x0) = g(x0) we have that |m(x) –m(x0)| <  whether
m(x) = f (x) or m(x) = g(x) as long as |x – x0| < δ. Since x0 was arbitrary, iterating
the procedure the result follows.
Since b ∈ B was arbitrary, then it follows that (Tv) is continuous.
Lemma 1.A.2.3. (Tv) satises A1-A3.
In this section I prove the boundedness (A1) and monotonicity properties (A2-A3) of (Tv).
In the proof of the monotonicity properties I use the fact that a maximum over a smaller
set is smaller than the one on a larger set.
Lemma 1.A.2.2. (Tv) satises A1 (boundedness property).
Proof. The minimum dividend is given by d = min
{
pi(xmin) – χo – δk – bmax +
1
1 + r bmin, 0
}
and the maximum dividend is given by d¯ = pi(xmax) – χo – δk – bmin + qbmax(xmax)bmax
Then (Tv) ∈ [ 11 – β · ιI · d,
1
1 – β · d¯]
|B| = [vmin, vmax]|B|.
(Tv) satises A2. Let b0 < b1. Then (Tv)(b0) ≥ (Tv)(b1).
Proof. Assume (φX ,φD,φR) = (0, 0, 0). It is easy to see that Wb1,0,0,0 < Wb0,0,0,0, and
therefore that Bb1,0,0,0 ⊆ Bb0,0,0,0. The result follows. Assume (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 1). By
theorem 1.5.1, α∗bb is independent on b. Hence Bb1,1,1,1 = Bb0,1,1,1, and the result follows.
If (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 0) than Bb1,1,1,0(x) = Bb0,1,1,0(x) = ∅ and the result trivially follows.
If (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 0, 0) than Bb1,1,0,0(x) ⊂ Bb0,1,0,0(x) and the result follows.
(Tv) satises A3. Let x0 < x1. Then: (Tv)(x0) ≤ (Tv)(x1).
Let Bb,φX ,φD ,φR (x) ≡ B
(
p(b′, x),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x)
)
. and let us establish the following result
B
(
p(b′, x0),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)
) ⊆ B (p(b′, x1),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)) (1.A.8)
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Proof. For any feasible choice vector y = (b′, d) we have p(b′, x1)y ≤ p(b′, x0)y. The result
follows from the fact that In particular
p(b′, x1)y = d – qb′(x1)b′
= d – qb′(x1)b′ + [qb′(x0)b′ – qb′(x0)b′]
= d – qb′(x0)b′ – [qb′(x1)b′ – qb′(x0)b′]
= d – qb′(x0)b′ – ∆q = p(b′, x0) – ∆q
and that, ∆q = [qb′(x1)b′ – qb′(x0)b′] ≥ 0 by monotonicity properties of the transition
function Q(x, dx′). Then:
B
(
p(b′, x1),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)
)
= {y ∈ R2 : p(b′, x1)y ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)}
= {y ∈ R2 : p(b′, x0)y ≤ Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) + ∆q}
= B
(
p(b′, x0),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) + ∆q
)
(1.A.9)
Then
B
(
p(x0),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)
) ⊆ B (p(x0),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) + ∆q) = B (p(x1),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0))
where in the rst inclusion I use the fact that Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) < Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) + ∆q, and
where the last equality comes from (1.A.9). The result follows.
Proof. Assume (φX ,φD,φR) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}. It is easy to see that Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0) <
Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x1). Then
BφX ,φD ,φR (x0) ≡B
(
p(b′, x0),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0)
) ⊂ B (p(b′, x1),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x0))
⊂B (p(b′, x1),Wb,φX ,φD ,φR (x1)) ≡ BφX ,φD ,φR (x1)
where the rst inclusion comes from (1.A.8). The result follows. If (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 1, 0)
than Bb,1,1,0(x0) = Bb,1,1,0(x1) = ∅ and the result trivially follows. If (φX ,φD,φR) = (1, 0, 0)
than Bb,1,0,0(x) is independent on x and the result follows.
Lemma 1.A.2. T : V → V .
Proof. Putting together Lemma 1.A.2.1. Lemma 1.A.2.2. and Lemma 1.A.2.3. we have
that T : V → V .
1.A.3 T is a contraction mapping with modulus β in (V , || · ||)
Lemma 1.A.3. T satises monotonicity and discounting
Lemma 1.A.3.1. Monotonicity.
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Proof. Let b′ ∈ B, let f , g ∈ V with f ≤ g. Then, by Monotonicity property of the
Lebesgue integral ∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) ≤
∫
X
gb′(x′)Q(x, dx′)
Since this result holds ∀ b′ ∈ B, then (Tf )(b, x) ≤ (Tg)(b, x).
Lemma 1.A.3.2. Discounting.
Proof. Let a ∈ R. Then:
β
∫
X
(fb′(x′) + a)Q(x, dx′)
= β
∫
X
(fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa
∫
X
Q(x, dx′)
= β
∫
X
(fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa
where in the second line I used the linearity property of the Lebesgue integral, and in the
third line the fact that by denition of transition matrix Q(x, ·) is a probability measure.
Then:
(Tv)(b, x) = max
φX
{
max
(d,b′)∈B0,0,0
g(d) + β
∫
X
(fb′(x′) + a)Q(x, dx′) ,
max
φD
[
VX , max
φR
{
max
(d,b′,k)∈B1,1,1
g(d) + β
∫
X
(fb′(x′) + a)Q(x, dx′) , 0
}]}
= max
φX
{
max
(d,b′)∈B0,0,0
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa ,
max
φD
[
VX , max
φR
{
max
(d,b′,k)∈B1,1,1
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa , 0
}]}
≤max
φX
{
max
(d,b′)∈B0,0,0
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa ,
max
φD
[
VX + βa , max
φR
{
max
(d,b′,k)∈B1,1,1
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) + βa , βa
}]}
= max
φX
{
max
(d,b′)∈B0,0,0
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) ,
max
φD
[
VX , max
φR
{
max
(d,b′,k)∈B1,1,1
g(d) + β
∫
X
fb′(x′)Q(x, dx′) ,
}]}
+ βa =
= (Tv)(b, x) + βa
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where the inequality comes from the fact that max{A + βa, 0} ≤ max{A + βa, βa}.
Lemma 1.A.4. (Tv) is a contraction mapping with modulus β.
Proof. (Tv) maps the spaceV inV (Lemma 1.A.2). NoticingV ⊂ B(X) (where B(X) denotes
the space of bounded function), and since by Lemma 1.A.3 (Tv) satises the monotonicity
and discounting properties, then (Tv) is a contraction mapping.
1.A.4 Theorem 1.4.1
Theorem 1.4.1 There exists a unique v∗ ∈ V such that: v∗ = (Tv∗). Moreover: i) v∗ is
continuous and bounded, and it satises the monotonicity properties A1-A3. ii) The optimal
correspondence B∗b(x) is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Since V is a complete metric space (Lemma 1.A.1), and (Tv) : V → V is a contrac-
tion mapping with modulus β (Lemma 1.A.4) applying the Contraction mapping theorem
(Theorem 3.2, Stokey et al. [1990a]) there exists a unique v∗ = (Tv∗). i) follows from the
properties of the space of function considered. The fact that B∗b(x) is compact and upper
hemicontinuous is a direct consequence of Berge’s Maximum Theorem.
1.B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.4.2
Theorem1.4.2. There exists a uniqueα∗ : X×K×Z→ A, withα∗b(x, k, z) ∈ C [0,1]b (X× K× Z)
∀b ∈ B, which solves (1.12).
Since the surplus of the rm is monotonic in d, the constraint in (1.12) is binding. Since
the two controls b′ and a enter additively in the objective function and the derivative is a
linear operator, the problems are separable. Hence we can rewrite the real (vector-)valued
correspondence α∗(x) = {α∗b(x, k, z) ∈ [0, 1] : b ∈ B} ⊂ R|B|, with α∗ : X× K× Z→ A ≡
[0, 1]|B| ⊂ R|B| dened in (1.12) as
α∗b(x, k, z) = arg max
a∈[0,1]
max
b′∈B
{
Sf (a; b, x, k, z)θ Sc (a; b, x, k, z)1–θ
}
s.t. Sf (a; b, x, k, z) ≥ 0, Sc (a; b, x, k, z) ≥ 0
Proof. The proof proceeds in 2 steps. Fix b ∈ B. Then:
1. Claim. For any (x, k, z) ∈ X × K × Z, α∗b(x, k, z) ⊂ R is i) not-empty, ii) compact
valued, iii) upperhemicontinuous.
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Proof. Since [0, 1] is a not-empty, compact valued and continuous feasible corre-
spondence, and the objective function is continuous (product of continuous func-
tions), then by direct application of the Berge’s Maximum Theorem the optimal cor-
respondence α∗ is not-empty compact-valued, uhc and it is contained in the feasible
correspondence [0,1]. Noticing that x was arbitrary the result follows.
2. Claim. Since θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1], then α∗b(x, k, z) : X × K × Z → [0, 1] is a continous
function.
Proof. Since the objective function is strictly concave over the convex-compact val-
ued set [0, 1], α∗b(x, k, z) is unique (Lemma (1.D.1)). Since α
∗
b(x, k, z) is uhc (Point 2)
and single-valued, then α∗b(x, k, z) is a continuous function.
Lemma 1.B.1. If θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1], if α∗b(x, k, z) : X × K × Z → [0, 1] which solves (1.12)
exists then is unique, ∀b ∈ B.
Proof.
α∗b(x, k, z) = arg max
a∈[0,1]
{
Sf (a; b, x, k, z)θ Sc (a; b, x, k, z)1–θ
}
= arg max
a∈[0,1]
NB (a; b, x, k, z)
s.t. Sf (a; b, x) ≥ 0, Sc (a; b, x, k, z) ≥ 0
Let NB (a; b, x, k, z) = Sf (a; b, x, k, z)θ Sc (a; b, x, k, z)1–θ denote the Nash Bargaining prod-
uct as a function of a. NB (a; b, x, k, z) is a continuous function (product of continuous
function) over a compact support [0, 1]. Hence by Berge’s Maximum theorem the optimal
correspondence α∗b(x, k, z) is uhc.
Given (b, x, k, z), NB (a; b, x, k, z) is twice continuously dierentiable with respect to a. To
show the result, we have to prove that NB (a; b, x, k, z) is strictly concave over a ∈ [0, 1].
By taking the second derivative of NB (a; b, x, k, z) with respect to a
∂2NB (a; b, x, k, z)
∂a2
= – ιbθ
[
(1 – θ)ιb(Sf )θ–2(Sc)1–θ + b(Sf )θ–1(Sc)–θ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
– b(1 – θ)
[
ιb(Sf )–θ(Sc)θ–1 + θ(Sf )θ(Sc)–θ+1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0
Hence for a given (b, x, k, z) there exists a unique solution α∗b(x, k, z). Since (b, x, k, z) was
arbitrary the result follows.
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1.C Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1.5.1
Let α∗ ∈ C [0,1]b (X× K× Z) be the solution to the Nash Bargaining problem (1.12). Then
for any (b, x, k, z) ∈ B× X× K× Z, if the nash bargaining surplus
S(x, k, z) ≡ pi(x; k, z)–δk–(χo+χb)+qb∗′(x, k, z)b∗′+
β
ι
·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)–R7(k) ≥ 0
then an interior solution α∗b(x, k, z) exists and equals:
α∗b (x, k, z) =
R7(k)
b
+ (1 – θ) · S(x, k, z)
b
Proof. LetNP(x, k, z) = ι·[pi(x; k, z) – δk – (χo + χb) + qb∗′(x, k, z)b∗′] . For any (b, x, k, z) ∈
B× X× K× Z, taking the log of the objective function and taking partial derivative with
respect to a
θ
∂Sf (a; b, x, k, z)
∂a
1
Sf (a; b, x, k, z)
+ (1 – θ) b
[ab – R7(k)]
= 0
θ
–ιb
Sf (a; b, x, k, z)
+ (1 – θ) b
[ab – R7(k)]
= 0
–ιθ 1
NP(x, k, z) – ιab + β · ∫X vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′) + (1 – θ) 1[ab – R7(k)] = 0
ιθ[ab – R7(k)] = (1 – θ)
[
NP(x, k, z) – ιab + β ·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)
]
ab = 1
ι
[
ιθR7(k) + (1 – θ)
(
NP(x, k, z) + β ·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)
)]
ab = θR7(k) + (1 – θ)
(
pi – δk – (χo + χb) + qb∗′(x, k, z)b∗′ +
β
ι
·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′)
)
ab = R7(k)+(1–θ)
(
pi – δk – (χo + χb) + qb∗′(x, k, z)b∗′ +
β
ι
·
∫
X
vb∗′(x′; k, z)Q(x, dx′) – R7(k)
)
we get the interior solution:
α∗b(x, k, z) = θ
R7(k)
b
+ (1 – θ) · S(x, k, z)
b
1.D Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1.5.3 45
1.D Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1.5.3
Proof. By variable transformation, let us dene S˜f (a · b; x, k, z) = Sf (a; b, x, k, z) ∈ R and
S˜c(a · b; x, k, z) = Sc (a; b, x, k, z) ∈ R as functions of a · b ∈ B+.
Then I can rewrite the bargaining problem (1.12) as
max
a·b∈B+
{
S˜f (a · b; x, k, z)θ S˜c (a · b; x, k, z)1–θ
}
, s.t. S˜f (a · b; x, k, z) ≥ 0, S˜c (a · b; x, k, z) ≥ 0
The (unique-)solution of the transformed problem α∗b > 0 is function uniquely of (x, k, z)
and does not depend on b, which concludes the proof.

chapter 2
Bankruptcy Reforms When
Workers Extract Rents
2.1 Introduction
Do workers’ rents matter for corporate bankruptcy reforms? The main argument in favour
of pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms is that creditors recover more, and therefore lend more.
This paper presents a novel channel through which this argument might break down:
when workers extract rents, an increase in creditor rights ought not to increase expected
recovery values. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms can actually backre.
I start with the theory. Firms le for Chapter 11 (Ch 11) not only to restructure debt
but also to restructure labour contracts1. From this observation, I build a theory where
shareholders weigh the cost of restructuring labour contracts against their claims on the
going-concern value of the rm. In this environment bankruptcy reforms face a trade-
o. A more creditor-friendly bankruptcy law raises recovery values upon successful re-
organizations, but at the expenses of the other stakeholders: workers and shareholders.
Shareholders have less incentives to restructure labour contracts, making more likely that
reorganizations fail and rms get liquidated2. When the drop in the likelihood of success
of Ch 11 is larger than the increase in recovery values upon success, expected recovery
values fall, the cost of debt rises and the bankruptcy reform backres.
The bargaining power of workers determines when this happens. When workers do
not extract rents, restructuring labour contracts does not aect the success of the reor-
ganization. Conversely, when workers extract a lot of rents, failing to restructure labour
contracts can prevent the rm from regaining economic soundness, and cause the reorga-
nization to fail3. As a result, the eect of bankruptcy reforms on credit markets depends
1In U.S. corporations can ask for debt relief under Chapter 7 (Ch 7) - which disciplines the liquidation
of the assets of the rm and ends with its dissolution - and Chapter 11 (Ch 11) - which disciplines the
reorganization process among the stakeholders - bondholders, shareholders and workers - in the attempt
of preserving the corporation as a going concern. Under Ch 11 a debtor is granted the possibility to reject
any executory contract bondage that impairs the rm viability (§365 (a)). These contracts include debt
obligations but, by far, do not reduce to them.
2By law, when a Chapter 11 reorganization fails, the case is converted to Chapter 7.
3The bankruptcy experiences of Delta Airlines and Hostess-Brands are illustrative in this sense. Both
corporations led for Ch 11 to reduce labour expenses, but the latter failed to nd an agreement with the
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on the bargaining power of workers.
To study the implications of bankruptcy reforms for economic activity, I propose a
static model where resources are misallocated from their productive alternative because
of an enforcement constraint, which I microfound using the corporate bankruptcy law.
The expected recovery upon default determines the ex-ante lending, and the fraction of
resources that are misallocated. I use this framework to answer analytically a norma-
tive question: what is the optimal level of creditor rights? For a given bargaining power
of workers, the optimal (output maximizer) level of creditor rights weighs the benet of
higher recovery values upon successful reorganizations against a lower likelihood of suc-
cess of the procedure. Since restructuring labour contracts matters more (for the success
of Ch 11) as workers rents increase, the optimal level of creditor rights decreases with the
bargaining power of workers.
The model illustrates how the bankruptcy law aects credit markets through the labour
and debt restructuring activity, and how workers’ rents alter this linkage. I call this chan-
nel the restructuring channel.
I turn to facts. In the late 90s the U.S. shifted towards a more pro-creditor bankruptcy
reorganization process. I use this legal experiment to test the theory in the data. The
empirical question is whether the shift in creditor rights protection aected in the same
way rms facing dierent bargaining power of workers. To address it, I exploit two sources
of variation: historical dierences in the degree of unionization across states, and the
change in the creditor rights protection regime. The analysis uses rm level accounting
data from Compustat, bankruptcy information from UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research
Database , and a proxy for the bargaining power of workers from the Union Membership
and Coverage database (CPS) , for the period 1979-2012.
I identify the break in the creditor rights protection regime in 1998 as the structural
change in the relative use of the Ch 11 procedure with respect to the liquidation alterna-
tive, Ch 7. The break is associated with a drop in the likelihood of success of Ch 11 (from
95% to 92%), driven by highly unionized rms (from 96% to 92%). In the same spirit, Ch
11 becomes less attractive than Ch 7, especially for rms in highly unionized states. At
the country level, rms experienced a dramatic deleveraging (–28%), mainly concentrated
among highly unionized rms (–43%). Besides, dividend yields halved, and the Tobin-Q
cross-sectional volatility tripled, again with signicant dierences across regions. Using
regression techniques, I control for many sources of bias impairing the previous descrip-
tive statistics analysis. The results hold through.
To study the positive implications of bankruptcy reforms, I build and characterize a
general equilibrium dynamic model with heterogenous rms and default in equilibrium,
where the default options capture salient features of the U.S. corporate bankruptcy law.
I model the reorganization problem among the rms’ stakeholders - shareholders, bond-
unions. While Delta airlines emerged on april 2007 with a 20% reduction in the employees and an healthier
nancial structure, Hostess Brand assisted at the piece-meal sale of its popular brands.
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holders and workers - as a two stage Nash bargaining over labour and debt contracts, and a
restructuring eort decision of the shareholders. Shareholders bargain rst with workers
and then with creditors. The rationale behind this assumption is legal. The U.S. Corporate
bankruptcy law recognizes higher priority to workers over creditors on the rm surplus4.
The consequence of this assumption is economic. Shareholders use the threat of liquida-
tion in the second stage to reduce the bargaining position of workers in the rst stage.
The success of the reorganization process is stochastic and depends on the restructuring
eort that shareholders decide to exert when bargaining with workers. In case of failure,
the case is converted to Ch 7.
I conclude with policy counterfactual experiments. I calibrate the dynamic model to the
U.S. economy from 1979 to 1998 to assess the macroeconomic and rm level implications
of changes in the bankruptcy law. Then, I run two experiments.
In the rst experiment, I examine the eects of the shift in creditor rights protection
regime experienced by the U.S.. I discipline the increase in creditor rights to match the
likelihood of success of Ch 11 in the post-break period. The model predicts changes in
rms’ bankruptcy choices and nancial structure which are consistent with the data. In
the model economy, the shift does not produce signicant changes in aggregate TFP, out-
put, and consumption, but has seizable regional eects: output increases in lowly union-
ized regions by 0.60% and decreases in highly unionized region by 0.36%. Consumption
displays a similar behaviour.
In a second experiment, I try to attach a value to the bankruptcy reorganization proce-
dure. The motivation rests on historical reasons. Ch 11 was introduced in 1978, with the
enactment of the Corporate Bankruptcy Code. What if it had never been introduced? The
model records a sizeable deleveraging (-20%) and drop in the dividend-price ratio (80%),
driven by lowly unionized rms. Despite consumption and output would have barely
changed in aggregate (–0.11%), the regional dynamics would have been dramatically dif-
ferent: output would have been 14% lower in highly unionized states, and 24% higher in
lowly unionized ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. Section
2.3 organizes the empirical evidence. Section 2.4 lays out the Static Model. Section 2.5
builds up the Dynamic Model. Section 2.6 performs the Quantitative Analysis, and Section
2.9 concludes.
4§507 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper seats in the nexus between the macro-nance5 and the corporate-bankruptcy
literature. It contributes to recents macroeconomic studies of the interaction between
the labour and credit market in presence of limited commitment6, by foregrounding a
novel mechanism within the lines7 of the U.S. corporate bankruptcy law: the restructuring
channel. As in these papers, the mechanism works through a collateral constraint, but
its legislative hallmark allows me to study the eect of changes in the law on economic
activity8. As in Biais and Mariotti [2009]9, the nal eect of bankruptcy reforms depends
on the interplay between the credit and labour market. In both frameworks pro-creditor
bankruptcy reforms can backre, but for dierent reasons10: while in Biais and Mariotti
[2009] an increase in creditor rights yields higher expected recovery values (for a xed
wage), it ought not to be the case in my framework.
In this respect, the paper also departs from Corbae and D’Erasmo [2015]11 and Peri
[2015]12 - which, in the spirit of Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull [2007], rstly
5In particular, the macroeconomic literature that studies the impact of nancial frictions on rm dy-
namics. Among others, Cooley and Quadrini [2001], Jermann and Quadrini [2008], Jermann and Quadrini
[2012].
6Michelacci and Quadrini [2009] rstly studies the interaction between nancial frictions and the labour
markets in order to explain a few stylized facts about wages and rm dynamics. Hence Monacelli et al. [2011]
looks at the business cycle implications of the presence of search friction under limited enforcement of debt
contracts for the (un)employment uctuations. In conclusion, Quadrini and Sun [2015] studies in a rm
dynamic framework the use of capital structure policy to lower the hiring cost of the workers and provide
empirical evidence of a strong correlation between hiring growh and debt growth, which increases with a
proxy of the bargaining power of workers.
7In particular, §365 of Ch 11 of the U.S. corporate Bankruptcy law. Despite the restructuring of labour
contract is a well established phenomenon in the bankruptcy literature (among others, Geva [2012]), it has
not received the same attention by the economic literature.
8Hints on this nexus between bankruptcy and economic growth can already be found in La Porta et al.
[1997, 1998], where nancial development is partially proxied by variables that measure the eciency of
bankruptcy laws and the extent they protect the rights of the creditors. The seminal papers La Porta et al.
[1997, 1998] pioneered the burgeoning literature that investigates the implications of institutions and regu-
lations on the development of nancial and credit markets. They nd that better institutions and regulations
are crucial to establish well-functioning nancial and credit markets. Following, King and Levine [1993] and
Rajan and Zingales [1998] document that improvements in the nancial and credit markets foster economic
growth, an idea that traces back to Schumpeter (1911).
9To the best of my knowledge, Biais and Mariotti [2009] represents the rst attempt to study the general
equilibrium implications of changes in the bankruptcy law, and the rst attempt to illustrate how bankruptcy
laws aect economic activity by altering the general equilibrium linkage between the credit market and
labour market.
10In Biais and Mariotti [2009] theory a more pro-creditors bankruptcy law foster investment and labour
demand, driving up wages and reducing protability. This generates a trade-o, for which soft-laws can
generate more utilitarian welfare than tough laws.
11Corbae and D’Erasmo [2015] investigates in a fully edged rm dynamic model the macroeconomic
implication of a longly debated bankruptcy reform suggested by Aghion et al. [1994] and recently proposed
by the American Bankruptcy Institute. As a result, they document - among other aspects - an increase in
consumption (2.32%), output (1.99%) and measured TFP (1.03%) after the adoption, due to cheaper borrowing,
and better allocation of resources in the economy.
12Peri [2015] tries to identify the channels through which changes in the actual bankruptcy law design
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investigate in a rm dynamic model á la Hopenhayn13 the macroeconomic implications
of changes in the U.S. corporate bankruptcy law - where an increase in the bargaining
power of creditors yields higher recovery values. By breaking the identity between stake-
holders14 and stockholders15 (enlarging the denition of stakeholders to include workers),
and modelling the bargaining over labour contracts, expected recovery values can actually
drop.
The focus on the misallocation of resources in the static model adds to the literature
pioneered by Erosa and Cabrillana [2008]. As in Moll [2014]16, I investigate in a tractable
framework the sources of misallocation in an economy where the severity of the nancial
frictions is pinned down by the court-supervised bankruptcy process and the bargaining
power of workers.
The empirical analysis complements the ndings of Klasa et al. [2009]and Matsa [2010]17
- which nd that highly unionized rms tend to be more leveraged and to herd less on cash
(than lowly unionized) - and the suggestive evidence of Quadrini and Sun [2015]18 - which
nd a positive correlation between employment growth and debt growth that is increas-
ing in the level of unionization - by studying the eect of bankruptcy reforms on rms’
bankruptcy choices and nancial structure when workers extract rents.
In conclusion, I provide statistical support of the narrative approach followed by the
bankruptcy literature - which has highlighted a shift in the creditor rights protection
regime in the late 90s19 - by identifying a break in the relative use of the Ch 7 and Ch
11 procedures by publicly listed rms in 1998.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
In the late 90s the U.S. shifted towards a more pro-creditor bankruptcy reorganization
process. When did the shift in creditor rights protection regime happen? How did it aect
might aect TFP. Among others, I found that changes in the bankruptcy law that reduce the eciency of
liquidation aect TFP through the negative eect it exerts on large rms, despite large rms tend not to
le for Ch 7. In doing so, I foreground a close relation between recovery value under Ch 11 and the equity
issuance cost of the rm, which works through the forward looking nature of the debt restructuring process.
13This paper adds to the vast literature on rm dynamics pioneered by Hopenhayn [1992], in which the
author extends the long run industry equilibrium theory by introducing a concept of stationary equilibrium,
which allows him to investigate the phenomena of entry, exit and heterogeneity in the size and growth rates
of rms.
14Stakeholders are formally dened as the agents that have an economic interest in the corporation.
15Namely, bondholders and shareholders
16Moll [2014] studies the eect of nancial frictions on capital misallocation and aggregate productivity.
17Klasa et al. [2009] and Matsa [2010] study, respectively, the strategic use of corporate cash holdings
and capital structure in collective bargaining with labor unions.
18Quadrini and Sun [2015] studies how workers extract rents aect rms’ hiring choices in a dynamic
model where rms use leverage to reduce the bargaining position of the workers at the cost of a higher
likelihood of distress (the bargaining channel).
19Among others, Warren [1999] and Miller [2007].
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the bankruptcy phenomenon and corporate structure of rms facing dierent bargaining
power of workers?
I answer these questions by collecting rm level accounting data from Compustat
North-America Fundamentals Annual , bankruptcy information from the UCLA LoPucki
Bankruptcy Research Database and a proxy for the bargaining power of workers from the
Union Membership and Coverage database (CPS)20, for the period 1979-2012.
2.3.1 The Shift in the Creditor Rights Protection Regime
Ch 11 looks nowadays more creditor-friendly than it did 30 years ago21: when did the
shift in creditor rights protection regime happen? Since an increase in creditor rights
makes the reorganization procedure less attractive than its liquidation alternative, I iden-
tify the shift as the structural break in the relative use of the bankruptcy procedures. Two
bankruptcy ling regimes emerge from the plot of annual lings for Ch 7 liquidation and
Ch 11 reorganization by publicly traded rms from 1979 to 2012 (Fig. 2.3.1, Compustat
data): while Ch 11 lings dominates Ch 7 lings in the pre-1998 period22, the liquidation
alternative is steadily more attractive in the ever after. The Quandt-likelihood-ratio test -
for the presence of a structural break at an unknown date in the number of annual Ch 11
lings - corroborates the eye-ball inspection of a break in 1998 (Fig. 1.B.2).
The legal literature substantiates this nding (narrative approach). Warren [1999] and
Miller [2007] explanations point at nancial institutions lobbying for their bankruptcy
agenda in 1997-199823.
2.3.2 Shift in Creditor Rights protection and the Bargaining Power
of Workers
How did the shift in creditor rights aect rms facing dierent bargaining power of work-
ers? To answer this question I exploit two sources of variation: historical dierences in the
20The interested reader can refer to Appendix 1.A for a detailed description of the data.
21Baird and Rasmussen [2003], Ayotte and Morrison [2009] sustain that the reorganization process is
now in the hands of the creditors. Warren and Westbrook [2003] pushes this argument further, by claiming
that the debt-in-possession era has meet his end at the hands of the secured-party-in-possession era.
22With the exception of 1979-1980, Ch 11 lings always exceeds Ch 7 lings.
23In Warren [1999], professor at Harvard Law School Elizabeth Warren says and I quote ‘According to the
New York Times [K.Q. Seelye, "House to Vote Today on Legislation for Bankruptcy Overhaul" New York Times (9
June 1998) A18. 6.], nancial institutions spent, in 1997 alone, about 40 million lobbying for their bankruptcy
agenda - an amount matched only by the enormous tobacco lobby. One can only dream about how many
millions were spent when lobbying intensied during 1998.’. Miller [2007] reinforces this argument, arguing
that these eorts have been channelled not only in the consumer bankruptcies but also on provisions related
to Ch 11 reorganization. These provisions became statutory with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in 2004.
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Figure 2.3.1: Annual Ch 7 and Ch 11 filings
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012. The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) financial (NAICS
52) and public administration (NAICS 92) corporations, American Depository Receipts (ADR).
degree of unionization across states (geographical dimension), and the shift in the creditor
rights protection regime (time dimension).
The U.S. Unionization Regions
I proxy the bargaining power of workers with the unionization coverage - the fraction of
all employed civilian wage and salary workers covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment (Current Population Survey (CPS)) - of the U.S. state where the firm’s headquarter is
located. I then organize U.S. states in two regions based on their historical levels of union-
ization. I assign states to the highly [lowly] unionized region if their 1983-2014 average
coverage is above [below] the median of the U.S. states 1983-2014 average coverages. Fig-
ure 2.3.2 displays the results: highly unionized region in dark-blue and lowly unionized
region in light-blue.
The stability of the cross-sectional standard deviation of the U.S. states unionization
coverage over time suggests that the cross-sectional long-run unionization coverage rank-
ings was preserved over time (Figure 1.B.3, Appendix 1.B.2).
Firm bankruptcy choices, by unionization region.
How did the shift in creditor rights affect the bankruptcy phenomenon of firms facing
different bargaining power of workers? I answer this question in two steps.
First, I restrict the attention to the population of publicly listed firms in bankruptcy
reorganization (UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database).
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Figure 2.3.2: Time series average coverage rate by unionization region over the period
1983-2014
Note: U.S. States organized in highly unionized (13.9%, dark blue) and lowly unionized (6.7%, light blue) region. Source: Union
Membership and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
Table 2.3.1: Share of Successful Reorganizations Ch 11
Share of Successful Reorganizations Ch 11 1979-1998 1999-2012 1979-2012
Aggregate 0.9511 0.9201*** 0.9296
Highly Unionized region 0.9661 0.9191 ** 0.9310
Lowly Unionized region 0.9440 0.9208 ** 0.9288
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, one-sided mean-comparison t test (Welch)
Note: The two-way table reports the ratio of the Ch 11 filings that are not converted to Ch 7 over the total number of Ch 11 filings
for different regions (rows) and time periods (columns). Regions: the aggregate economy (row 1), highly unionized region (row 2),
lowly unionized region (row 3); Time periods: Ch 11 cases that have been disposed in the pre-shift period (Column 1), post-shift
period (Column 2) and the whole analysis period (Column 3). Source: UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-2012.
The data-set is purged by involuntary filings, prepackaged cases, dismissals, and missing data.
The restructuring channel predicts that an increase in creditor rights reduces the in-
centives of shareholders to restructure labour contracts and makes more likely that re-
organizations fail (intensive margin channel). In addition, the likelihood of success of Ch
11 should drop more as the bargaining power of worker increase, and a successful re-
structuring of labour contracts is required for the reorganization to succeed. To test these
implications, I report the fraction of Ch 11 cases that are not converted to Ch 7 before and
after the break, in aggregate and by unionization region (Table 2.3.1). In line with the legal
literature, I document an economy-wide decrease in the likelihood of success of the Ch 11
procedure. I then complement the existing evidence, by documenting a larger drop in the
likelihood of success of Ch 11 in the highly unionized region. The theory I will develop
later is in line with this empirical evidence.
Second, I restrict the attention to the population of publicly listed firms in bankruptcy
reorganization and liquidations (Compustat).
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The restructuring channel predicts that an increase in creditor rights makes Ch 11 less
attractive than Ch 7 (extensive margin channel), especially when workers extract a lot of
rents, and restructuring labour contracts is key to regain economic soundness. In line
with the theory, Figure 2.3.2 shows that after the break the relative use of Ch 11 drops
significantly more for firms in the highly unionized region (red line).
Figure 2.3.3: Fraction of Ch 11 cases over total default, by unionization region
Note: Ratio of Ch 11 cases over total default (Ch 7 + Ch 11), in the lowly unionized region (blue), and highly unionized region (red).
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-2012. The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) financial (NAICS
52) and public administration (NAICS 92) corporations, American Depository Receipts (ADR).
Firm balance-sheets, by unionization region.
Table 2.3.2 takes a snapshot of the firms’ distribution by unionization region, in aggregate,
and for the time-windows of interest: pre-shift, post-shift and 1979-2012.
Few facts emerge. The median leverage decreased by 27% in the U.S., led by firms in
highly unionized states (-43%). If any, leverage slightly increases in the lowly unionized
area (1.3%). Similar behaviour for the dividend price ratio, that experienced a 46% drop
at the country level, with firms in the highly unionized region on the driving seat (51%
drop). While the median Tobin-q (market value of the firm over asset value) increases by
almost 19% at any geographical level, the volatility more than quadruple at the country
level, driven by firms in the lowly unionized region. In conclusion, labour productivity
increased by almost 50% (median), and doubled its dispersion, without significant regional
differences.
2.3.3 Regression Analysis
This section attempts to isolate the effect of the shift in creditor rights, by controlling for
endogeneity issues that impairs the previous descriptive statistics analysis. Because of the
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Table 2.3.2: Firm balance-sheets, by unionization region
1979-1998 1999-2012 1979-2012
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
Leverage 0.1853 0.1360 0.1859 0.1865 0.0985 0.2321 0.1873 0.1247 0.2030
Lowly Unionized 0.2054 0.1635 0.1939 0.2263 0.1657 0.2410 0.2152 0.1678 0.2118
Highly Unionized 0.1745 0.1232 0.1799 0.1665 0.0702 0.2224 0.1733 0.1065 0.1955
Dividend Price Ratio 0.0082 0.0013 0.0140 0.0044 0.0000 0.0120 0.0061 0.0006 0.0129
Lowly Unionized 0.0078 0.0010 0.0143 0.0054 0.0000 0.0143 0.0066 0.0005 0.0146
Highly Unionized 0.0086 0.0016 0.0141 0.0042 0.0000 0.0111 0.0061 0.0007 0.0124
Tobin-Q 1.6140 0.9033 2.1469 2.8728 1.0786 8.5315 2.7442 1.0667 7.7504
Lowly Unionized 1.3677 0.7849 1.8287 2.6398 0.9351 8.3024 2.5188 0.9191 7.6358
Highly Unionized 1.7408 0.9789 2.2659 2.5643 1.1563 5.8050 2.4871 1.1453 5.3403
Labour Productivity 1.9884 1.4255 2.1400 3.2138 2.0986 4.2002 2.4245 1.6811 2.8542
Lowly Unionized 2.1660 1.3977 2.5805 3.8110 2.1136 5.3781 2.7132 1.6625 3.5065
Highly Unionized 1.9016 1.4427 1.8717 2.9852 2.1433 3.5005 2.2898 1.7043 2.4450
Note: The table reports values of the panel average, median and standard-deviation of the statistic reported in the row at dierent
geographical level (Aggregate, Lowly Unionized, and Highly Unionized Region) for the pre-shift period (1979-1998), post-shift
period (1999-2012), and the whole period (1979-2012). Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-2012. Union
Membership and Coverage database (CPS). The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) nancial (NAICS 52) and public administration
(NAICS 92) corporations, American Depository Receipts (ADR). It also excludes observations with missing State eld.
absence of a control group, these ndings do not have a causal interpretation and should
be interpreted as suggestive.
The analysis is arranged in two layers. To motivate the question, I use state-level
data and contrast the eect of the shift in creditor rights protection regime on labour
productivity in highly and lowly unionized states. To substantiate the mechanism against
competing hypothesis, I turn to rm-level data and investigate the impact of the shift on
rms’ bankruptcy outcomes, bankruptcy choices, leverage, and labour productivity.
Table 2.3.3 organizes the results accordingly. The analysis uses annual data over the period
1983-2012 from Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual and the Union Member-
ship and Coverage database (CPS)24.
State-level Analysis
Table 2.3.3 Column 1 reports estimates of the following di-in-di regression
ln Yt,s
Lt,s
= α + βU · dU + β>1998 · d>1998 + β>1998,U · d>1998 · dU
+ ln Yt–1,s
Lt–1,s
+ σ′Xt,s + αtdt + αsds
24The interested reader can refer to Appendix 1.A for a detailed description of the data.
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Table 2.3.3: Main Results
State Level Firms Level
Labour Productivity Bankruptcy Choice Leverage Labour Productivity
Likelihood Success Ch 11/Ch 7
d>1998 0.141∗∗∗ 1.516 8.306∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.038) (0.924) (3.926) (0.009) (0.010)
d>1998 · dU -0.099∗∗ -5.169∗∗∗ -3.005∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.047) (0.960) (1.532) (0.011) (0.013)
Trend No No No Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No Yes No No
State dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Firms Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,477 300 177,988 148,949 140,847
βˆ>1998 + βˆ>1998,U 0.042 -3.653 5.301 0.066 -0.013
s.e. 0.05 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.01
Regression coecients, Standard error clustered at state level in parenthesis
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Regressions are organized in two panels: State Level and Firms Level. State Level: Column (1) - Aggregate Labour Pro-
ductivity: Blundell-Bond two-steps estimates of the log of state level labour productivity, ln Yt,s/Nt,s over: 1) Treatment variables:
structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herndhal index of sectoral
concentration (sector real sales shares unit), number of rms, Nt,s . Time and states xed eects are reported. Instruments: 1) GMM
type: up to 3 lags of the dependent variable and continuous covariates; 2) iv-type: dU , d>1998, and d>1998 ·dU . Firms Level: Column
(2) - Likelihood of Success of Ch 11: Probit of Ch 11 (=1) vs. Chapter 7 (=0) over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998,
unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 ·dU ; 2) Firms level controls: log real total assets, at,i/Pt , leverage, bt,i/at,i . Column
(3) - Bankruptcy Choice: Multinomial logit regressions of rms continuation choice φ = {Continuation, Ch 7, Ch 11} over: 1)
Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) Country level controls: level
of union coverage, Covt ; 3) State level controls: aggregate real sales, Yt,s , Herndhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real
sales shares unit), employment shares by sector (naics), level of union coverage, Covt,s , interaction terms: dU ·Covt,s , d>1998 ·Covt,s ,
d>1998 · dU · Covt,s ; 4) Firms level controls: real sales, yt,i/Pt , leverage, bt–1,i/at–1,i , real total assets, at,i/Pt ; 5) Fixed eect controls:
time, states, and sector xed eects are reported. Ch 7 and Ch 11 denote the relative bankruptcy choices (the baseline case Ch
7 is omitted). Column (4) - Leverage: Fixed eect regression of ln bt,i/at,i over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998,
unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herndhal index of sectoral concentration (sector
real sales shares unit); 3) Sector level controls: aggregate amount of debt over aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of
consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t , employment share of labour by sector in the state of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: lagged value,
ln bt–1,i/at–1,i , log labour productivity, ln yt,i/nt,i , log real total assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear trend, t, and interaction term
t · dU . Leverage is measured as total liabilities over total assets (compustat identiers: lt, at). Column (5) - Labour Productivity:
Fixed eect regression of ln yt,i/nt,i over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction
term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herndhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit); 3) Sector level con-
trols: aggregate amount of debt over aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t , employment
share of labour by sector in the state of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: log labour productivity, ln yt–1,i/nt–1,i , log real total
assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear trend, t, and interaction term t · dU . Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual,
1979-2012. Union Membership and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
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of log measured labour productivity ln Yt,s
Lt,s
over its lagged value, dummy variables d(·) and
a set of controls X , where the t and s subscripts stand for time and state. The identication
assumption is that ln Yt,s
Lt,s
follows a stationary25 AR(1) process. The regressors of interest
are: the treatment, d1998, which takes value 1 after the break in 1998; dU , which takes
value 1 when a state is highly unionized; the interaction term d>1998 · dU , which informs
about the dierential impact of the shift in creditor rights in highly unionized states. In
addition to time, αt , and state, αs, xed eects, the regression includes time-varying state-
specic controls Xt,s: Herndhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares
unit), number of rms Nt,s.
After the break, log productivity increases by 14% in lowly unionized states, while it
increases by a not signicant β>1998 + β>1998,U = 2.6% in highly unionized states. The
estimates of β>1998 and β>1998,U are stable across dierent methodologies (LSDV, Fixed
Eect, Random Eect, Blundell-Bond) - which controls for a variety of sources of endo-
geneity and non-stationarity issues - suggesting a very precise estimation. The interested
reader can refer to Appendix 1.B.3 for a detailed description of the empirical methodology
adopted and robustness checks.
Firm-level Analysis
The order of the columns in Table 2.3.3 mirrors the unfolding of the mechanism. An in-
crease in creditor rights reduces the incentive of shareholders to bargain with workers
over the employment benets, lowering the likelihood of success of Ch 11 in the highly
unionized region - intensive margin channel (Table 2.3.1). As a result, the bankruptcy reor-
ganization becomes less attractive than the liquidation alternative, especially in the highly
unionized region - extensive margin channel. These channels imply lower recovery values
upon default, and therefore more expensive debt, causing a shift towards a less leveraged
capital structure, especially in highly unionized states - general equilibrium channel. The
increase in the cost of debt per unit of collateral, makes more dicult to exploit investment
opportunities reducing measured labour productivity, especially in the highly unionized
region. Appendix 1.B.4 performs a battery of robustness and placebo checks.
2.4 The Static Model
The economy lasts for one period, and is populated by a representative rm, a represen-
tative worker and a mass one of identical lenders. The rm is run by a risk neutral share-
holder and has access to a leontief technology that transforms capital, k, and a labour unit
in output, A ·max{k, k¯}. The project scale, k¯, denotes the threshold beyond which returns
25In Appendix 1.B.3 I perform a battery of panel data unit root tests followed by a state-by-state unit-root
tests to support the assumption.
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on capital sharply decrease. After production, the capital fully depreciates. The repre-
sentative worker owns the rm, supplies a unit of labour inellastically, and consumes his
income, C = w + Π, which consists of a wage, w, and rm’s prots, Π. In conclusion,
there is a competitive market of risk neutral lenders, which own k¯26 unit of capital that
can lend to the representative rm or use to produce with a linear technology, k. To make
the problem interesting, I assume that the rm’s technology is more productive than the
lenders’ technology, A > 1.
The timing of the model is the following. At the beginning of the period the rm is
paired with the worker, and lending takes place. At the end of the period the output is
shared among the agents as follows. The shareholder chooses how much to borrow, k, to
maximize prots
A ·max{k, k¯} – Rk · k – w
The interest rate on the loan, Rk , and the wage, w, determines the shares of output that
go to lenders and to the worker, respectively. On one side, price competition in the credit
market bids the loan interest rate down to the return on the lenders’ linear technology,
Rk = 1. On the other side, the surplus of the rm - net of the capital repayment, k - is split
between the shareholder and the worker in a nash bargaining fashion,
w = arg max
v
[ (A – 1) · k – v ] 1–θU · [v – w] θU
where θU denotes the bargaining power of the worker and w his outside opportunity.
Since the worker does not value leisure, w = 0.
An equilibrium in this economy is the set of prices {w, Rk} and allocations such that
the rm maximizes prots and the bond market clears.
This environment is peculiar. Resources are in the wrong hands: lenders own capital
but do not have access to the productive technology, and viceversa the rm. In this econ-
omy, the misallocation arises if frictions impede that capital moves from the lenders to the
rm. To study it, I compare outcomes under two polar assumptions on the enforceablity
of debt contracts: perfect and limited.
2.4.1 Perfect enforceability of debt contracts
If debt contracts are perfectly enforceable, in equilibrium all capital is invested in the rm
technology, k∗ = k¯27. Henceforth, I refer to the output under perfect enforceability of debt
26The fact that the aggregate amount of capital coincides with the project potential is for technical rea-
sons (simplies the algebra). Footnote 27 explains how.
27By assuming that the aggregate capital coincides with the project scale, we have that in rst best all
capital is invested in the productive technology. Assuming it dierently - as long as the aggregate capital
is greater than the project scale - would complicate the algebra but would keep unchanged the economic
intuition.
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contracts
YFB = A · k¯ (2.4.1)
as the rst best aggregate output, and use it to contrast outcomes under limited enforce-
ability of debt contracts.
2.4.2 Limited enforceability of debt contracts
This section introduces a twist: after producing, the shareholder can default on his debt
obligations by ling either for reorganization (Ch 11) or liquidation (Ch 7). Bankruptcy
is costly: upon bankruptcy all output is swiped out. In this environment, the rm value
depends on the project scale. The two procedures dier on how they dispose of the project
and share the surplus among the stakeholders: the shareholder, the lenders and the worker.
Under Ch 7, lenders liquidate the project, net of a clearance loss ψ ∈ (0, 1)28, and recover
(1 – ψ) · k¯; the shareholder and the worker get nothing. Under Ch 11, the project is not
liquidated and it is used to produce. Let ζ · k¯29 be the going-concern value of the rm
in Ch 11, with 0 ≤ (1 – ψ) < ζ ≤ 1 < A. In Ch 11 all contracts {w, Rk} are annulled30.
As a result, the shareholder, lenders and the worker enter in a two stage nash bargaining
process, which is structured as follows. The shareholder bargains rst with the worker
and afterwards with lenders. This assumption formalizes the higher priority that the U.S.
Corporate bankruptcy law recognizes to the workers over lenders on the rm’s surplus31.
To conclude, the likelihood of success of the reorganization procedure, αR(e, θU ), depends
on the eort, e ∈ [0, 1], that the shareholder decides to exert to restructure the labour con-
tract, and the bargaining power of the worker, θU . In case of failure, the case is converted
to Ch 7.
The shareholder solves the reorganization problem by backward induction. Accord-
ingly, in the second stage he bargains with the lenders over a debt haircut, for a given wage
compensation and level of eort (henceforth, the debt restructuring problem). Hence, in
the rst stage he bargains with the worker over the wage, for a given level of eort (hence-
forth, the labour restructuring problem). In conclusion, at the onset of the reorganization
he chooses the level of eort that maximizes his expected share of the surplus, net of re-
structuring costs. The interested reader can refer to Appendix 1.C for all the derivations.
28The liquidation clearance loss captures the presence of frictions in the cash-auction procedure. As
instance, the nancing problem and the lack of competition problem (See Aghion et al. [1994]). The rst
problem relates to the diculties in raising big amount of fundings in a brief amount time. The second
problem depends on the lack of competition on the bidding sides. See Shleifer and Vishny [2011] for an
amplication of the nancing problem in recessions due to the congestion of the secondary markets (re-
sales).
29ζ captures the output distruption occurring during the reorganization: lost of supply-client relation-
ship, best managers, etc..
30§365 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
31§507 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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2.4.3 The Debt Restructuring
In the second stage, for a given eort choice, e, and wage, v,
NBCv,e(k) = max
r∈R+
[αR(e; θU ) · (ζ · k¯ – v – r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm’s Expected Surplus
]1–θC · [αR(e; θU ) · r + (1 – αR(e; θU )) · (1 – ψ) · k¯ – (1 – ψ) · k¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lenders’ Expected Surplus
]θC
s.t ζ · k¯ – v – r ≥ 0 αR(e; θU ) · r + (1 – αR(e; θU )) · (1 – ψ) · k¯ ≥ (1 – ψ) · k¯ (2.4.2)
the shareholder and lenders bargain over the debt repayment, r , to maximize the nash
bargaining product between their expected surpluses (the debt restructuring problem). In
this context, the bargaining power of lenders, θC , proxies for the level of creditor rights
protection. If the reorganization is unsuccessful the rm gets liquidated, the shareholder
receives nothing, VL = 0, and lenders get the recovery value under Ch 7, (1 – ψ) · k¯. The
specication of the surplus of the lenders formalizes a legal requirement referred to as
the best interest of creditors test: by law it is responsibility of the judge to guarantee that
creditors recover under Ch 11 at least as much as under Ch 732.
As a result of the bargaining process, the expected recovery value under Ch 11 and the
expected surplus of the shareholder are, respectively,
R11v,e(k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + αR(e; θU ) · θC ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – (1 – ψ) · k¯ – v , 0] (2.4.3)
SFv,e(k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC) ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – (1 – ψ) · k¯ – v , 0] . (2.4.4)
2.4.4 The Labour Restructuring
In the rst stage, for a given eort choice, e, the labour restructuring problem
NBUe (k) = max
v∈R+
[ SFv,e(k¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm’s Expected Surplus
]1–θU · [αR(e; θU ) · v]θU (2.4.5)
entails the choice of the wage compensation that maximizes the nash bargaining product
between the expected surpluses of the shareholder and of the worker. Again, if Ch 11 fails
the case is transferred to Ch 7, where both get nothing. Substituting (2.4.4) in (2.4.5) we
get the wage compensation
w(k¯) = θU ·max [ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0] · k¯ (2.4.6)
Proposition 2.4.1. The wage compensation upon labour restructuring decreases with the
liquidation value (1 – ψ)k¯. (The threat of liquidation)
32Pursuant to §1129 of Ch 11 impaired class of claims or interests ‘will receive or retain under the plan
on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the eective date of the plan, that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7
of this title on such date.
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The shareholder uses the threat of liquidation in the second stage to reduce the bargaining
position of the worker in the rst stage. This conclusion results from the timing of the debt
and labour restructuring problems, which arises from the order of priority in the payment
assigned by the law to employees and creditors.
For the ease of notation, let
S(k¯) ≡ max [ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0] · k¯
denote the nash bargaining surplus. Substituting (2.4.6) in the objective function, it is easy
to show that - for a given eort level e - the expected recovery value under Ch 11 and the
expected surpluses of the shareholder and worker are, respectively,
R11e (k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + αR(e; θU ) · θC · (1 – θU ) · S(k¯) (2.4.7)
SFe (k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC) · (1 – θU ) · S(k¯) (2.4.8)
SWe (k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · θU · S(k¯). (2.4.9)
2.4.5 The Restructuring Eort Problem
Upon entering reorganization, the shareholder chooses the restructuring eort, e ∈ [0, 1],
that maximizes his claims on the expected surplus of the rm,
VR(k¯) = max
e∈[0,1]
SFe (k¯) – c(e, k¯)
I assumeαR(e; θU ) = (1–(1–e)·θU ). This specication formalizes the intuition that without
a formal attempt to restructure labour contracts, e = 0, the probability of success of the
reorganization procedure decreases with the bargaining power of the worker, 1 – θU . By
exerting restructuring eort, the shareholder can temper this negative eect and increase
the likelihood of success (1 – θU + e · θU ). Lastly, by assuming that the eort cost function
is linear on the rm surplus, c(e) ≡ c11 · e
2
2 · S(k¯), the problem reads
VR(k¯) = max
e∈[0,1]
[
(1 – (1 – e) · θU ) · (1 – θC) · (1 – θU ) – c11 ·
e2
2
]
· S(k¯)
Proposition 2.4.2. The optimal level of eort
e∗ = (1 – θC) · (1 – θU ) ·
θU
c11
(2.4.10)
decreases with the bargaining power of lenders, θC .
An increase in creditor rights, θC , reduces the fraction of the nash-bargaining surplus
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that goes to the shareholder, tempering his incentives to exert eort. As a consequence,
at optimum the likelihood of success of Ch 11
αR(e∗; θU ) = (1 – θU ) ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
–
θ2U
c11
· θC
]
(2.4.11)
decreases with the creditor rights protection. In turn, this result implies that at optimum
an increase in creditor rights has a countervailing eect on Ch 11 recovery values,
R11(k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + αR(e∗; θU ) · θC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade o
·(1 – θU ) · S(k¯) (2.4.12)
If on one side, upon a successful reorganization it increases the recovery value (by in-
creasing the share θC of the total surplus of the rms that goes to the lenders), on the
other side it reduces the likelihood of success of Ch 11. As a result, an increase in cred-
itor rights ought not to increase expected recovery values, and pro-creditor bankruptcy
reforms can backre. The next section, closes the model and studies how these reforms
aect the allocation of resources in the economy.
2.4.6 Characterization of the equilbrium
The participation constraint, requires the debt repayment Rk · k to be no larger than the
expected recovery value L(k¯) = max [ R11(k¯) , R7(k¯) ]33,
Rk · k ≤ L(k¯)
By price competition in the credit market, Rk = 1, and the monotonicity of the rm’s
preferences over k we get the equilibrium level of borrowing
k∗ = min
{
(1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ] , 1
}
·k¯
(2.4.13)
Let k∗/k¯ denote the fraction of resources that is invested in the rm’s technology. Then,
let m = (k¯ – k∗)/k¯ denote the fraction of resources that is misallocated and invested in the
un-productive linear technology. Then, the equilibrium output
Y = [1· (1 – m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction of k¯ invested in productive technology
+ 1
A
· m︸︷︷︸
Fraction of k¯ invested in unproductive technology
] ·A · k¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y FB
(2.4.14)
33The recovery value under bankruptcy has to be greater equal than the recovery value under Ch 7,
independently on the procedure.
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is smaller than the rst best output, YFB. In turn, the misallocation of resources
m = 1 –
(1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
αR(e∗;θU ) · θC
·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ]

depends on the relative eciency of the bankruptcy law (ζ ,ψ) and - through the labour
and debt restructuring activity - depends on the level of creditor rights protection and
bargaining power of workers, (θU , θC).
2.4.7 Normative Analysis
What is the (optimal) output maximizing level of creditor rights? To answer this question
I study the problem of a social planner which takes as given the bargaining power of the
worker, and maximizes output by choosing the level of creditor rights protection, θC . This
problem is equivalent to the one of minimizing the misallocation of resources
max
θC∈[0,1]
Y (θC ; θU ) = (1 – θU )2 ·max [ ζ – (1 –ψ) , 0 ] max
θC∈[0,1]
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
(2.4.15)
Proposition 2.4.3. In an interior solution34, the optimal level of creditor rights
θ∗C(θU ) =
1
2 ·
[
c11
θ2U
+ 1
]
(2.4.16)
decreases with the bargaining power of the worker.
The existence of a blissing point in the social planner problem is the result of the
countervailing eect that an increase in creditor rights has on the equilibrium likelihood
of success of Ch 11, αR(e∗; θU ), and on the share of nash bargaining surplus that goes to
the lenders, (1 –ψ) · k¯ + αR(e∗; θU ) · θC · (1 – θU ) · S(k¯). Keeping x αR(e∗; θU ), an increase
in θC mechanically increases the share of the nash bargaining surplus, S(k¯), that goes to
the lenders. Upon a successful reorganization, it increases recovery values, fosters ex-ante
the lending, and reduces the misallocation of resources in the economy, boosting output.
Yet, it reduces the share of the nash bargaining surplus that goes to the shareholder, (1 –
θC) · (1 – θU ) · αR(e∗; θU ) · S(k¯), tempers his incentives to exert restructuring eort, and,
by doing so, reduces the likelihood of success of Ch 11, (2.4.11).
34When ζ > (1 – ψ), or equivalently when, R11(k¯) > R7(k¯).
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Proposition 2.4.3 says that whether one force prevails the other depends on the bar-
gaining power of the worker. When θU → 0, exerting eort to restructure labour con-
tracts, e, does not help the rm to regain economic soundness, and therefore does not alter
the likelihood of success of Ch 11, αR(e∗; θU ). It is then optimal to give all the bargaining
power to the lenders, θC → 1. Conversely when θU → 1, failing in restructuring labour
contracts can prevent the rm to regain its economic soundness, and therefore exerting
eort in restructuring labour contracts is crucial. Accordingly, the optimal level of creditor
rights attains its minimum, 0.5(c11 + 1).
Out of the algebra, Proposition 2.4.3 contains an important message. In economies
where worker extract a lot of rents, an increase in creditor rights can increase the mis-
allocation of resources, by suocating the incentives to restructure labour contracts in
reorganization. This result might shed light on why more unionized countries - as Italy,
France - have lower creditor rights protection than less unionized ones - say, U.S.
2.5 The Dynamic Model
The economy is populated by rms, credit intermediaries and a household. In the economy
there are two regions. Regions dier by the bargaining power of workers - highly and
lowly unionized - and by the measure of rms35.
Firms are run by risk neutral shareholders36, who maximize the expected discounted
stream of dividends. They articulate in two types: incumbents and entrants.
There is a continuum of incumbents, which dier by the region where they are lo-
cated, their (xed) capital scale of production, their (xed) productivity and their histo-
ries. The incumbents are the producing rms in the economy. They combine capital and
labour into a decreasing returns-to-scale technology and experience uninsurable persis-
tent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The labour cost varies across regions and across
rms: the (region-specic) bargaining power of workers determine the fraction of the
(rm-specic) surplus that is extracted by workers. Incumbents nance investment and
dividends using internal and external funds: retained prots, one-period non-contingent
loans and equity issuance. Incumbents can renege on their debt obligations and default.
In compliance with the bankruptcy law, they have access to two bankruptcy procedures:
liquidation (Ch 7) and reorganization (Ch 11). In Ch 7 an incumbent relinquishes all its
assets to the creditors (net of a liquidation loss) and exits from the market; workers are
laid o. Conversely, in Ch 11 an incumbent enters in a reorganization procedure with the
other stakeholders: workers and creditors. The process articulates in a two stage [nash]
35The household and the credit intermediaries abstract from the spatial dimension.
36The model abstracts from agency frictions arising from the separation of governance and control.
Recent empirical studies suggests that managers vs shareholders does not characterize the key tension in
large corporate reorganizations, where 70% of CEO are replaced within 2 years of the bankruptcy ling
(Ayotte and Morrison [2009]).
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bargaining with workers (rst) and creditors (later) over labour and debt contracts. The
success of the Ch 11 procedure is stochastic. If the reorganization fails, the case is trans-
ferred to Ch 7. By exerting costly eort in restructuring labour contracts, the rm can
increase the likelihood of success of the procedure.
In each period, a positive mass of potential entrants starts production with a time-to-
build lag. At entry, each rm draws a region, a capital-scale, and a permanent productivity
level, that remain xed over life. Then it draws a persistent idiosyncratic productivity
shock and decide whether to actually enter or not. Actual entrants nance their capital
scale by issuing equity or debt.
Firms have access to a competitive nancial sector with free entry. Each nancial
intermediary oers a menu of loan sizes and interest rates to rms, wherein each loan
makes zero expected prots.
In conclusion, the representative household owns the rms, saves in the credit market,
supplies inellastically labour to rms, and consumes out of the wage income, returns on
savings and the aggregate amount of dividends distributed by rms.
2.5.1 The State of the Incumbents
An incumbent is dened as a tuple (r , k, z, b, x) where: r ∈ R ≡ {L,H } is the index of the lo-
cation, where L [H] denotes the lowly [highly] unionized region; k ∈ K ≡ [kmin, kmax] ⊂
R+ is the physical capital stock scale, as drawn at entry; z ∈ Z ≡ [zmin, zmax] denotes
the permanent productivity, as drawn at entry; x ∈ X ≡ [xmin, xmax] ⊂ R+ is an unin-
surable idiosyncratic productivity shock; b ∈ B ≡ {bmin, . . . , bmax} ⊂ R is the amount
of outstanding debt/savings, where B is a nite set with cardinality |B|, and bmin < 0,
bmax > 0.
To simplify notation, I summarize with p ≡ (r , k, z) ∈ P ≡ R × K × Z the permanent
characteristics, and with s ≡ (b, x) ∈ S ≡ B× X the endogenous state variables.
2.5.2 The Production Technology
Firms use capital, k, and labour, n ∈ N ≡ [nmin, nmax] ⊂ R+, to produce an homoge-
neous consumption good, y ∈ Y ⊂ R+, using a decreasing returns-to-scale production
technology,
y(p, x, n) ≡ (z · x)(1–αη)(k1–αnα)η (2.5.17)
where37 η is the decreasing return to scale parameter38 and α is the value-added share of
labour. The idiosyncratic productivity, x, follows a stochastic process dened on the mea-
37The normalization parameter (·)1–αη on the actual productivity level, z ·x, ensures that the rm’s prot
function after wage compensation pi(p, s) is linear on z · x
38The parameter (1 – η) is sometimes referred to as the span of control (Lucas [1978]).
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surable space (X ,B(X)) with transition function Q(x, dx′)39, where hereafter B(·) denotes
the Borel algebra on X . The operating prots are
pi(p, s, n) ≡ y(p, x, n) – w(p, s, n) · n – χo (2.5.18)
where the wage contracts ( p , s , n , w(p, s, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, n) are rm specic and deter-
mined through nash bargaining, as described in Section 2.5.7. Capital depreciates at rate
δ. Thereby, to maintain a constant capital scale, investment equals i = δk40.
2.5.3 The Financing Technology
Incumbents nance investment using retained prots, one-period non-contingent loans
and equity issuance41. Let
g(d) ≡
[
I{d≥0} + ι · I{d<0}
]
· d
denote the ow of dividends [equity issuance] d ∈ D ≡ [d, d¯] ⊂ R between the household
and the rm. Henceforth, as a convention, let I{y} denote an indicator function, which
takes value 1 when y is true. The previous formula says that rms can issue equity by
setting d < 0 and incurring an additional proportional cost, ι > 142.
The presence of a default option yields a substantial departure of the loan-market
arrangement from the Arrow-Debreu world. This departure formalizes in the device of
rm specic one-period non-contingent loan contracts,
(
p, x, b′, q(p, x, b′)
)
, where q : P×
S → Q is the pricing function in the space of continuous and bounded functions CQ, with
Q ≡ [0, qmax] ⊆ R, 0 ≤ qmax ≤ 1. In particular, a rm with characteristics (p, x) is allowed
to save (b′ < 0) or borrow (b′ > 0) at the price q(p, x, b′). This specication highlights the
dependence of the loan price on ve key rms characteristics: the permanent (z) and
persistent productivity (x), the assets (k), the region (r), and the size of the loan (b′). If
shocks are persistent43, a high productivity today, x, predicts a higher productivity next
period. Thereby, the rm is less likely to default and can issue debt at a higher price.
Similar argument holds for z. A higher capital scale, k, yields a larger collateral, which
tempers creditors’ losses upon default, and mitigates downward pressures on the debt
price. The region, r , aects the labour cost and therefore the rm’s protability; by doing
39I assume that Q(x, dx′) is continuous on (x, x′), is decreasing in a rst order stochastic dominance sense
on x. This property is satised by many processes - e.g. the rst order autoregressive process on which I
focus in the calibration - and capture the idea that the higher is the idiosyncratic productivity today, the
more likely it will be higher tomorrow. On the top of that, I assume thatQ(x, dx′) satises the Feller property.
40The result follows from the law of motion of capital k′ = (1 – δ)k + i and the fact that k′ = k.
41To maintain tractable the state space, I do not consider the outright hierarchical layers of ownership
(bonds, debentures, preferred equity, common equity) but just a neat pattern of layered debt and equity.
42Following the literature, equity issuance is expensive (Hennessy and Whited [2007]).
43If productivity shocks were i.i.d., the price q would not depend anymore on the current x.
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so, it alters the likelihood of nancial distress and the associated interest rate on debt. In
conclusion, larger loans increase the probability of default and commands higher interest
rates.
As a result, rms preferences over the nancing sources are in line with the pecking
order theory: rst retained prots, then debt and only then equity issuance. In equilibrium
, the equity issuance cost, ι – 1, establishes a lower bound to the debt price.
2.5.4 The Firm Choices
Firms take ordinary decisions (n, d, b′), and extra-ordinary decisions. In particular, they
decide whether to continue (φX = 0) or exit (φX = 1). Upon exit, they decide whether
to default (φD = 1) or repay the debt (φD = 0). If they default, they have to choose the
bankruptcy procedure: reorganization (φR = 1) or liquidation (φR = 0).
2.5.5 The Bankruptcy Law Technology
The bankruptcy procedures formalize the legal ways by which rms can repudiate their
debt obligations. In the model, a bankruptcy procedure, φR, is: 1) a set of stipulations, SRφR ∈
R3, on rms’ ordinary decisions, (n, d, b′); 2) a legal environment whereby stakeholders44
agree on how to split the surplus; 3) a resolution about the existence of the rm as a going
concern.
Bankruptcy Liquidation
In bankruptcy liquidation (φR = 0), a rm does not produce, and cannot take any ordinary
decision (n, d, b′)45, SR0 (p, s) ≡ ∅. Creditors seize the collateral of the rm - which consists
of undepreciated capital -
R7(p, s) ≡ min { b , (1 – ψ)(1 – δ)k } (2.5.19)
suering a liquidation clearance loss, ψ ∈ (0, 1), which captures frictions in the cash-
auction procedure46. Workers and shareholders get nothing. Once the rm is liquidated,
it exits the market.
44The denition of stakeholders include: shareholders, workers and credit intermediaries.
45Indeed, in Ch 7 the rm ceases the ordinary activity. The judge appoints a trustee with the precise
purpose of marshalling the assets of the rm and reimburse the creditors.
46As instance, the nancing problem and the lack of competition problem (See Aghion et al. [1994]). The
rst problem refer to the diculties of raising large fundings in short time. The second problem arise from
the lack of competition on the bidding sides. See Shleifer and Vishny [2011] for a study of the amplication
of the nancing problem in recessions due to the congestion of the secondary markets (re-sales).
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Bankruptcy Reorganization
During bankruptcy reorganization, a rm cannot distribute dividends, and cannot save4748
SR1 (p, s) ≡
{
(n, d, b′) ∈ N× D– × B+ :
d – q(p, x, b′)b′ + k ≤ y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, n) · n – χo + (1 – δ)k – αC(p, s)b
} (2.5.20)
The reorganization procedure involves a two stage nash bargaining, rst with workers
over labour contracts, wR(p, s), and then with creditors over debt contracts, αC(p, s)b. Re-
organizations can fail. By exerting costly eort (in restructuring labor contracts) the rm
can increase the likelihood of success. Section 2.5.8 elaborates the details.
2.5.6 The Timing
The timing is the following: i) productivity shocks realize and incumbents decide ii) whether
to continue, to exit or to default; iii.a) if they continue, they produce and take dividend,
investment and nancing decisions; iii.b) if they exit, they sell the assets, and use the
proceedings to repay the debt and distribute dividends (if any); iii.c) if they le for liqui-
dation, they do not produce and exit the market; iii.d) if they le for reorganization, they
produce, restructure labour expenses, bargain over a debt haircut and take nancing deci-
sions (jointly with the creditors); if the reorganization succeeds they continue, otherwise
they are liquidated.
The Incumbents
Let the value V : P × S → R of an incumbent (p, s) be
V (p, s) = max
φX
{
VC(p, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation
, max
φR
{
VX (p, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit
, max
φD
{
VR(p, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reorganization
, VL(p, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquidation
}} }
(2.5.21)
where
VX (p, s) = (1 – δ)k – b
denotes the value at exit,
VL(p, s) = 0
47These restrictions arise from an application of the Absolute Priority Rule: to secure the higher priority
of creditors’ claims over the shareholders’ ones, most bankruptcy laws do not allow rms to divert funds
(by distributing dividends or save).
48Y– = Y \ R++, and Y++ = Y \ R–.
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denotes the value of liquidation, and VC(p, s), VR(p, s) denote the value of a rm that de-
cides, respectively, to continue and reorganize, as characterized in the following sections.
2.5.7 The Continuation Problem
Let
VC(p, s) = max
(n,d,b′)∈N×D×B
g(d) + β · Ex′|x
[
V (p, s′)
]
(2.5.22)
s.t. d ≤ y(p, x, n) – w(p, s, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′)b′ – b
( p , s , n , w(p, s, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, n)
describe the problem of a rms that decides to continue. The menu of wage contracts
( p , s , n , w(p, s, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, n) denes the wage compensation w(p, s, n) to be paid by a
rm (p, s) that hires n workers. Let θU (r) ∈ [0, 1] denote the bargaining power of workers,
which varies across regions, with θU (L) < θU (H ). Let w : P × S × N→W ≡ [0,wmax] be
the wage function in the space CW(P × S×N) of continuous functions bounded between
[0,wmax].
Then, I can dene the wage correspondence (Ww) : W ⊆ R+ → R+ as
(Ww)(p, s, n) ≡ arg max
v∈W
VCv,n(p, s)(1–θU (r)) · [v · n – w · n]θU (r) (2.5.23)
s.t. VCv,n(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
where w is the wage that satises the free entry condition, as specied in Section 2.5.9
and
VCv,n(p, s) ≡ max
b′∈B
g
[
y(p, x, n) – δk – χo + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – b – v · n
]
+ βEx′|x
[
V (p, s′)
]
,
is the continuation value when the wage is v and the number of workers hired is n.
Theorem 2.5.1. There exists a unique w∗ ∈ CW(P × S × N) such that w∗ = (Ww∗).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.1.
Proposition 2.5.2. Given a number of workers, n, and a continuing rm (p, s), in an interior
solution:
- the nash bargaining surplus is
S(p, s, n) ≡ max
b′∈B
y(p, x, n) – δk –χo +q(p, x, b′)·b′–b–wn+β · 1I{d≥0} + ι · I{d<0}
·Ex′|x
[
V (p, s′)
]
(2.5.24)
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- the wage compensation is
w(p, s, n) · n = w · n + θU (r) · S(p, s, n) (2.5.25)
Accordingly, the continuation problem (2.5.22) can be rewritten as
VC(p, s) = (1 – θU (r)) max
n∈N
S(p, s, n) (2.5.26)
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.2.
Proposition (2.5.2) says that the continuation problem (2.5.22) boils down to (2.5.26): the
rm chooses (n, b′) to maximize the share of expected discounted value of future dividends
that is not extracted by workers, (2.5.26). Appendix 1.D.2 discusses the separability of the
max operator over the rm’s choices, b′ and n. Proposition 2.5.3 characterizes the problem.
Proposition 2.5.3. The labour demand, n∗, and output, y∗, of rm (p, s) are
n∗(p, s) = z · x ·
(
αη
w
) 1
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη (2.5.27) y∗(p, s) = z · x ·
(
αη
w
) αη
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη (2.5.28)
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.2.
Proposition 2.5.3 says that the rm’s labour demand does not depend on w(p, s, n), but
on the outside opportunity cost, w. In words, this result means that rm and workers’
interests are aligned in making the pie as big as possible, S(p, s, n∗), and contrast only on
how to split it, w(p, s, n∗). It also means, that the class of wage contracts studied is the
weakest, in the sense that it does not directly distort ordinary decisions - say, to generate
inecient size choices - but it distorts directly only extensive margin ones: entry, exit and
default.
Substituting the optimal choices, the wage compensation becomes
w(p, s) = w + θU ·
S(p, s, n∗)
n∗ (2.5.29)
2.5.8 The Reorganization Problem
Let
VR(p, s) = max
e∈E
αR(e; θU (r)) ·
[
max
(n,d,b′)∈N×D–×B+
g(d) + β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]]
– c(e)
s.t. d ≤ y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, e, n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labour Restructuring
·n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – αC (p, s, e, n,wR(p, s, e, n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Restructuring
·b
(2.5.30)
( p , s , e , n , v , αC (p, s, e, n, v) ) ∈ AC (p, s, e, n, v)
( p , s , e , n , wR(p, s, e, n) ) ∈ WR(p, s, e, n) (2.5.31)
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describe the problem of a rm that decides to le for Ch 11. In reorganization, share-
holders enter in a two stage nash bargaining, rst with workers over the wage compe-
nation wR (labour restructuring problem) and then with creditors over the debt haircut
αC (debt restructuring problem). The timing reects the super-priority that the U.S. Cor-
porate bankruptcy law recognizes to workers claims over creditors’ ones on the rm’s
surplus. The reorganization succeds with probability αR(e, θU (r)), that depends on the
restructuring eort, e, and the regional bargaining power of workers, θU (r). By back-
ward induction, shareholders solve, rst, the debt restructuring problem (for a given eort
choice, number of workers, and wage), and then the labour restructuring problem (for a
given eort choice). In conclusion, upon entering reorganization, they choose the eort
that maximizes their share of the expected discounted value of future dividends net of a
restructuring cost. The next sessions develop the details.
The Debt Restructuring
In the second stage, for a given eort choice, e, number of workers, n, and wage, v, share-
holders bargain with the credit intermediaries over the due recovery rate a ∈ [0, 1] on the
defaulted loan, b. Let the expected surplus of a rm (p, s) that les for reorganization be
SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≡ αR(e; θU (r)) ·max
maxb′∈B+ ι ·
y(p, x, n) – v · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
D.I.P. Financing
–ab
 + β · Ex′ |x [V (p, s′)] , 0

s.t. y(p, x, n) – v · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
D.I.P. Financing
–ab ≤ 0 (Equity Issuance) (2.5.32)
Let the credit intermediaries surplus be
SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≡ min
 b , max[αR(e; θU (r)) · a · b + (1 – αR(e; θU (r))) · R7(p, s) , R7(p, s) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Best Interest of creditors test

(2.5.33)
The minimum operator controls for the fact that creditors cannot recover more than the
outstanding debt. Conversely, the maximum operator formalizes the following legal re-
quirements - sometimes referred to as the best interest of creditors test49: it is responsibility
of the judge to guarantee that creditors recover under Ch 11 at least as much as under Ch
7.
Let θC ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of creditors and αC : P × S × E× N×W→
49Pursuant to §1129 of Ch 11 impaired class of claims or interests ‘will receive or retain under the plan
on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the eective date of the plan, that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7
of this title on such date.
2.5 The Dynamic Model 73
A ≡ [0, 1] denote the Ch 11 recovery rate function. Then, I can dene the reorganization
recovery rates correspondence (ACαC) : A→ R+ as
(ACαC)(p, s, e, n, v) ≡ arg max
a∈[0,1]
{
[SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus Firm
](1–θC ) · [ SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus Creditors
]θC
}
(2.5.34)
s.t. SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0
Theorem 2.5.4. There exists a unique αC,∗ ∈ CA(P × S × E × N ×W) such that αC,∗ =
(NαC,∗).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.1.
Proposition 2.5.5. Given (e, n, v), and a reorganizing rm (p, s), in an interior solution:
- the nash bargaining surplus is
SRn,v(p, s) ≡ max
{
max
b′∈B+
y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk – vn + β · 1
ι
· Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′))
]
– R7(p, s), 0
}
(2.5.35)
- the expected Ch 11 recovery value is
R11e,n,v(p, s) ≡ αC(p, s, e, n, v)b = R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC · SRn,v(p, s) (2.5.36)
- the share of expected surplus that goes to shareholders is
SFe,n,v(p, s) ≡ αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC) · ι · SRn,v(p, s) (2.5.37)
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.3.
The Labour Restructuring
In the rst stage, for a given eort choice, e, and number of workers, n, shareholders
bargain with workers over the wage compensation. Let wR : P × S × E × N → W ≡
[0,wmax] be the wage function in the space CW(P × S × E× N) of continuous functions
bounded between [0,wmax]. Then, I can dene the wage correspondence (WRwR) : W ⊆
R+ → R+ as
(WRwR)(p, s, e, n) ≡ arg max
v∈W
[SFe,n,v(p, s)](1–θU (r)) · [αR(e; θU (r)) · (v · n – w · n)]θU (r)
(2.5.38)
s.t. SFe,n,v(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
where I assume that workers get nothing if the reorganization procedure fails (and the
case is transferred to Ch 7).
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Theorem 2.5.6. There exists a unique wR,∗ ∈ CW(P × S × E × N) such that wR,∗ =
(WRwR,∗).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.1.
The menu of wage contracts ( p , s , n , e , wR(p, s, e, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, e, n), establishes the
wage compensation wR(p, s, e, n) that a rm (p, s) has to pay when decides to hire n work-
ers, and exert e eort in restructuring labour contract.
Proposition 2.5.7. Given (n, e), and a reorganizing rm (p, s), in an interior solution:
- the nash bargaining surplus is
SRn (p, s) ≡ max
{
max
b′∈B+
y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk – wn + β · 1
ι
· Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′))
]
– R7(p, s), 0
}
(2.5.39)
- the wage compensation is
wR(p, s, e, n) · n = w · n + θU (r) · SRn (p, s) (2.5.40)
- the expected recovery value under Ch 11 is
R11e,n(p, s) ≡ R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC · (1 – θU (r)) · SRn (p, s) (2.5.41)
- the share of expected surplus that goes to shareholders
SFe,n(p, s) ≡ αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC) · (1 – θU (r)) · ι · SRn (p, s) (2.5.42)
Accordingly, the reorganization problem (2.5.30) can be rewritten as
VR(p, s) = max
e∈E
αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC) · (1 – θU (r)) · ι ·max
n∈N
SRn (p, s) – c(e) (2.5.43)
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.3.
By substituting (2.5.39) in (2.5.40), the main result of Proposition 2.4.1 carries through
the dynamic framework: the rm uses the threat of liquidation to reduce the bargaining
position of the workers. (Again, this result stems from the timing of the restructuring
problems.) The reorganization problem (2.5.30) boils down to (2.5.43): the rm chooses
(n, b′) to maximize the share of expected discounted value of future dividends that is not
extracted by the workers, or creditors (2.5.43). Appendix 1.D.3 discusses the separability
of the max operator over the rm’s choices, b′ and n.
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Proposition 2.5.8. The labour demand, n∗, and output, y∗
n∗(p, s) = z · x ·
(
αη
w
) 1
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη (2.5.44) y∗(p, s) = z · x ·
(
αη
w
) αη
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη (2.5.45)
coincides with the ones under continuation (Proposition (2.5.3)).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.3.
The model does not capture the lay-os of workers that rms experience during bankruptcy.
Since rms and workers bargain over the wage (and not over wage and number of workers)
there are no distorsions in size choices. That said, the wage compensation wR(p, s, e∗, n∗) ·
n∗ shrinks during bankruptcy (as in the data), because of the reduction in the surplus
due to the threat of liquidation. Beside tractability, this particular class of labour con-
tracts allows me to get sharper predictions: in the model, all the ineciencies arise from
extra-ordinary decisions (extensive margin) and not from inecient size choices (inten-
sive margin). This has important consequences on the interpretation of the quantitative
results, which should be taken as a conservative measure of the impact of pro-creditor
bankruptcy reforms.
Substituting the optimal choices, we get an expression for the nash bargaining surplus in
reorganization, the expected recovery value under Ch 11, and the expected share of the
surplus that goes to shareholders and workers
SR(p, s) ≡ max
{
max
b′∈B
y(p, x, n∗) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk – wn∗ + β · 1
ι
· Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′))
]
– R7(p, s), 0
}
(2.5.46)
R11e (p, s) ≡ R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC · (1 – θU (r)) · SR(p, s) (2.5.47)
SFe (p, s) ≡ αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC) · (1 – θU (r)) · ι · SR(p, s) (2.5.48)
SWe (p, s) ≡ αR(e; θU (r)) · θU (r) · SR(p, s) (2.5.49)
Expressions (2.5.47), (2.5.48), (2.5.49) are the dynamic version of the solution to the debt
restructuring and labour restructuring problem in the static model (2.4.7), (2.4.8), (2.4.9).
The Restructuring Eort Problem
The eort cost function c : P × S × E → R+, with c′(p, s, ·) > 0, gives the shareholders’
cost in rm (p, s) to exert e units of eort to restructure labour contracts (in output units).
Let αR : E× R → [0, 1], with αR′(·; r) > 0, denote the likelihood of success of Ch 11 for a
given eort, e, and bargaining power of workers, θU (r), with r ∈ R ≡ {L,H }. Shareholders
choose the amount of eort e ∈ E ⊆ R+ that solves
VR(p, s) = max
e∈E
SFe (p, s) – c(p, s, e) (2.5.50)
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where VR(p, s) is the value of reorganization that results from the restructuring activity.
Because of the symmetry between the dynamic and static model, it is easy to show that
at optimum, e∗, the expected recovery value under Ch 11
R11(p, s) ≡ R7(p, s) + αR(e∗; θU (r)) · θC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trade o
·(1 – θU (r)) · SR(p, s) (2.5.51)
carries on the main trade-o illustrated in (2.4.12): an increase in creditor rights (θC) ought
not to increase expected recovery values.
2.5.9 The Credit Intermediaries
In the economy there is a competitive nancial sector. Each risk neutral credit intermedi-
ary oers a set of rm-specic contracts
(
p, x, b′, q(p, x, b′)
)
∈ Ω
(
p, x, b′
)
. Let the pricing
function q : P × S → Q ≡ [0, qmax] ⊂ R+ be
q(p, x, b′) =
1
1 + rF
b′ ≤ 0
1
b′(1 + rF )
E
(1 – φX · φD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Default
· b′ + φX · φD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default
·( φR︸︷︷︸
Ch 11
· R11(p, s) + (1 – φR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ch 7
R7(p, s)
) b′ > 0
(2.5.52)
with φi ≡ φi(p; s′), i = {X ,D, R}. Under price competition, we have that (2.5.52) holds with
equality whenever contracts are traded in strictly positive quantities50. So, rms earn the
risk-free interest rate, rF , on their savings, b′ ≤ 0. Conversely, loans’ prices depend on the
endogenous probability that the rm will meet its debt obligation and the recovery rates
upon default; both these factors are function of rms’ bankruptcy choices. In conclusion,
let a(p, x, b′) denote the aggregate amount of contracts
(
p, x, b′, q(p, x, b′)
)
issued
a(p, x, b′) ≡ q(p, x, b′) · b′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amount of Loan granted

∫
P×X
[ (1 – φX )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation
+ φXφDφR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reorganization
] · Ib′(p,s)=b′ µ(b, ds)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Measure Incumbents asking for debt
+M
∫
P×X
φE · Ib′(p,x)=b′G(ds)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Measure Entrants asking for debt

(2.5.53)
50As a result of the optimization problem of a prot maximiser risk neutral credit intermediary with deep
pockets.
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Entrants
A large number of ex-ante identical potential entrants, M , decides whether to pay a xed
cost to enter, χE.
If they pay, they draw from the probability measure space (P ×X,B(P ×X),Gr ,k,z,x ) a
region, r , a permanent idiosyncratic productivity, z, a permanent capital scale, k, and an
idiosyncratic persistent productivity shock, x.
Upon the realization (r , k, z, x), entrants decide whether to actually enter (φE = 1) or
not (φE = 0). If they decide to enter, they nance their capital scale, k, by accessing a
menu of rm specic not contingent debt contracts
(
p, x, b′, q(p, x, b′)
)
∈ Ω
(
p, x, b′
)
51
and, ultimately, by issuing equity. The problem of a potential entrant, can be described as
V E(w) =
∫
P×X
max
φE
φE ·
[
max
(d,b′)∈D×B
g(d) + β ·
∫
X
V (p, s′)Q(x, dx′)
]
Gr ,k,z,x (r , dk, dz, dx)
s.t. d + k ≤ q(p, x, b′) · b′
g(d) =
(
I{d≥0} + ιE · I{d<0}
) · d (2.5.54)
By assuming free entry in the credit industry, the wage w ∈ R+ is such that
VE(w) ≥ χE (2.5.55)
with equality if in steady state, M > 0. Henceforth I will refer to (2.5.55) as the free entry
condition (FEC) and to w as the FEC-wage. Dierently from Hopenhayn [1992], rms
nance the capital scale, k, by issuing equity or rm specic debt contracts q(p, x, b′) · b′
that depends on the bankruptcy law. In conclusion, because of the decreasing returns-to-
scale production technology and the proportional investment cost, δk, rms can nance
a high capital scale, k, only if they draw a high permanent productivity, z. As a result, in
equilibrium large rms have to be productive.
Invariant Distribution
Let ΠIp : (B × X) ×
(
2B × B(X)
)
→ [0, 1] be the transition function of a (r , k, z)-type
incumbent from the state (b, x) to the state Z ≡ Zb′ × Zx′ ,
ΠIp((b, x),Z ) =
[
1 – φX (p, s) ·
(
1 – φD(p, s) · φR(p, s)
)]
· Ib′ (p,s)∈Zb′ ·
∫
Zx′
Q(x, dx′)
where Zb
′
,Zx
′
, are the projections of Z ∈
(
2B × B(X)
)
.
Similarly, let ΠEp : X×
(
2B × B(X)
)
→ [0, 1] be the transition function of a (r , k, z)-type
51Notice how the bankruptcy law aects rms entry decision by changing the feasible set of external
nancing opportunities.
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entrant, dened as
ΠEp (x,Z ) = φE(p, x) · Ib′ (p,x)∈Zb′ ·
∫
Zx′
Q(x, dx′)
Let µ a probability measure in the space Γ
(
B× X, 2B × B(X)
)
of probability measures.
Then, I can dene the operator (Ψµ):
(Ψµ)(Z ) =
∑
B
∫
P×X
ΠIp((b, x),Z )µ(dp, ds) + M
∫
P×X
ΠEp (x,Z )Gr ,k,z,x (r , dk, dz, dx)
(2.5.56)
2.5.10 The Household
The economy is populated by a unit measure of innitely-lived, identical households, with
preferences over streams of consumption - represented by an istantaneous Bernoulli utility
function u(C) - that discount the future as the rms, β.
In each period each household is endowed with Ns unit of time that supplies inelasti-
cally. It further decides how much to consume, C, and how much to lend to the nancial
intermediaries, B′. Accordingly, the problem of the representative household can be de-
scribed as
VH (B;µ) = max
{C,B′}
u(C) + β · VH (B′) (2.5.57)
s.t. C + qmaxB′ = W + D + B
where D is the aggregate dividend, and qmax ≡ 11 + rF
, where rF is the risk free interest
rate. Then in steady state
β = qmax ≡ 11 + rF
(2.5.58)
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2.5.11 The Aggregates of the Economy
The producing rms in the economy are the incumbents that either do not exit or reorga-
nize. As a result, the net aggregate output
Y ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] y∗(p, s)µ(dp, ds)
+
∑
B
∫
P×X
φX (1 – φD) · (1 – δ) · k µ(dp, ds)
–
∑
B
∫
P×X
 [1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] · χo︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maintainance cost of operation
+φXφDφR · c(p, s, e∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reorganizing costs
µ(dp, ds)
–
∑
B
∫
P×X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] · [ιI – 1] · I{d<0} µ(dp, ds)
– M
∫
P×X
φE · [ιE – 1] · I{d∗<0}Gr ,k,z,x (r , dk, dz, dx) – M · χE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry cost
(2.5.59)
The aggregate investment is
I ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
[1 – φX (1 – φDφR)] · δk µ(dp, ds) + M
∫
P×X
φE · k Gr ,k,z,x (r , dk, dz, dx)
(2.5.60)
and, by national income accounting (resource constraint) aggregate, consumption is
C = Y – I (2.5.61)
The aggregate dividends amount to
D ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
[1 – φXφD (1 – φR)] g(d∗(p, s))µ(dp, ds)
+ M
∫
P×X
φEg
(
d∗(p, s)
)
Gs(ds) (2.5.62)
The aggregate demand of labour equals
Nd ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
n∗(p, s)µ(dp, ds) (2.5.63)
where n∗(·) is dened in (2.5.27).
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Then, the aggregate demand of loans is
Bd ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
a(p, x, b′) µ(b, ds) (2.5.64)
where a(p, x, b′) is dened in (2.5.53).
In conclusion, the aggregate wage equals
W ≡
∑
B
∫
P×X
w(p, s) · n∗(p, s)µ(dp, ds) (2.5.65)
2.5.12 The Equilibrium
Denition. A steady-state competitive equilibrium is a wage w, a set of price schedules
{w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗}, a measure µ∗, a mass of potential entrants M∗, the incumbents policies
{φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗}, the entrants policy functions {φE,∗, b′,∗e , d∗e }, and the household
decisions (C∗,B′,∗) such that:
1. given w and {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗}, then
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
solve the incumbents
problem (2.5.21);
2. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗} and
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e } solve
the entrants problem (2.5.54);
3. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗},
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, and B′,∗,
then C∗ solves the household problem (2.5.57);
4. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗}, and
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then αC,∗ is the nash bargain
solution (2.5.34);
5. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗},
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, then q∗ satises the zero-
prot condition (2.5.52)
6. given {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗},
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, thenw satises
FEC (2.5.55);
7. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗},
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, then µ∗ =
Ψµ∗, ∀M;
8. given w, {w∗, q∗,wR,∗,αC,∗},
{
φ∗X ,φ∗D,φ∗R, b′,∗, n∗, d∗
}
, and {φ∗E, b′,∗e , d∗e }, µ∗ and C∗:
8.1. M∗ is such that labour market clears, N s = Nd (M∗), where Nd dened in
(2.5.63);
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8.2. B′,∗ is such that the loan market clears, Bd = B′,∗, where Bd dened in (2.5.64).
2.6 Quantitative Analysis
How did the shift in creditor rights protection regime aect rms’ bankruptcy choices, and
the rms distribution? What would have happened if Ch 11 had never been introduced
in 1979? To answer these questions I calibrate the dynamic model to the U.S. economy
from 1979-1998. The rm level accounting data are from Compustat North-America Fun-
damentals Annual, 1950-2012; further information on bankruptcy are from UCLA LoPucki
Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-2012.
2.6.1 Functional Forms
The calibration requires more structure on both the uncertainty governing the model
economy, and the restructuring process.
Uncertainty
The log-idiosyncratic productivity shock, ln xt , follows an AR(1) process
ln xt+1 = (1 – ρln x ) · µ¯ln x + ρln x ln xt + t+1, t+1 ∼ N
(
0,σ2
)
(2.6.66)
I approximate the process with a discrete-state Markov chain, by using Gauss-Hermite
nodes and weights and by applying the Tauchen and Hussey [1991] weights correction
in order to account for the persistency. I discretize the support52 of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock using 9 points.
For what concerns the uncertainty at entry, Gr ,k,z,x , I make the following assump-
tions: the permanent and persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks are drawn from
log-normal distributions, Gz(µG(z),σG(z)) and Gx (µG(x),σG(x)); the xed capital scale is
drawn from a pareto distribution Gk((κk , kmin). In conclusion entrants are born with prob-
ability pθU (H ) in the highly unionized region (formally Gr = {1, 0; pθU (H ), 1 – pθU (H )}). By
assuming independence across these dimensions, I have Gr ,k,z,x = Gr · Gk · Gz · Gx .
2.6.2 The Restructuring Eort Problem
I need to specify functional forms for the eort cost function, c(p, s, e), and the likelihood
of a success of Ch 11, αR(e; θU (r)) (Section 2.5.8).
I assume c(p, s, e) is linear in the surplus, c(p, s, e) = c(e) · ι · SR(p, s), as in the static
model; dierently, I set c(e) = c11 · e.
52Following standard practice, I determine the bounds of the support using a trimming parameterm = 20.
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Then, I set αR(e; θU (r)) = sr11,p · (1 – exp(–e) · θU (r)), with r = L,H . An interpretation
is in order. As explained in the static model, this specication formalizes the intuition
that without a formal attempt to restructure labour contracts, e = 0, the probability of
success of the reorganization procedure decreases with the bargaining power of workers,
1 – θU (r). By exerting restructuring eort, shareholders can temper this negative eect
and increase the likelihood of success, 1 – exp(–e) · θU (r). In this context, θU (r) proxies for
the reluctance of workers to accept changes in labour conditions, namely the reduction
in the wage wR. Lastly, I scale the likelihood of success of Ch 11 in the two regions by a
dierent factor sr11,p with r = L,H , to let the U.S. data say where the scope of restructuring
labour contracts is stronger.
2.6.3 Calibration
The economy is calibrated over the period 1979-199853. One period in the model cor-
responds to one year. The model has 28 parameters: physical technology (α, η, δ,χo),
labour market (θU (L), θU (H ), pθU (H )), nancing technology (ιI , ψ, θC), restructuring tech-
nology (c11, sL11,p, sH11,p), entrants (χE, ιE), discounting (β, r), labour supply, N , and uncer-
tainty {(µ¯ln x , ρln x ,σ), (µG(x),σG(x)), (µG(z),σG(z)), (κk , kmin) , pX }, whose parameters are
discussed, in details, in the next section.
I use estimates or impose restrictions on 12 parameters and structurally estimate the
rest.
2.6.4 Parameters Restrictions
I start by imposing restrictions on the uncertainty governing the model economy.
First of all, I set the unconditional mean of the log-idiosyncratic productivity shock to
0, µ¯ln x = 0. Following, I impose restrictions on (µG(x),σG(x)), (µG(z),σG(z)). In particular,
I assume the initial idiosyncratic productivity shocks x′ are drawn from the long-run log
normal distribution, Gx (0,σ/
√
1 – ρ2ln x ). Hence, I assume Gz = Gx , and I discretize the
permanent idiosyncratic productivity into 3 levels associated to the conditional expecta-
tion of z falling in one of the following intervals: [0, x20th], [x20th, x80th], [x80th,∞], where
xqth, denotes the qth percentiles. By so doing I tie the cross-sectional distribution prop-
erties of the permanent eciency with the long-run property of the eciency process
estimated in the data.
Next I move to the physical technology. Following Gilchrist et al. [2013], I set the
value-added share of labour in the production function α = 0.7, and the estimated de-
creasing return to scale parameter η = 0.8554. The real risk-free rate and the annual rm
53In 1978 the U.S. Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which became eective on October 1,
1979.
54These parameters are consistent with the literature (e.g. Barseghyan and DiCecio [2011]). In turn,
this parameters specication imply a decreasing returns to scale parameter over physical capital γ = 0.63
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Physical Technology
α 0.70 Value-added share of labour Gilchrist et al. [2013]
η 0.85 Production Function Returns to Scale Gilchrist et al. [2013]
Financing Technology
ιE ιI Equity issuance cost entrants Restriction
Bankruptcy Technology
sH11,p 1.00 Scope of restructuring in highly unionized region Normalization
Economy
β 0.96 Subjective Discount Factor FOC
rF 0.04 Real Risk-Free Interest Rate FRED
N s 1.00 Labour Supply Normalization
Uncertainty
µ¯ln x 0 Unconditional mean of ln xt Standard
µG(x) 0 Expected persistent productivity ln xt Restriction
σG(x) σ/
√
1 – ρ2ln x Standard deviation of persistent productivity ln xt Restriction
µG(z) 0 Expected permanent productivity ln zt Restriction
σG(z) σ/
√
1 – ρ2ln x Standard deviation of permanent productivity ln zt Restriction
Table 2.6.4: Parameters Restrictions
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discount factor are set to r = 0.04. By (2.5.58), the steady-state household annual discount
rate is β = 11 + rF
= 0.9615. Hence, I normalize the labour supply N s = 1.
For what concerns the nancing technology, I assume that entrants and incumbents
face the same equity issuance cost, ιI = ιE.
I conclude by normalizing the scope of restructuring parameter in the highly unionized
region to sH11,p = 1. Table 2.6.4 summarizes parameters and restrictions.
2.6.5 Estimation Strategy
I estimate 16 parameters by minimizing the weighted sum of squared residual between a
set of moments computed in the model, m(θ), and in the data, mˆ. I choose 34 moments that
are a priori informative55 about the rms distribution and the phenomenon of corporate
bankruptcy default.
Since some moments are more sensitive to changes in some parameters, to illustrate
the tightest links, I partition the set of estimated parameters in two: the one responsible for
the default/exit phenomenon, and the one responsible of the rm distribution. For what
concern the parameters responsible to match the default/exit phenomenon: pX targets the
aggregate exit rate (by default and not); χo is used to match the aggregate default rate;
ψ matches the Ch 7 default rate; θU (L), θU (H ) match Ch11 default rates in the lowly and
highly unionized regions; c11 and sL11,p match the fraction of Ch 11 that are converted to
Ch 7 in the highly and lowly unionized region, respectively; pθU (H ) targets the fraction of
rms in highly unionized states; θC targets the aggregate median recovery value under
Ch 11. For what concerns the rm distribution, I devote a set of parameter to capture
information about the size of the rms and another set of parameters to capture moments
related to the leverage: the equity issuance cost ιI is used to match the expected leverage of
the incumbents; the entry costχE targets the Tobin-q statistics of incumbents; kmin targets
the median leverage at entry; κk and δ matches the cross-section standard deviation of
leverage and Tobin-q of incumbents. In conclusion ρln x σ have major eects on all the
statistics in the model. In particular, I use them to match 10th, 20th, 50th, 70th, 90th
percentiles of the distribution of leverage (incumbents and entrants) and Tobin-Q. Table
3.5.7 reports the results of the estimation.
2.7 The Shift in Creditor Rights Protection Regime
How did the shift in creditor rights protection regime aect the U.S. economy and the
rms nancial structure? In this section I use the calibrated model economy to answer
consistent with the lower bound of reasonable parameters for the class of Cobb-Douglas production function
(e.g. Arellano et al. [2012]).
55Heuristically speaking the moments are informative about the unknown parameter if they are sensitive
to its changes.
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Table 2.6.5: Simulated Method of Moments Estimation
Target Data Model Parameter Description
Default
Ei[ Exit Rate ] 0.0639 0.0192 pX 0.0148 Exogenous Prob Exit
Ei[ Default Rate ] 0.0077 0.0075 χo 6.4215 Maintenance Cost
Ei[Ch 7 Default Rate] 0.0023 0.0019 ψ 0.7672 Clearance Loss under Ch 7
Ei[Ch 11 Default Rate|r = L] 0.0020 0.0015 θU (L) 0.1192 Unions Barg.pow in region L
Ei[Ch 11 Default Rate|r = H] 0.0034 0.0041 θU (H ) 0.3741 Unions Barg pow in region H
Ei[αR(e∗)|r = H] 0.9440 0.9440 c11 0.0110 Cost of Restructuring Eort
Ei[αR(e∗)|r = L] 0.9661 0.9661 sL11,p 0.9681 Scope of restructuring in region L
Ei[Ir=H ] 0.6536 0.6224 pθU (H ) 0.7113 Pr. entering in region H
qi,50[αR · αC + (1 – αR) · C7(k)/b] 0.5309 0.2730 θC 0.4824 Creditors bargaining power
Firms Distribution
q50,i[B/A | Incumbents] 0.1360 1.2551 ιI 1.0985 Inc. Equity Issuance Cost
Ei[V /A | Incumbents] 1.6140 0.2561 χE 0.2531 Entry Cost
q50,i[B/A | Entry] 0.1190 1.2551 kmin 0.7054 Lower Bound k
σi[B/A| Incumbents] 0.1859 0.4494 κk 0.3633 Pareto Exponent Gk
σi[V /A | Incumbents] 2.1469 0.3765 δ 0.2208 Depreciation Rate
σi[B/A | Entry] 0.2137 0.2049 σ 0.0943 Volatility of innovation of ln(x)
q50,i[Y /Employee] 1.4255 0.5121 ρln x 0.9657 Persistency of ln(x) AR(1)
Note: The rst and second column report the structural parameters of the model and their description. The third column reports
the targeted statistics: E[·] denotes time series averages, while Ei[·], σi[·] and qx,i[·] denote the time series averages of, respectively,
cross-sectional averages, standard deviations and cross-sectional x-percentiles. The Data column reports the moment computed
in the data (rms ratios are trimmed at 1 and 99 percentiles). Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-
1998. The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) nancial (NAICS 52) and public administration (NAICS 92) corporations, American
Depository Receipts (ADR).
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this question. To discipline the exercise, I increase the bargaining power of creditors, θC ,
to mach the 1999-2012 fraction of Ch 11 filings that are converted to Ch 7, keeping all the
other parameters fixed at their 1979-1998 levels. Table 2.7.6 reports the fit.
Table 2.7.6: Discipline of the increase in creditors rights protection
Panel A. Disciplining the Shift in Creditor Rights Protection Regime
1979-1998 1999-2012
Data Calibrated Model Data Post-shift Model
θC - 0.4824 - 0.7939
Likelihood of Success of Ch 11 0.9511 0.9601 0.9201 0.9129
Note: The table reports the likelihood of success (row 2) in the Data and in the Model for the pre (1979-1998) and post (1999-2012)
shift period for different values of θC (row 1).
Table 2.7.7 compares the steady-states outcomes at region and aggregate level. Asmain
result, it validates the mechanism. Let me start with the trigger. An increase in creditor
rights depresses the restructuring effort, reducing the likelihood of success of the Ch 11
procedure (–3.5%). The effect is stronger in highly unionized states (–3.8% against –2.7%),
where the scope of restructuring is stronger (see Figure 2.7.4).
Figure 2.7.4: Likelihood of Success of Ch 11 procedure and creditor rights
Note: Implied Likelihood of success of the Ch 11 procedure for different bargaining power of the creditors θC by unionization
region: highly (green), lowly (red) and aggregate (blue). The statistic is computed using the parameterization in Tables 2.6.4 and
3.5.7, but for the bargaining power of the creditors.
Thereby, reorganization becomes less attractive than its liquidation alternative (–0.5%),
especially for firms where workers extract many rents (–0.7%). Accordingly, the recov-
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ery rate upon default drops (–3.3%), driven by the drop in the recovery rates in Ch 11
(–4.88%). The cost of debt service raises and hinders rms’ ability to use debt to smooth
out shocks, reducing their protability especially in highly unionized states. Firms are less
likely to enter in the highly unionized region (–0.01%), and when they enter they ought to
be smaller (–0.22%) and more productive. TFP increases by (0.02%) and the productivity
distribution becomes more positively skewed (2.01%). Firms substitute retained earning
for debt, which explains the drop in the dividend price ratio (–2.1%).
Table 2.7.7: Eect of the Shift in Creditor Rights Protection Regime
Eect of the Shift in Creditor Rights Protection Regime
Lowly Unionized Highly Unionized Aggregate
% % %
Bankruptcy Composition
Fraction of Ch 11 which are successful -3.8566 -5.3032 -4.9218
Fraction of defaulters which le for Ch 11 -0.2207 -0.9863 -0.7591
Firms Distribution
Assets per rm -0.1540 -0.3124 -0.2553
Employee per rm -0.0974 -0.1761 -0.1512
Total Factor Productivity 0.0109 0.0334 0.0238
Total Factor Productivity Skewness 1.2626 2.8426 2.2483
Leverage -0.4831 -0.1270 -0.3413
Labour Productivity -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
Tobin Q 0.9025 0.9848 1.3950
Tobin Q Standard Deviation -0.3377 0.6012 0.3678
Dividend Price Ratio -2.4878 -3.1062 -1.9599
National Income Accounting
Output (Y) 0.8439 -0.5062 0.0000
Consumption (C=NY-I) 0.8298 -0.5490 -0.0307
Since debt is more expensive for unit of collateral, the model captures a country level
deleverage –0.22% (as in the data), but does not match the across regions dynamics. The
reason is that smaller amount of debt together with more productive rms, reduces the
likelihood of default (–0.33%) on a given loan, especially in lowly unionized regions. As in
the data, the model predicts an increase in the Tobin-Q volatility 0.24%, but fail to produce
the across-region. The model replicates qualitatively the country-wise and regional drop
in the dividend-price ratio observed in the data.
In aggregate, output does not fall, but the economy records signicant regional eects.
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2.8 The Economic Value of the Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zation Procedure
What is the economic value of Ch 11? This question traces its roots back to 1979 - year of
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code - when Ch 11 was for the rst time introduced. I
address this question by investigating what would have happened if Ch 11 had never been
introduced. Table 2.8.8 compares the 1979-1998 U.S. model economy with what it would
have been without Ch 11.
Table 2.8.8: Eect of Shutting Down Ch 11
Eect of Shutting Down Ch 11
Lowly Unionized Highly Unionized Aggregate
% % %
Bankruptcy Composition
Fraction of Ch 11 which are successful -0.0000 0.0000 -100.0000
Fraction of defaulters which le for Ch 11 -100.0000 -100.0000 -100.0000
Firms Distribution
Assets per rm -0.5169 -5.2130 -3.1409
Employee per rm -0.0732 -2.6724 -1.6160
Total Factor Productivity -0.0370 0.5257 0.2383
Total Factor Productivity Skewness -4.3795 48.5853 23.0546
Leverage -47.7650 -1.0651 -19.7417
Labour Productivity -0.1185 -0.1185 -0.1185
Tobin Q 78.4584 0.1766 84.8176
Tobin Q Standard Deviation -39.4996 15.8793 25.3063
Dividend Price Ratio -100.1352 65.3641 -82.1180
National Income Accounting
Output (Y) 23.3297 -14.1846 -0.1184
Consumption (C=NY-I) 24.3028 -14.8402 -0.1263
The results are striking, and this is the logic. The closure of Ch 11 pushes expected
recovery values down and makes debt more expensive. An increase in the debt cost has
two countervailing eects: 1) it makes more dicult for rms to smooth out shocks; 2) it
reduces the value of being an incumbent (in both regions) pushing the FEC-wage down
(–0.12%). Firms in dierent regions are more sensitive to one or the other eect. An in-
crease in the debt cost washes out, unproductive rms, increasing aggregate TFP (0.24%).
TFP increases in highly unionized states by half a percentage point while it drops in lowly
unionized states (–0.03%). The reason is that highly unionized rms suer disproportion-
ally more the loss of Ch 11. They experience a signicant reduction in size (–5.2%) and
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need to be more productive to stay. The lowly unionized rms benet more from the drop
in the FEC-wage, allowing more unproductive rms to stay. This drives up the debt cost
(–2.11% drop in the price), decreases their leverage, and yields a signicant change in the
dividend distribution policy (drop in dividend price ratio). The equity issuance becomes
more attractive than the debt alternative (44%), especially for entry rms (153%). Through
entry, rms relocate in the lowly unionized region. Fixing the mass of rms at entry, be-
cause of the churning eect there will be less rms, more productive, producing a greater
amount of output. Then, to maintain labour demand equal to labour supply the mass of
rms has to increase. Consumption and output sensibly falls by 0.1% in aggregate but
with a strong asymmetric impact on the economy: it drops by 14% in the highly unionized
region and increase by 24% in the lowly unionized one.
On the top of that, there are signicant changes in the corporate structure of rms.
The increase in the debt price comports a signcant deleveraging, extremely pronounced
in lowly unionized regions (–48% vs –1%). Per unit of assets, rms are more valuable (84%
increase in Tobin-Q), especially in lowly unionized regions (78%). Besides, the dividend
yield drops by 80%, led by lowly unionized rms (–100%). Conversely, rms in highly
unionized states experience a 65% increase.
2.9 Conclusions
In this paper I study from a positive and normative point of view the macroeconomic
implications of bankruptcy reforms when workers extract rents. By doing so, I make four
contributions.
First, I foreground a channel through which pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms can back-
re, which does not appeal to agency frictions. Firms le for bankruptcy reorganization
not only to restructure debt but also to restructure labour contracts. An increase in credi-
tor rights suocate the incentives of the shareholders to bargain with the workers, making
the procedure more likely to fail. When workers extract many rents - and restructuring
labour contracts is required to re-establish the economic soundness - the drop in the like-
lihood of success can oset the increase in recovery values upon success, and make the
reform backre.
Second, I embed the restructuring channel into a static model - where I use the bankruptcy
law to microfound the enforcement constraint - and show how the optimal (output max-
imizing) level of creditor rights decreases with the bargaining power of workers. The
exercise sheds some light on why more unionized countries - as Italy, France - have lower
creditor rights protection than less unionized ones - say, U.S.
Third, I establish the mechanism in the U.S. data. To do that, I exploit two sources of
variation: historical dierences in the degree of unionization across states, and a shift in
the creditor rights protection regime. As a result, I document a break in the relative use
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of Ch 11 in 1998, associated with a drop in the likelihood of success of Ch 11, a signicant
deleveraging (-27%), drop in the dividend yields (46%), a three-fold increase in Tobin-Q
dispersion. The theory rationalizes the dierent response of highly and lowly unionized
rms.
Fourth, I perform a positive analysis. First of all, I build a general equilibrium rm
dynamic model, where the default option captures salient features of the U.S. corporate
bankruptcy law. The novel ingredient is the restructuring problem among the stake-
holders: shareholders, bondholders and workers. Second, I calibrate the model to the
U.S. economy from 1979-1998, using rm level accounting data from Compustat North-
America Fundamentals Annual , bankruptcy information from UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy
Research Database , and a proxy for the bargaining power of workers from Union Mem-
bership and Coverage database (CPS).
Then, I perform two policy experiments. In the rst experiment, I use the model econ-
omy to assess the eect of the observed increase in creditor rights protection. An increase
in creditor rights tempers the shareholder incentives to restructure labour contract, re-
ducing the likelihood of success of Ch 11. In turn, it makes Ch 11 less attractive than Ch 7,
causing the inecient liquidation of viable rms. The reduction in the expected recovery
rates upon default, yields an increase in the cost of debt service and a decrease in the lever-
age. These eects are stronger in highly unionized regions, where restructuring labour
contract is more crucial for the success of the reorganization process. In a second policy
experiment, I try to attach an economic value to Ch 11 gauging the losses of shutting it
down. Indeed, the reorganization procedure was a novelty of the 1979 bankruptcy code.
What would have happened if Ch 11 had never been introduced? Despite output and con-
sumption do not show signicant changes in aggregate (–0.11% and –0.12%) the regional
eects are economically important. Highly unionized rms suer disproportionally from
the loss of the Ch 11 procedure, as summarized by a 15% drop in output and consump-
tion. Since there are more highly unionized rms in the economy the wage that clears
the free entry conditions drops. Firms in lowly unionized states benet signicantly from
the drop in the wage, bringing about a signicant restructuring of their nancial structure
(43% drop in leverage, associated with a huge decrease in dividend yield). All together the
lowly unionized region records a signicant increase in consumption and output (around
24%).
The quantitative results are a conservative measure of the macroeconomic implica-
tions of changes in the corporate bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy reforms aect directly ex-
tensive margin decisions (entry and form of exit), and only indirectly - through prices -
rms’ intensive margin choices (leverage, hirings,. . . ).
In my future work, I plan to ll this gap by exploring the following extensions. On one
side, by assuming that in reorganization share-holders can reduce the bargaining power
of workers for a stochastic number of periods, we will observe a strategic use of leverage
to enter Ch 11 default and restructure labour contracts. This mechanism would provide
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an alternative explanation of the strategic use of capital structure to lower hiring cost
(complementing the bargaining channel of Quadrini and Sun [2015]). On the other side,
by assuming hiring and ring costs, I can explore the interaction between my restructur-
ing channel and the bargaining channel of Quadrini and Sun [2015]. I expect both these
extensions to amplify the real eects of bankruptcy reforms.

Appendix
1.A Appendix: Data
The rm level accounting information is from COMPUSTAT North America fundamentals annual
data. The cleansing of the database is conducted at several layers. Firstly, I purge the sample
from utilities (NAICS 22), nancial (NAICS 52) and public administration corporations (NAICS
92). Secondly, I drop CUSIPs for American Depository Receipts (ADRs)56.
1.A.1 Description
The description of the variable is organized in three layers: rm (t, i), state (t, s) and aggregate
level t. In case of user-dened variables (as instance, real debt bt,i = lt,i/Pt ) the reader can nd the
denition of the variables in the relative subsections.
Firm Level
Sales salet,i. This item represents gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular
sales completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales
and allowances for which credit is given to customers, for each operating segment. Variable name
in Compustat: sale.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Firms real output yt,i = salet,i/Pt .
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Long-term debt lt,i . (U.S. and Canadian GAAP Denition) The item represents debt obligations due more
than one year from the company’s balance sheet date. This item is a component of Total Liabilities (LT).
This item includes: Purchase obligations and payments to ocers, when listed as long-term liabilities; Notes
payable, due within one year and to be refunded by long-term debt when carried as a non-current liability;
Long-term lease obligations (capitalized lease obligations); Industrial revenue bonds; Advances to nance
construction; Loans on insurance policies; Indebtedness to aliates; Bonds, mortgages, and similar debt;
All obligations that require interest payments; Publishing companies’ royalty contracts payable Timber
contracts for forestry and paper; Extractive industries’ advances for exploration and development; Produc-
tion payments and advances for exploration and development. This item excludes: Subsidiary preferred
stock, included in Minority Interest; The current portion of long-term debt, included in Current Liabilities;
Accounts payable due after one year, included in Liabilities Other; Accrued interest on long-term debt, in-
cluded in Liabilities Other; Customers’ deposits on bottles, kegs, and cases, included in Liabilities Other;
Deferred compensation; Long-term debt should be reported net of premium or discount. Standard & Poor’s
will collect the net gure. Variable name in Compustat: dltt.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Real debt bt,i = lt,i/Pt .
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Total Asset att,i . This item represents the total assets/liabilities of a company at a point in time. If the
company does not report a useable amount, this data item will be left blank. Variable name in Compustat:
at.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
56ADRs are securities created to permit the trading in U.S of stock listed on foreign stock exchanges.
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Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Real asset at,i = att,i/Pt .
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Employee nt,i . This item represents the actual number of people employed by the company and its consol-
idated subsidiaries. Variable name in Compustat: emp.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Output per Worker yt,i/nt,i = yt,i/nt,i .
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Probability that a Ch 11 case is converted to Ch 7, 1 – αˆR = #(Ch 11 to Ch7)#Ch 11 . It is ratio of the Ch 11
lings which are converted to Ch 7 over the total number of Ch 11 lings which are not dismissed. The
numerator includes Ch 11 cases which are conrmed and eventually converted. The sample includes all
the Ch 11 cases which have been disposed57 before the end of 1998. The data-set is purged by involuntary
lings, prepackaged cases, dismissals, and missing data. The Lopucki variables involved in the computation
are: Disposition, Chapter, Voluntary, Prepackaged, YearDisposed.
Source: UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-1998.
Website: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu.
Average Recovery Rate under Ch 11., E[αR · αC + (1 – αR) · C7(k)]. I compute the recovery rate under
Ch 11 for each case as the ratio between: a) numerator: the sum between the distribution to all classes of
secured and unsecured credtors, and b) denominator: secured and unsecured creditors claims, as reported
in the disclosure statement. Hence I average this statistic across cases in the same year, and compute the
nal statistic as time-series average of the cross-sectional rst moments. The sample includes all the Ch
11 cases which have been disposed before the end of 1998. The data-set is purged by involuntary lings,
prepackaged cases, dismissals, and missing data. On the top of that I trim all the observations for which
any of the secured/unsecured claims and dispositions were missing. The Lopucki variables involved in the
computation are: Chapter, Voluntary, prepackpreneg, YearDisposed, DistribUnsec, DistribSecDiscloState,
ClaimsSecDiscloState, ClaimsUnsec.
Source: UCLA LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 1980-1998.
Website: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu.
Fraction of rms in highly unionized states, E[mˆ(pθU (H ))]. The statistic is computed as the 1979-1998
time series average of the percentage rms in highly unionized states.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-1998.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Fraction of Ch 11 cases over total default, by region, E[mˆ(θU (L))], E[mˆ(θU (H ))]. The statistic is the
1979-1998 time series average of the ratio between the number of Ch 11 cases and the total default (Ch 7 +
Ch 11), by region.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-1998.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Sector Level
Sector j. NAICS classication sectors. Excluded: utilities (22), nancial (52) and public administration cor-
porations (92). Variable name in Compustat: naics.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Employment Share Empsharet,s,j =
∫
φJ(i)=j,S(i)=s
nt,i
Nt,s
di, where J(i) and S(i) are the sector and state of rm
i.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
57Using the ling year produces insignicant changes.
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Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
State Level
Union Coverage Covt,s = NCovt,s /NTott,s . a) NTott,s represents the all employed civilian wage and salary work-
ers, ages 16 and over in the Current Population Survey. Not included are employed 14-15-year-olds, self-
employed workers, or a small number of unpaid family workers. b) NCovt,s is the number of employed civilian
wage and salary workers who has answered yes to one of these successive questions related to their prin-
cipal job: A) ‘On this job, is . . . a member of a labor union or of an association similar to a union?’. If the
answer is ‘no’ than the worker is asked: B) ‘On this job, is . . . covered by a union or employee association
contract?’. Hence, workers are counted as covered by a collective bargaining agreement if they are union
members or if they are not members but say they are covered by a union contract.
Source: Union Membership and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
Website: http://www.unionstats.com.
Number of Firms It,s . Total number of rms active at time t in state s.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Herndhal Index Ht,s =
∫
Empshare2t,s,jdj.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Country Level
Aggregate Output Yt,i =
∫
i
yt,idi.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Employment Nt,i =
∫
i
nt,idi.
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
Labour Productivity Yt,i/Nt,i .
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012.
Website: http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
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1.B Appendix: Empirical Analysis
1.B.1 Identification of the break
Figure 1.B.1 reports the relative use of Ch 11 procedure, computed as the ration between the annual filings
for Ch 11 over the annual filings for bankruptcy by publicly listerd firms. The figure suggests a break in the
relative use of the reorganization procedure in 1998. The Quandt-likelihood-ratio test - for the presence of
a structural break at an unknown date in the number of annual Ch 11 filings - corroborates the finding (Fig.
1.B.2).
Figure 1.B.1: Time series of default composi-
tion by bankruptcy procedure
Note: The shaded areas denote the share of annual bankruptcy
filings by bankruptcy procedure: Ch 7 (red), Ch 11 (blue).
Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual,
1950-2012. The sample excludes: utilities (NAICS 22) financial
(NAICS 52) and public administration (NAICS 92) corporations,
American Depository Receipts (ADR).
Figure 1.B.2: Quandt likelihood ratio over
1979-2012
Note: QLR test - Quandt,1960. Source: Compustat North-
America Fundamentals Annual, 1950-2012. The sample ex-
cludes: utilities (NAICS 22) financial (NAICS 52) and public
administration (NAICS 92) corporations, American Depository
Receipts (ADR).
1.B.2 Stability of the unionization coverage ranking over time.
Figure 1.B.3 reports the time series of the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of the U.S. States
unionization coverage, over the period 1983-2012. While the average unionization coverage has signifi-
cantly decreased over time (red line), the standard deviation of coverage has remained stable (blue line).
This empirical evidence suggests that the cross-sectional long-run unionization coverage rankings was pre-
served over time.
1.B.3 State-Level Analysis
See Online Appendix.
1.B.4 Firm-Level Analysis
See Online Appendix.
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Figure 1.B.3: Time series of cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of Coverage
Source: Union Membership and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
1.B.5 How are results sensitive to the structural break date?
The bankruptcy literature agrees that Ch 11 looks nowadays more creditor-friendly than it did 30 years ago.
Nonetheless, the shift in creditor rights protection did not arise from an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code,
but from a series of causes. Warren [1999] and Miller [2007] point at financial institutions lobbying for their
bankruptcy agenda. Adlera et al. [2010] identify a break in 2001, with a change in the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”) and the adoption of UCC §9-104, that sanctioned the practice of writing control provisions into
debt instruments, allowing in case of distress to shift control over a debtor’s financial decisions from equity-
appointed management to the creditor. Adlera et al. [2010] and Gennaioli and Rossi [2010] also suggests a
shift in the judicial attitude. The enactement in 2004 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA) contains several pro-creditor provisions relating to Ch 11 reorganizations58. For
this reason Figure 1.B.4 reports the main coefficients of interest (break β>1998 and interaction term β>1998,U
in Table (2.3.3)) when the break date ranges between 1998 and 2004. Broadly speaking, results hold through.
1.B.6 How are results sensitive to the partition of firms in highly
and lowly unionized?
In order to answer this question, Figure 1.B.5 reports the main coefficients of interest (break β>1998 and in-
teraction term β>1998,U in Table (2.3.3)) under different percentiles of the unionization coverage distribution
separating lowly from highly unionized states: 20%, 25%, 33.33%, 50%, 66.66%, 75%, 80%. Broadly speaking,
results hold through.
58Among others, the mandatory cap on a debtor’s exclusive period to file a plan of reorganization; en-
hanced protections for reclamation and trade creditors; a mandatory cap on the period to assume or reject
unexpired leases of non-residential real property; expanded protection of utilities; mandatory appointment
of a chapter 11 trustee in certain circumstances and relaxation of the ability to recover preferences.
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Figure 1.B.4: β>1998,U , and β>1998 for different definitions of d>t
Note: Coefficient estimates and 95% c.i. on β>1998,U , β>1998 when d>t is computed at structural break dates, t: 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. The results are displayed in 4 panels. Each panel reports - in order / by colour - the pair of coefficient
estimates of β>1998 (on the left) and β>1998,U (on the right) coming from the same regression. In a panel, regressions differ by the
assumption on the break date. In order (by colour): 1998 (blue), 1999 (purple), 2000 (green), 2001 (orange), 2002 (light-green), 2003
(red), 2004 (violet). The 4 panels report clockwise and starting from the north-west corner coefficients estimates from: I. State-
Level Labour Productivity Blundell-Bond two-steps regression of state level labour productivity, ln Yt,s/Nt,s over: 1) Treatment
variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herfindhal index
of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit). Time and states fixed effects are reported. Instruments: a) GMM type: up
to 3 lags of the dependent variable and continuous covariates; b) iv-type: dU , d>1998, and d>1998 · dU . II. Bankruptcy Choice
Multinomial logit regressions of firms continuation choice φ = {Continuation, Ch 7, Ch 11} over: 1) Treatment variables: structural
break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) Country level controls: level of union coverage, Covt ; 3)
State level controls: aggregate real sales, Yt,s , Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit), employment
shares by sector (naics), level of union coverage, Covt,s , interaction terms: dU · Covt,s , d>1998 · Covt,s , d>1998 · dU · Covt,s ; 4) Firms
level controls: real sales, yt,i/Pt , leverage, bt–1,i/at–1,i , real total assets, at,i/Pt ; 5) Fixed effect controls: time, states, and sector fixed
effects are reported.. Ch 7 and Ch 11 denote the relative bankruptcy choices (the baseline case Continuation is omitted). III.
Leverage Fixed effect regression of ln bt,i/at,i over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU ,
interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit); 3)
Sector level controls: aggregate amount of debt over aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t ,
employment share of labour by sector in the state of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: lagged value, ln bt–1,i/at–1,i , log labour
productivity, ln yt,i/nt,i , log real total assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear trend, t, and interaction term t · dU . Leverage is measured
as total liabilities over total assets (compustat identifiers: lt, at). IV. Labour Productivity Fixed effect regression of ln yt,i/nt,i
over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls:
Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit); 3) Sector level controls: aggregate amount of debt over
aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t , employment share of labour by sector in the state
of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: log labour productivity, ln yt–1,i/nt–1,i , log real total assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear
trend, t, and interaction term t · dU . Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-2012. Union Membership
and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
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Figure 1.B.5: β>1998,U , and β>1998 for different definitions of dU
Note: Coefficient estimates and 95% c.i. on β>1998,U , β>1998 for different percentiles of the unionization coverage distribution
separating lowly from highly unionized states: 20%, 25%, 33.33%, 50%, 66.66%, 75%, 80%. The results are displayed in 4 panels. Each
panel reports - in order / by colour - the pair of coefficient estimates of β>1998 (on the left) and β>1998,U (on the right) coming from
the same regression. In a panel, regressions differ by the assumption on the percentile of the unionization coverage distribution
separating lowly from highly unionized states. In order (by colour): 20% (blue), 25% (purple), 30% (green), 50% (orange), 70% (light-
green), 75% (red), 80% (violet). The 4 panels report clockwise and starting from the north-west corner coefficients estimates from:
I. State-Level Labour Productivity Blundell-Bond two-steps regression of state level labour productivity, ln Yt,s/Nt,s over: 1)
Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998·dU ; 2) State level controls: Herfindhal
index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit). Time and states fixed effects are reported. Instruments: a) GMM
type: up to 3 lags of the dependent variable and continuous covariates; b) iv-type: dU , d>1998, and d>1998 · dU . II. Bankruptcy
Choice Multinomial logit regressions of firms continuation choice φ = {Continuation, Ch 7, Ch 11} over: 1) Treatment variables:
structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) Country level controls: level of union coverage,
Covt ; 3) State level controls: aggregate real sales, Yt,s , Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit),
employment shares by sector (naics), level of union coverage, Covt,s , interaction terms: dU ·Covt,s , d>1998 ·Covt,s , d>1998 ·dU ·Covt,s ;
4) Firms level controls: real sales, yt,i/Pt , leverage, bt–1,i/at–1,i , real total assets, at,i/Pt ; 5) Fixed effect controls: time, states, and sector
fixed effects are reported.. Ch 7 and Ch 11 denote the relative bankruptcy choices (the baseline case Continuation is omitted).
III. Leverage Fixed effect regression of ln bt,i/at,i over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU ,
interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls: Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit); 3)
Sector level controls: aggregate amount of debt over aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t ,
employment share of labour by sector in the state of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: lagged value, ln bt–1,i/at–1,i , log labour
productivity, ln yt,i/nt,i , log real total assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear trend, t, and interaction term t · dU . Leverage is measured
as total liabilities over total assets (compustat identifiers: lt, at). IV. Labour Productivity Fixed effect regression of ln yt,i/nt,i
over: 1) Treatment variables: structural break, d>1998, unionization dummy, dU , interaction term, d>1998 · dU ; 2) State level controls:
Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration (sector real sales shares unit); 3) Sector level controls: aggregate amount of debt over
aggregate amount of assets by sector in the state of consideration, ln Bs,j,t /As,j,t , employment share of labour by sector in the state
of consideration; 4) Firms level controls: log labour productivity, ln yt–1,i/nt–1,i , log real total assets, ln at–1,i/Pt . 5) Other : linear
trend, t, and interaction term t · dU . Source: Compustat North-America Fundamentals Annual, 1979-2012. Union Membership
and Coverage database (CPS), 1983-2014.
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1.C Appendix: Static Model
The Debt Restructuring
The debt restructuring problem (2.4.2) can be rewritten as
NBCv,e(k) = αR(e; θU ) · max
r∈R+
[ζ · k¯ – v – r]1–θC · [r – (1 – ψ) · k¯]θC (1.C.1)
s.t ζ · k¯ – v – r ≥ 0 r ≥ (1 – ψ) · k¯ (1.C.2)
Upon success, the recovery value under Ch 11 which solves the problem is
r∗ = max{ θC · (ζ · k¯ – v) + (1 – θC ) · (1 – ψ) · k¯ , (1 – ψ) · k¯ }
Substituting in the objective function, it is easy to show that for a given v and e the expected surplus of the
rm is
SFv,e(k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (ζ · k¯ – v – r∗)
= αR(e; θU ) ·
[
ζ · k¯ – v – θC · (ζ · k¯ – v) – (1 – θC ) · (1 – ψ) · k¯
]
= αR(e; θU ) ·
[
(1 – θC ) · (ζ · k¯ – v) – (1 – θC ) · (1 – ψ) · k¯
]
= αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) ·
[
ζ · k¯ – v – (1 – ψ) · k¯]
SFv,e(k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – v – (1 – ψ) · k¯ , 0] (1.C.3)
Similarly, the expected surplus of the lenders is
SCv,e(k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · θC ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – v – (1 – ψ) · k¯ , 0]
and the expected recovery value under Ch 11 is
R11v,e(k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + αR(e; θU ) · θC ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – v – (1 – ψ) · k¯ , 0] (1.C.4)
Equations (2.4.4), (2.4.3) follows.
The Labour Restructuring
Substituting the surplus of the rm (2.4.4) in (2.4.5) the problem reads
NBUe (k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC )1–θU max
v∈R+
[ζ · k¯ – (1 – ψ) · k¯ – v]1–θU · [v]θU
from which we get that the wage compensation (2.4.6),
w(k¯) = θU ·max [ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0] · k¯
For the ease of notation, let
S(k¯) = max [ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0] · k¯
denote the surplus of the rm.
Let [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯ = 0, then w(k¯) = 0 and therefore SFe (k¯) = SWe (k¯) = 0 and R11v,e(k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯.
On the other hand, let [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯ > 0. Then by substituting (2.4.6) in the objective function, we have
that
SFe (k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) ·max
[
ζ · k¯ – w(k¯) – (1 – ψ) · k¯ , 0]
= αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) ·max
[
[ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯ – θU · [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯ , 0
]
= αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) · (1 – θC ) · [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯
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and similarly
SWe (k¯) = αR(e; θU ) · (1 – θC ) · θU · [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯
R11e (k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + αR(e; θU ) · θC · (1 – θU ) · [ζ – (1 – ψ)] · k¯ (1.C.5)
The results (2.4.8), (2.4.9), and (2.4.7) follow.
1.C.1 The Restructuring Eort Problem
Proof Proposition 2.4.2
Proof. Given
e∗ = (1 – θC ) · (1 – θU ) · θUc11
Result a. The optimal level of eort decreases in θC
∂e∗
∂θC
= –(1 – θU ) · θUc11 < 0
Result b.
∂e∗
∂θU
= 1 – θC
c11
· ∂(θU – θ
2
U )
∂θU
= 1 – θC
c11
· [1 – 2 · θU ]
The results follows.
Substituting (2.4.10), the probability of success of the Ch 11 procedure
αR(e∗; θU ) = (1 – θU ) ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
–
θ2U
c11
· θC
]
Substituting αR(e∗; θU ) and simplifying we get
R11(k¯) = (1 – ψ) · k¯ + (1 – θU ) ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
–
θ2U
c11
· θC
]
· θC · (1 – θU ) · S(k¯)
= (1 – ψ) · k¯ + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
· S(k¯)
1.C.2 Characterization of the Equilbrium
The enforcement constraint
By using (2.4.12), the recovery value in bankruptcy L(k¯) = max [ R11(k¯) , R7(k¯) ] becomes
L(k¯) =
{
(1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ]
}
· k¯ (1.C.6)
The participation constraint, requires the debt repayment Rk · k to be not larger than the expected recovery
value,
Rk · k ≤ L(k¯)
By price competition in the credit market, Rk = 1. Then, since the rm preferences are increasing in k,
ex-ante, the optimal amount borrowed by the rm is
k∗ = min{ L(k¯) , k¯ }
102 Bankruptcy Reforms When Workers Extract Rents
where the minimum operator captures the resource feasibility constraint (the lenders cannot lend more than
the total amount of capital they have).
Substituting (1.C.6) we get the optimal level of borrowing
k∗ = min
{
(1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ] , 1
}
· k¯
The misallocation of resources
The output in the economy is given by
Y = A · k∗ + [k¯ – k∗]
= AL(k¯) + [k¯ – L(k¯)]
= A
[
(1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
–
θ2U
c11
· θC
]
· θC ·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
·k¯
+
1 – [ (1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 · [(1 + θ2Uc11
)
–
θ2U
c11
· θC
]
· θC ·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
 · k¯
= [A · (1 – m) + 1 ·m] · k¯
= [1 · (1 – m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction of k¯ invested in productive technology
+ 1
A
· m︸︷︷︸
Fraction of k¯ invested in unproductive technology
] · A · k¯
and (2.4.14) follows.
1.C.3 Normative Analysis
The problem of a social planner which chooses the optimal level of creditor rights by taking as given the
bargaining power of workers
max
θC∈[0,1]
(1 – m(θU , θC , ζ ,ψ)) = (1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ]
= (1 – ψ) + (1 – θU )2 ·max [ ζ – (1 – ψ) , 0 ] · max
θC∈[0,1]
[(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C
]
= max
θC∈[0,1]
(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
· θC –
θ2U
c11
· θ2C (1.C.7)
is equivalent to (2.4.15). Hence taking FOC(
1 +
θ2U
c11
)
– 2 · θ
2
U
c11
· θC = 0
θC =
1
2 ·
[
c11
θ2U
+ 1
]
we get (2.4.16).
1.D Appendix: Dynamic Model 103
1.D Appendix: Dynamic Model
1.D.1 Proof of Theorem 2.5.1, 2.5.4, 2.5.6
Existence of unique continuous function
Without loss of generality, let us express the nash bargaining problems (2.5.23), (2.5.34), and (2.5.38) as
(Tf )(p, s) = arg max
c∈C
{
A
(
p, s, c
)(1–θ) · B(p, s, c)θ}
s.t. A
(
p, s, c
)
≥ 0, B
(
p, s, c
)
≥ 0 (1.D.8)
where c ∈ C reads v ∈ W in (2.5.23), and (2.5.38), and reads a ∈ [0, 1] in (2.5.34). A (·) ,B (·) are continuous;
I will be more precise about their functional forms when needed.
Proof. The proof proceeds in 3 steps.
1. For any f ∈ C C(P × S) and (p, s) ∈ P × S, (Tf )(p, s) ⊂ R is i) not-empty, ii) compact valued, iii)
upperhemicontinuous and (Tf )(p, s) : C→ C.
Proof. Since C is a not-empty, compact valued, continuous feasible correspondence, and the objective
function is continuous (product of continuous functions), then by direct application of the Berge’s
Maximum Theorem the optimal correspondence is not-empty compact-valued, uhc and is contained
in the feasible correspondence C. Noticing that s was arbitrary the result follows.
2. For any f ∈ C C(P × S), the product correspondence
(Tf )(p, s) = Π(p,s)∈P×S(Tf )(p, s) ⊂ C
is not empty, compact valued, uhc and (Tf )(p, s) : C→ C.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that: 1) by point 1, (Tf )(p, s) is not empty, compact valued,
uhc, included in C; 2) the product correspondence preserves these properties (Aliprantis and Border,
1999: Thm 16.28).
3. Since θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1], then (Tf )(p, s) is a not-empty, compact and convex-valued uhc correspondence
with (Tf )(p, s) : C→ C.
Proof. Lemma (1.D.1) shows that the solution is unique. In particular if θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1], by strict
concavity of the objective function over [0, 1], the Nash Bargaining Problem is well dened with a
unique continuous solution.
This implies that the product correspondence (Tf )(p) is a single-valued, continuous function.
Hence by Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg FPT there exists a continuous f ∗(p, s) ∈ C such that f (p, s)∗ ∈ (Tf )(p, s).
Because of Lemma 1.D.1 we know also that the solution is unique (which completes the proof).
Uniqueness
Lemma 1.D.1. If θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1], for a given p there exists a unique f (p, s) ∈ C C(P × S) which solves the
Nash Bargaining Problem.
Proof. Since the proof require to specify the functional forms of A (·) ,B (·) I will proceed theorem-wise. I
start rst with the restructuring problems (2.5.34) and (2.5.38), which are dierentiable on the whole support,
and move eventually to the continuation problem (2.5.23), which is dierentiable almost everywhere, except
in d = 0.
For simplicity, let h(·) = A (·)θ B (·)1–θ denote the objective function.
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• Theorem 2.5.4: uniqueness of solution to the debt restructuring problem
Taking derivative with respect to a
∂h(a)
∂a
= αR
[
–(1 – θC ) · ιb(SF )–θC (SC )θC + θC (SF )1–θC (SC )θC–1b
]
Taking second derivative:
∂2h(a)
∂a2
= –αR
{θC (1 – θC ) · (ιb)2 · (SF )–θC–1(SC )θC + θC (1 – θC ) · ιb2(SF )–θC (SC )θC–1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+

(1 – θC )θC (SF )–θC (SC )θC–1ιb2 + (1 – θC )θC (SF )1–θC (SC )θC–2b2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
} < 0
which completes the proof.
• Theorem 2.5.6: uniqueness of solution to the labour restructuring problem
Taking derivative with respect to w
∂h(v)
∂v
= αR
[
–(1 – θU ) · ιn(SF )–θU (SW )θU + θU (SF )1–θU (SW )θU –1n
]
Taking second derivative:
∂2h(v)
∂v2
= –αR
{θU (1 – θU ) · (ιn)2 · (SF )–θU –1(SW )θU + θU (1 – θU ) · ιn2(SF )–θU (SW )θU –1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+

(1 – θU )θU · (SF )–θU (SW )θU –1ιn2 + (1 – θU )θU (SF )1–θU (SW )θU –2n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
} < 0
which completes the proof.
• Theorem 2.5.1: uniqueness of solution to the wage bargaining problem when the rm continues.
Taking derivative with respect to w
∂h(v)
∂v
= –(1 – θU ) · g′(·) · n(SF )–θU (SW )θU + θU (SF )1–θU (SW )θU –1n
Taking second derivative:
∂2h(v)
∂v2
= –
{θU (1 – θU ) · (g′(·) · n)2 · (SF )–θU –1(SW )θU + θU (1 – θU ) · g′(·) · n2(SF )–θU (SW )θU –1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+

(1 – θU )θU · (SF )–θU (SW )θU –1g′(·) · n2 + (1 – θU )θU (SF )1–θU (SW )θU –2n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
} < 0
Since in an interior solution with d 6= 0 g(·) = 1 if d > 0 and g(·) = ι if d < 0, the result follows.
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1.D.2 The Continuation Problem
Since rm’s preferences are monotonic in d, the budget constraint in (2.5.22) is binding, the rm’s ordinary
choices reduce to (n, b′), and the continuation problem simplies to
VC (p, s) = max
(n,b′)∈N×B
g
(
y(p, x, n) – w(p, s, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′)b′ – b
)
+ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]
s.t. ( p , s , n , w(p, s, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, n)
Since labour is not a state variable, the static size choice, n - taken in order to maximize prots - does not
alter the inter-temporal debt choice, b′ - taken to smooth dividends over time. Mathematically, since the two
controls enter additively in the objective function and the derivative is a linear operator, the problems are
separable.
Hence, (2.5.22) becomes
VC (p, s) = max
n∈N
max
b′∈B
g
(
y(p, x, n) – w(p, s, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′)b′ – b
)
+ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]
s.t. ( p , s , n , w(p, s, n) ) ∈ W (p, s, n)
To simplify notation, let the operating prots net of investment and gross of the debt issuance be
A(p, s, n, b′) ≡ y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk
let the discounted markov operator be
E(p, x, b′) ≡ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]
and let omit the dependence of the bargaining power on the region, θU ≡ θU (r).
Proposition 2.5.2 and 2.5.3
By and large, for a given n, we can rewrite (2.5.23)
w(p, s, n) ≡ arg max
v∈W
maxb′∈B g
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – v · n
]
+ E(p, x, b′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
VCv,n(p,s)

(1–θU )
· [v · n – w · n]θU
s.t. VCv,n(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
Fix b′. By taking rst order condition with respect to v
(1 – θU )
g′(·)
g
(
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – vn
)
+ E(p, x, b′)
n = θU
1
v – w
(1 – θU )g′(·)[v – w]n = θU
[
g
(
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – vn
)
+ E(p, x, b′)
]
(1.D.9)
By denition of g(d) =
[
I{d≥0} + ι · I{d<0}
] · d, we have g′[·] = 1 if d > 0, g′[·] = ι if d < 0, and g′[0] is not
dened. Accordingly, Problem (2.5.23) might have an interior or corner solution.
An interior solution is the wage winterior (p, s, n) which satises (1.D.9), for either d > 0 or d < 0.
The existence of an interior solution proceeds by guess and verify: rst, I guess that d > 0, substitute it in
(1.D.9) and check if for wd>0(p, s) satises it. If not I proceed with d < 0.
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Let us guess d > 0. Than solving (1.D.9) when g′[·] = 1, we get
(1 – θU )g′(·)[v – w]n = θU
[
g
(
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – vn
)
+ E(p, x, b′)
]
vn = +wn + θU
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + E(p, x, b′)
]
and therefore
winteriord>0 (p, s, n)n = wn + θU
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + E(p, x, b′)
]
Then I verify that:
d = A(p, s, n, b′) – b – w(p, s, n)n ≥ 0
If not, I guess d < 0. Than g′[·] = ι and
(1 – θU )g′(·)[v – w]n = θU
[
g(A(p, s, n, b′) – b – vn) + E(p, x, b′)
]
vn = +wn + θU
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + 1
ι
· E(p, x, b′)
]
and therefore
winteriord<0 (p, s, n)n = wn + θU
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + 1
ι
· E(p, x, b′)
]
Then I verify that
d = A(p, s, n, b′) – b – w(p, s, n)n < 0
Let us denote the nash bargaining surplus of the rm
S(p, s, n) =

max
b′∈B
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + E(p, x, b′) d > 0
max
b′∈B
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + 1
ι
· E(p, x, b′) d < 0
or more compactly
S(p, s, n) ≡ max
b′∈B
A(p, s, n, b′) – b – wn + β · 1
I{d≥0} + ι · I{d<0}
+ E(p, x, b′)
Then we can rewrite the interior solutions
winterior (p, s, n)n = wn + θU S(p, s, n)
and the value of continuation for a given number of workers
VCn (p, s) = (1 – θU )S(p, s, n)
Since the b′ which maximizes VCn (p, s) coincides with the b′ which maximizes the nash bargaining surplus
S(p, s, n), then it maximizes both winteriord<0 ,w
interior
d>0 . Equations (2.5.24), (2.5.25) follows. The rm chooses n to
maximize
max
n∈N
(1 – θU ) · S(p, s, n)
and (2.5.26) follow.
Let b′,∗ be the optimal choice of debt, manipulating and substituting
(1 – θU ) max
n∈N
A(p, s, n, b′,∗) – b – wn + 1
I{d≥0} + ι · I{d<0}
· E(p, x, b′,∗)
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Since hiring is a static choice, by taking FOC and using (3.3.1):
αη(z · x)(1–αη)k(1–α)ηnαη–1 = w
n = z · x
(
αηk(1–α)η
w
) 1
1–αη
Equations (2.5.27) follows.
Hence substituting in (3.3.1)
y(p, x, n∗) = (z · x)(1–αη)(k1–αn∗,α)η
= (z · x)
(
αη
w
) αη
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη
and equation (2.5.28) follows.
Let me now turn to the corner solutions, i.e. the wage for which d = 0
wcorner (p, s, n) =
A(p, s, n, b′) – b
n
Given n, a solution to (2.5.23) is the wage which maximizes the nash-bargaining product.
max{VCwinterior ,n(p, s)
(1–θU (r)) · [winterior · n – w · n]θU (r), max{VCwcorner ,n(p, s)(1–θU (r)) · [wcorner · n – w · n]θU (r)}
When wcorner (p, s, n) solves (2.5.23), there is indeterminacy of n. To see this
VCwcorner ,n(p, s) = max
b′∈B
g
[
A(p, s, n, b′,∗) – b – wcornern
]
+ E(p, x, b′)
= max
b′∈B
g
[
A(p, s, n, b′,∗) – b – (A(p, s, n, b′,∗) – b)
]
+ E(p, x, b′)
Hence only wcorner · n is determined. This is a computationally interesting case. How do I deal with it?
Since lim
d→0+
n∗(p, s) = lim
d→0–
n∗(p, s) = n∗(p, s) = z · x ·
(
αη
w
) 1
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη to preserve continuity, I assume that
n∗d=0 = n
∗ as well. In words, since a rm (p, s) which distribute a small amount of dividends chooses the same
amount of worker n∗(p, s), as if it were issuing a small amount of equity, than I assume it makes the same
hiring choice when it does not distribute dividends. I do not have a counter-argument why the continuity
should not hold, i.e. what is the rationale why a rm that distribute [issue] a small amount of dividends
[equity] dier dramatically in its hiring choices than the same rm that does not distribute dividends.
1.D.3 The Reorganization Problem
Since rm’s preferences are monotonic in d, the budget constraint in (2.5.30) is binding, the rm’s ordinary
choices reduce to (n, b′), and the reorganization problem simplies to
V R(p, s) = max
e∈E
αR(e; θU (r))·[
max
(n,b′)∈N×B+
ι
[
y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, e, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – αC (p, s, e, n,wR(p, s, e, n)) · b
]
+ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]]
– c(e)
s.t. y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, e, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – αC (p, s, e, n,wR(p, s, e, n)) · b < 0 (Equity Issuance)
( p , s , n , v , e , αC (p, s, e, n, v) ) ∈ AC (p, s, e, n, v)
( p , s , n , e , wR(p, s, e, n) ) ∈ W R(p, s, e, n)
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Since labour is not a state variable, the static size choice, n - taken in order to maximize prots - does not
alter the inter-temporal debt choice, b′ - taken to smooth dividends over time. Mathematically, since the two
controls enter additively in the objective function and the derivative is a linear operator, the problems are
separable.
Hence, (2.5.22) becomes
V R(p, s) = max
e∈E
αR(e; θU (r))·[
max
n∈N
max
b′∈B+
ι
[
y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, e, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – αC (p, s, e, n,wR(p, s, e, n)) · b
]
+ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]]
– c(e)
s.t. y(p, x, n) – wR(p, s, e, n) · n – χo – δk + q(p, x, b′) · b′ – αC (p, s, e, n,wR(p, s, e, n)) · b < 0 (Equity Issuance)
( p , s , n , v , e , αC (p, s, e, n, v) ) ∈ AC (p, s, e, n, v)
( p , s , n , e , wR(p, s, e, n) ) ∈ W R(p, s, e, n)
To simplify notation, let the operating prots net of investment and gross of the debt issuance be
A(p, s, n, b′) ≡ y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk
let the discounted markov operator be
E(p, x, b′) ≡ β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′)
]
and let omit the dependence of the bargaining power on the region, θU ≡ θU (r).
To simplify notation, let
A(p, s, n, b′) = y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′,∗e,n,v(p, s))b′,∗e,n,v(p, s) – δk
and let
E(p, s) = β · Ex′ |x
[
V (p, s′))
]
Proposition 2.5.5
By and large, for a given (e, n, v) we can rewrite (2.5.34)
αC (p, s, e, n, v) ≡ arg max
a∈[0,1]
{
[SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus Firm
](1–θC ) · [SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus Creditors
]θC
}
s.t. SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0
Hence using the denition of rm surplus (2.5.32) and credit intermediary surplus (2.5.33), we rewrite (2.5.34)
αC (p, s, e, n, v) = arg max
a∈A
[
αR · [ max
b′∈B+
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιab]
](1–θC )
·
[
αRab + (1 – αR)R7(p, s) – R7(p, s)
]θC
s.t. SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, d ≤ 0,
where αR(e; θU (r)) = αR. By simplifying it further,
αC (p, s, e, n, v) = αR(e; θU (r)) · arg max
a∈A
[
max
b′∈B+
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιab
](1–θC )
·
[
ab – R7(p, s)
]θC
s.t. SFe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, SCe,n,v
(
p, s; a
)
≥ 0, d ≤ 0,
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Since a ∈ A ≡ [0, 1] and b ∈ B, I make the following change of variable r = ab ∈ [0, bmax] ⊆ R+ and I get
the equivalent representation
αC (p, s, e, n, v) = αR(e; θU (r)) · arg max
r∈[0,bmax]
[
max
{
max
b′∈B+
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr , 0
} ](1–θC )
·
[
max{r – R7(p, s), 0}
]θC
Since the debt is chosen over a discrete nite set, b′ ∈ B ≡ {bmin, . . . , bmax} ⊂ R, then we can solve the
problem for any b′
αC (p, s, e, n, v; b′) = αR(e; θU (r)) · arg max
r∈[0,bmax]
[
max[ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr , 0]
](1–θC ) · [max[r – R7(p, s), 0]]θC
and then choose the optimal level of debt such that
b
′,∗ = arg max
b′∈B+
αC (p, s, e, n, v; b′)
Then for a given b′, by taking rst order conditions
(1 – θC ) · ι
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr = θC ·
1
r – R7(p, s)
r = R7(p, s) + θC ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn + 1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s)
]
Let the nash bargaining surplus in debt restructuring for a given (e, n, v) be
SRn,v,e(p, s) = max{A(p, s, n, b′) – vn +
1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s), 0}
Clearly, for an interior solution to exist the nash bargaining surplus has to be (strictly) greater than zero
SRn,v,e(p, s) > 0. Then upon success, the recovery value under Ch 11 is
r∗ = R7(p, s) + θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn – R7(p, s) + 1
ι
E(p, s), 0
}
Lemma 1.D.2. The optimal level of debt in possession nancing b
′.∗ and the Ch 11 recovery value upon success
r∗ do not depend on the level of eort exerted e.
Proof. The result comes by noticing that maximizing
αC (p, s, e, n, v) = αR(e; θU (r)) · arg max
r∈[0,bmax]
[
max[ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr , 0]
](1–θC ) · [max[r – R7(p, s), 0]]θC
tantamounts to maximize
αC (p, s, e, n, v) = arg max
r∈[0,bmax]
[
max[ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr , 0]
](1–θC ) · [max[r – R7(p, s), 0]]θC
Hence we can drop the dependence of the nash bargaining surplus on e, SRn,v(p, s), and considering the op-
timal debt b
′,∗ equation (2.5.35) follows.
Substituting r∗ in (2.5.32) we get the expected reorganization value of a rm after debt restructuring for a
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given (e, n, v)
SFe,n,v
(
p, s
)
= αR(e; θU (r)) ·
[
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn] + E(p, s) – ιr∗
]
= αR(e; θU (r)) · ι ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn + 1
ι
E(p, s) – r∗
]
= αR(e; θU (r)) · ι ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn + 1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s) – θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn – R7(p, s) + 1
ι
E(p, s), 0
}]
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · ι ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) + 1
ι
E(p, s) – vn – R7(p, s), 0
}
and equation (2.5.37) follows
SFe,n,v(p, s) = αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · ι · SRn,v(p, s)
Similarly, substituting r∗ we get the expected recovery value under Ch 11
R11e,n,v(p, s) ≡ αR(e; θU (r))r∗ + (1 – αR(e; θU (r)))R7(p, s)
= αR(e; θU (r))
[
R7(p, s) + θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn + 1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s), 0
}]
+ (1 – αR(e; θU (r)))R7(p, s)
= R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) – vn + 1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s), 0
}
and (2.5.36) follows.
Proposition 2.5.7
Let us report the labour restructuring problem (2.5.38)
(WRw)(p, s, e, n) = arg max
v∈W
[SFe,n,v(p, s)](1–θU ) · [αR(e; θU (r)) · [v · n – w · n]]θU
s.t. SFe,n,v(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
Substituting (2.5.37)
(WRw)(p, s, e, n) = arg max
v∈W
[αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · SRn,v(p, s)](1–θU ) · [αR(e; θU (r)) · [v · n – w · n]]θU
s.t. SFe,n,v(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
and simplifying
(WRw)(p, s, e, n)
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC )(1–θU ) · arg max
v∈W
[max
{
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn – R7(p, s)] + E(p, s), 0
}
](1–θU ) · [v · n – w · n]θU
s.t. SFe,n,v(p, s) ≥ 0, v ≥ w
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By taking rst order conditions,
(1 – θU ) · n · ι
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – vn – R7(p, s)] + E(p, s) = θU ·
n
v · n – w · n
v · n = w · n + θU ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w · n + 1
ι
E(p, s)
]
Let the labour restructuring nash bargaining surplus
SRn (p, s) = max{A(p, s, n, b′) +
1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s) – w · n, 0}
Clearly, for an interior solution to exist the nash bargaining surplus has to be (strictly) greater than zero
SRn (p, s) > 0. Equation (2.5.39) follows.
Then we get the wage compensation which maximizes the labour restructuring problem
w(p, s, e, n) = w + θU ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w · n + 1ιE(p, s)
]
n
as in equation (2.5.40), and the expected surplus of the workers is
SWn = αR(e; θU (r)) · θU · SRn (p, s)
Similarly, substituting in (2.5.37) we get the expected reorganization value of a rm after restructuring the
labour
SFe,n
(
p, s
)
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) ·max
{
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w(p, s, e, n)n] + E(p, s), 0
}
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) ·max
{
ι · [A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – wn – θU ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w · n + 1
ι
E(p, s)
]
] + E(p, s), 0
}
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) ·max
{
ι ·
[
(1 – θU ) · [A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – wn] – θU 1
ι
E(p, s)
]
+ E(p, s), 0
}
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · (1 – θU ) · ι ·max
{
[A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – wn +
1
ι
· E(p, s)], 0
}
from which equation (2.5.42) follows
SFe,n
(
p, s
)
= αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · (1 – θU ) · ι · SRn (p, s)
Similarly, substituting in (2.5.36) we get the expected recovery value under Ch 11
R11e,n,v (p, s)
= R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) – w(p, s, e, n)n +
1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s), 0
}
= R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) +
1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s) –
[
wn + θU ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w · n + 1
ι
E(p, s)
]]
, 0
}
= R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC · (1 – θU (r)) ·max
{
A(p, s, n, b′) +
1
ι
E(p, s) – R7(p, s) – wn, 0
}
and equation (2.5.41) follows
R11e,n(p, s) = R7(p, s) + αR(e; θU (r)) · θC · (1 – θU (r)) · SRn (p, s)
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In conclusion the expected surplus of the workers
SWe,n
(
p, s
)
= αR(e; θU (r))
[
w(p, s, e, n)n – wn
]
= αR(e; θU (r)) · θU ·
[
A(p, s, n, b′) – R7(p, s) – w · n + 1
ι
E(p, s)
]
= αR(e; θU (r)) · θU · SRn (p, s) (1.D.10)
Proposition 2.5.8
The rm chooses n to maximize (2.5.42).
max
n∈N
αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · (1 – θU (r)) · ι · SRn (p, s)
or equivalently to maximize the nash bargaining surplus
αR(e; θU (r)) · (1 – θC ) · (1 – θU (r)) · ιmax
n∈N
·SRn (p, s)
which since the hiring choice is a static decision, is equivalent in maximizing
max
n∈N
A(p, s, n, b′) – w · n = max
n∈N
y(p, x, n) – χo + q(p, x, b′)b′ – δk
and simplifying
max
n∈N
y(p, x, n) – w · n
The rm chooses the number of workers which equates the marginal product of labour to the outside op-
portunity cost of workers.
Taking FOC and using (3.3.1) equation (2.5.44) follows.
n = z · x
(
αηk(1–α)η
w
) 1
1–αη
Hence substituting in (3.3.1)
y(p, x, n∗) = (z · x)(1–αη)(k1–αn∗,α)η
= (z · x)
(
αη
w
) αη
1–αη
k
(1–α)η
1–αη
and equation (2.5.45) follows. Substituting the solution in (2.5.41), (2.5.42) and (1.D.10), then (2.5.47), (2.5.48)
and (2.5.49) follows.
chapter 3
Financial Development, Default
Rates and Credit Spreads1
3.1 Introduction
We study the joint dynamics of corporate default and credit spreads from 1950 to 2012. We document that,
over the last thirty years, defaults rates rose by 467% while credit spreads barely moved. We refer to this
evidence as the diverging trend between rising default rates and constant credit spreads.
We provide statistical support for the presence of one structural break in the unconditional mean of default
rates around 1984. This date splits the series of default rates in two samples with strikingly dierent char-
acteristics. On one hand, during the 1950’s and 1960’s the US economy recorded almost no bankruptcies:
the average default rate from 1950 to 1983 equals 0.3%. On the other hand, from the 1980’s on we observe
a dramatic rise in the number of defaults: the average number of corporate bankruptcies from 1984 to 2012
equals 1.7%. Hence, default rates have increased by 467% throughout the last thirty years. Conversely, the
time series of credit spreads does not display any structural shift in its unconditional mean. The average
credit spread over the period 1950-1983 records 91 basis points whereas the average spread from 1984 to
2012 amounts to 102 basis points. We run a battery of tests and show that this 11 basis points increase is
not statistically signicant.
At a rst glance, it is hard to reconcile the dierent behavior of default rates and credit spreads. Anecdotal
evidence would suggest the two time series to move together. The credit spread is a market measure of
default risk and for this reason it should capture relevant information about default rates1. Therefore, such
a steep rise in default rates should allegedly be mirrored by credit spreads. However it does not.
To understand this phenomenon, we propose an explanation based on a structural change in the supply side
of credit. Although we acknowledge that changes in nancial factors, such as shocks to liquidity or to the
credit ratings, could account for this diverging trend, we provide a theory that is based just on fundamentals.
We conjecture that the reduction in the cost of borrowing due to the widely documented process of dereg-
ulation and innovation incurred by the nancial sector in the 70s might explain this empirical evidence.
Apropos, we construct a dynamic equilibrium model where two features, the development of credit markets
and the limited enforceability of debt, can be accounted for the diverging trend between default rates and
credit spreads. We model the development of credit markets in a reduced form, as an exogenous reduction
of the xed cost of borrowing. We nd that nancial development can explain 64% of the observed increase
1This Chapter is a joint work with Omar Rachedi.
1Longsta et al. [2005] document that 71% of the Baa yield is explained by default risk.
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in average default rates and predict just a 2 basis points increase in the credit spreads. As a robustness check,
our explanation quantitatively accounts for a number of trends that have characterized public rms over
the last decades: the fall in the number of rms distributing dividends, the rise in the degree of dividend
smoothing, and the increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of public rms.
In order to illustrate the model mechanism let us rst discuss the implications of the main friction in our
economy: limited enforceability of debt contracts. In the model there is a distribution of heterogeneous
rms that can default on their debt. In such an event the credit intermediary seizes the assets of the rm.
This environment generates endogenous borrowing constraints which depend on the level of capital of the
rm, its idiosyncratic eciency and the demanded amount of debt. In particular, rms with less collateral
face tighter constraint because upon default credit intermediaries incur in higher losses. Secondly, less
ecient rms face tighter borrowing constraints because they have a higher probability to default in the
next period2. Finally, larger loans increase the probability of default, by raising the number of scenarios
where the rm will not be able to repay its debt. Accordingly, the interest rate which is charged on the loan
by the credit intermediary reects these dierent determinants of the expected default cost. In conclusion,
large or ecient rms can borrow more (or borrow the same quantity at a cheaper price) with respect to
ceteris paribus smaller or less ecient ones. In addition to these features, we assume the presence of a xed
borrowing cost that further reduces the nancing ability of all rms, hitting disproportionately small rms.
What happens with the development of the credit markets? What happens when xed costs of borrowing
are reduced? A reduction in the xed cost of borrowing has both direct and indirect eects. The direct
eect is straightforward and twofold. First of all, there is a reduction in credit rationing. Firms can now
benet from the possibility of accessing small amount of loans, before unfeasible because of the presence
of a xed borrowing cost3. Secondly, rms can either raise the same amount of debt at a cheaper price
or, equivalently, access at the same price a higher amount of loan (just reallocating the resources before
devoted to the payment of the borrowing cost to increase the amount of actual loan). The indirect eect is
the result of the dynamic response of rms to the new environment. To understand it, we need to look more
closely at the optimizing behavior of a rm in presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. In our model
rms maximize the expected discounted value of the stream of dividends. The presence of endogenously
convex loan price schedules makes the value function of the risk-neutral rms to be concave. For this reason,
rms seek to smooth dividends against idiosyncratic shocks. Debt is a channel for doing so. Nonetheless the
higher the xed borrowing cost, the tighter the borrowing constraint, and, accordingly, the more dicult for
the rm to use eciently debt for this purpose. In order to partially overcome this obstacle rms try to build
up physical capital. Physical capital is in fact the collateral against which rms can borrow at a cheaper price.
The result is that rms which have been lucky in experiencing a raw of good productivity shocks tend to
accumulate for precautionary reasons more physical capital than what might be motivated just by eciency
2Since the idiosyncratic shock is persistent, rms’ actual status predicts their future productivity. If we
assume independent idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the borrowing constraint would not depend on the
actual eciency of the rm.
3For example, suppose that before the credit market development a rm optimal loan (given the interest
rate) was 100$ gross of the borrowing cost, and suppose that the cost of the borrowing process was 200$.
The cost of the process is higher than the total amount of the loan required, therefore the rm would have
not entered that contract. After nancial development, there will be less rms constrained in this fashion.
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reasons. Therefore, the higher the level of xed cost of borrowing, the higher the amount of physical capital
devoted for this purpose. Indeed, the collateral value of capital decreases with the xed cost of borrowing.
Conversely, rms which have not been lucky/small rms struggle to optimally exploit protable investment
opportunities, given the high cost of debt. As a conclusion in this economy ineciently large rms coexist
with small rms which struggle to grow.
By reducing the xed cost of borrowing, nancial development signicantly aects those dynamics. The
reduction of borrowing costs eases rms’ access to debt. Ecient small rms can nance more investment
and grow, while inecient rms can reduce their size without being penalized as much as before on their
interest rates, due to the lack of collateral. Hence, inecient large rms shrinks down their scale of opera-
tion. As a consequence, given the higher collateral value of capital, rms can borrow more debt for the same
amount of capital, implying an increase in leverage. Together with a higher volatility of debt, this implies a
higher volatility of leverage. Higher level and volatility of leverage boost the likelihood that rms end up in
states of the world where they nd optimal to default, pushing up the overall default rate of the economy.
Why the rise in default risk does not translate in an increase of the credit spreads? This question requires
a quantitative answer, because the change in credit spreads is driven by two counteracting forces which
exert their inuence through three channels: the xed cost of borrowing, the quantity of risk and the loss
given default for the credit intermediaries. On the one hand, rising default rates increase the quantity of
risk bore by credit intermediaries with the consequence that credit spreads have to rise too. On the other
hand, there are two channels through which nancial development reduces the credit spreads: the xed
cost of borrowing and the loss given default. First of all, ceteris paribus nancial development reduces by
construction the xed cost of borrowing, and therefore the interest rate charged on the loan. The impact on
the interest rate is stronger the higher is the expected probability of default of the rm, contributing to the
reduction of the credit spread. Secondly, and more importantly from a quantitative point of view, nancial
development make less stringent the borrowing constraint by allowing rms to operate at a more ecient
scale. As a result, the average size and prots increase, implying larger ex-ante liquidation values in case
of default. This channel tempers the loss given default for the credit intermediaries, pushing down credit
spreads. In the model, nancial development makes default to rise from 0.3% to 1.2%. Yet, credit spreads
rise just by 2 basis points because the higher default risk is oset by a 24% upsurge in the median expected
recovery rate. The bulk of this increase comes from a boost in the prots of the rm, which go up by 21.73%.
The median size of capital rises too, by 9.34%.
The model also predicts a number of trend that characterized public rms over the recent decades. First, we
show that the reduction of the xed credit costs changes rms’ optimal decisions of dividend payout. After
nancial development rms are in fact more able to smooth dividends over time, and they can trade o this
reduction in volatility with a decrease in the level of dividends. The reduction of the borrowing costs makes
the measure of rms distributing dividends to shrink down by 34%. This number accounts for the 73% of the
decline documented for the U.S. by Fama and French [2001]. Furthermore, in the model rms also increase
the degree of dividend smoothing by a magnitude which is remarkably close to the values estimated by
Leary and Michaely [2011] on US public rms. Second, we study the volatility of rms’ returns and sales.
Indeed, Campbell et al. [2001], Comin and Mulani [2006], Comin and Philippon [2005] show the presence
of a secular upward trend in the volatilities of rms. We suggest that this empirical evidence can be (at least
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partially) accounted for by nancial development. Indeed, the model is able to reproduce a rise of 72 % in
the volatility of sales and 67% for rms’ returns.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on the role of credit markets on rm dynamics. The seminal paper in this
eld is Cooley and Quadrini [2001], which augments the environment of Hopenhayn [1992] with nancial
frictions, namely an equity issuance and a bankruptcy deadweight loss. The authors present a model where
the dynamics of rms, in terms of growth, job reallocation and exit, is negatively correlated with their initial
size and age, as it is in the data. Following Cooley and Quadrini [2001], many papers attempted to understand
qualitatively and quantitatively the role of nancial frictions on rm characteristics, rm dynamics and the
behavior of macroeconomic aggregates. Jermann and Quadrini [2012] show how the limited enforceability
of rms’ debt might generate endogenous borrowing constraints, which aects not only the dynamics of
individual rms, but even the behavior of aggregate nancial and real variables. Jermann and Quadrini
[2008] use a similar model to show that nancial development can be accounted for the rise in volatility
of aggregate nancial variables and the decline of the volatility of real economic activity. All these models
share a common feature: despite rms are allowed to renege on their debt, there is no default in equilibrium.
This result stems from the presence of an enforcement constraint, which binds in equilibrium, impeding the
rms to default. Recently, few papers have relaxed this condition allowing for equilibrium default. Arellano
et al. [2011] build a general equilibrium model which allows for equilibrium default, where nancial frictions
interact with increases in uncertainty at the rm level to generate a contraction in the economic activity.
Khan et al. [2012] and Gomes and Schmid [2010a] instead use equilibrium default to show that credit shocks
account for a sizable part of the business cycle uctuations and generate recessions similar to the recent
nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Finally, Gomes and Schmid [2010b] develop a model with equilibrium default
to explain the relationship between rms’ leverage, book assets and stock prices.
Despite the dierent panorama of questions involved, these papers share the same idea on the role of equi-
librium default. In all of them, equilibrium default is just a nancial friction, valued in the extent in which
is able to produce dynamics which are relevant for investigating phenomena other than default. In other
words, it is the instrumental nature rather than the default phenomenon per se to be appraised. This paper
reverses this logic. In particular it contributes on the literature investigating the phenomenon of corporate
default per se. In so doing, we restrict our attention on the relationship between the magnitude of default in
the economy (default rate) and the price of risk which is associated to it (credit spreads). From a modeling
point of view, this paper builds on Arellano et al. [2012], despite the emphasis of the two paper is on com-
pletely dierent questions. In particular, Arellano et al. [2012] focus on the role of nancial development
on rm dynamics, showing how nancial development reduces the dierences in leverage and growth rates
among large and small rms.
In conclusion, despite this paper is the rst documenting the diverging trend between the rise in corporate
default rates and constant credit spreads, the increase in default rate is not a new stylized fact. Among
others, Campbell et al. [2008] show that corporate bankruptcies have increased by 150% or 300%, depending
on how default is measured. A similar upward trend is instead found by Livshits et al. [2012] in the con-
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sumer bankruptcies in the United States. They show that, from 1970 to 2002, personal bankruptcies in the
United States have increased by around 500%, which is analogous to the number we report on corporate
bankruptcies.
3.2 Data
In this section we document the diverging trend between rising corporate default rates and constant credit
spreads from the period 1950-2012. This empirical evidence builds upon the contribution of Giesecke et al.
[2011] in the measurement of the average default rates and credit spreads of the economy.
3.2.1 Corporate Default Rates
We take the data on US public rms corporate default rates from the Moody’s Analytics Default and Recov-
ery Database. The data set covers the credit experiences of over 18,000 corporate issuers that sold long-term
public debt at some time between 1920 and 20124. On the one side, an appealing feature of the Moody’s data
is its broad denition of default which includes not only formal bankruptcy procedures (Chapter 7,Chapter
11) but also informal ones (distressed exchange5). We think this is the most relevant denition of default for
our analysis, which focuses on economic consequences of default6. On the other side, this data set presents
some drawbacks. First of all, the index made available to the public by Moody’s is issuer-weighted, while
a value-weighted index would be a more appropriate measure for gauging the economic impact of default.
Second, the sample of rms in consideration (the denominator of the ratio from which we obtain the default
rates) is the sample of rms rated by the rating agency, while we would need a broader measure of the public
rms population. Third, this index is a global index, which includes not only US rms, contaminating the
statistic with foreign default cycles. In conclusion, the index includes also nancial and utilities rms, which
we would like to depurate, given the dierent capital structure characteristics. A solution to these problems,
would be to use the data of Giesecke et al. [2011], which shares similar properties to the one under study
in this paper, and are cleaned of these shortcomings. Hence, until these better data become available, our
results should be mostly viewed as suggestive.
Figure 3.2.1 displays the annual issuer-weighted corporate default rates for U.S. public rmsfrom 1950 to
2012. Visual inspection of the picture foregrounds a dramatic upsurge in default rates starting from the
1980’s on, following a period of almost no default in the 1950’s and 1960’s. To test for the presence of a
break in the data generating process behind the times series of corporate default rates we apply the Bai and
Perron [1998]’s SupLR test statistics. This procedure checks the presence of multiple structural changes,
4As of January 1, 2012 approximately 5,000 corporate issuers held a Moody’s long-term bond, loan, or
corporate family rating, see Moody’s [2012], p. 16.
5A distressed exchange is one of three events which Moody’s denes as a default for the purpose of its
default rate statistics. It is any of the following two events: 1) the issuer can make a tender oer, agreeing to
pay cash for all or a portion of an outstanding debt security, usually at a price above the trading price, but
well below the face amount; 2) the issuer can make an exchange oer, through which an oer is made to
substitute the current outstanding securities for a new package of securities which may include: cash, new
bonds, stocks, other securities, or a combination thereof, see Moody’s [2012].
6Financial intermediaries care about the ultimate economic consequence of a delinquent loan, and not
about the form of legal bankruptcy or informal default that the debt obligation might have turned into.
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occurring at random dates. The test statistic is obtained by running an OLS regression. We test for the
existence of at most three break dates. Following Carvalho and Gabaix [2013], we assume that every date
T lies in a range [T1, T2], with T1 = 0.2n and T2 = 0.8n, where n denotes the sample size. The choice of a
20% trimming parameter is recommended by Bai and Perron [2006] to reduce the size distortions which is
present when allowing for serial correlation in the error.
As a data generator process for the default rates, we consider a rst order autoregressive model plus a
constant. We run two dierent test to check for a break in the constant and a joint break in the constant and
in the autoregressive coecient. Table 3.2.1 shows that we reject the null hypothesis of no break for both
cases at a 5% signicance level. Either case, the SupLR test statistic indicates the existence of a single break,
which is estimated at 1983 and 1984. We nd statistical evidence of these breaks even after controlling for
lagged GDP growth rates and lagged stock returns volatility. These tests tell us that default rates did change
their dynamics in the early 1980’s. Hereafter, we follow the vast literature on the Great Moderation that
indicates the existence of a break in the volatility of US GDP growth around 19847. We will then compare
two intervals of time, one going from 1950 to 1983 and the second from 1984 to 20128. In Table 2 we report
the mean values of the corporate default rates over the two intervals of time. Default rates rose from an
average value of 0.3% during the period 1950-1983 up to 1.7% over the last thirty years. This corresponds
to a 467% increase in average default rates. Surprisingly, this number almost equals the 500% increase in
consumer bankruptcy documented over the same time period by Livshits et al. [2012].
3.2.2 Corporate Credit Spreads
We measure the intensity of corporate default risk using the default rates of the public rms in the economy.
Accordingly, we would need an analogous measure of the average price of bond risk. Unfortunately, such a
series does not exist. As in Giesecke et al. [2011], we choose the series of spread of a hypothetical average
bond, which is considered to be within the Aaa and the Baa credit rating. Therefore, we compute the spreads
as the dierence between Moody’s Baa and Aaa Seasoned corporate all rms bond yields, and available at the
FRED database9. Our implicit assumption is that the Baa bond proxies for the risky asset in the economy
and the Aaa bond is the risk-free asset. We argue that this credit spread is the relevant measure for this
analysis. First of all, Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds belong to the investment-grade class. This class is
the most representative form of corporate bond in terms of bond issuance10 (supply side) and have peculiar
liquidity properties11. The fact that both the risky asset and safe asset belong to the same class allows us to
control (in the data) for common shift in the supply of liquidity for investment-grade bonds (demand side).
7Among others, McConnell and Perez-Quiros [2000], Stock and Watson [2002], Carvalho and Gabaix
[2013] and reference therein. In particular, Stock and Watson [2002] document a wide-spread decline in
aggregate volatility, analysing the time series of 124 macro variables since 1960.
8The results of the paper do not change when considering 1983 as the break date.
9For more information about the series, see Appendix 3.B.3.
10Investment grade bonds account for 2/3 for issuance volume in 1996, and more than 90% in 2006, see
Bessembinder and Maxwell [2008], p.28
11“For regulated nancial service rms, such as banks and life insurance companies, required reserves
are greater for noninvestment grade bonds. Further, many nancial institutions, including pension and
mutual funds, face restrictions on amount of non-investment grade debt they can hold”. Bessembinder and
Maxwell [2008], p.5.
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Figure 3.2.1: Corporate Default Rate
Note: this graph plots the annual corporate default rate (in percentage points) in the United States from
1950 until 2012. The circle line plots the average annual corporate default rate from 1950 until 1983, while
the dashed line plots the average annual corporate default rate from 1984 until 2012. Shaded area denotes
recession.
Table 3.2.1: Break Test for Default Rates
Defaultt = a + ρDefaultt–1 + t
H0: No Break in a H0: No Break in a and ρ
SupLR Stat 8.70 18.14
5% Critical Values 8.22 10.98
Null of No Break Reject Reject
Estimated Break Date 1983 1984
Note: this table reports the results of the Bai and Perron [1998] structural break
test on annual default rates given by Moody’s Default and Recovery Database.
We assume that default rates follow an AR(1) process and we test two null hy-
potheses: either no break just in the constant or no break in both the constant
and the autoregressive parameter. The table reports the test statistics (Su-
pLR stat), the 5% Critical Values, whether the test reject or accepts the null
hypothesis, and the estimated date of the break in case the null is rejected.
The reason why we preferred the Aaa corporate bond to the Treasury-Bill yield as a proxy of the risk-free
rate is manifold. First of all, we study the relation between the dynamics of corporate default and the risk-
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Table 3.2.2: Average Default Rates
1950-1983 1984-2012 ∆ 1984-2012/1950-1983
0.3% 1.7% +467%
Note: this table reports the average of annual default rates
given by Moody’s Default and Recovery Database, over
two dierent periods, from 1950 until 1983, and from 1984
until 2012.
based-dierential in the rms cost of nancing. Accordingly, an homogeneity argument would support the
choice of a rm safe corporate bond yield as a proxy of the risk free rate. Moreover, our explanation of
the joint dynamics is based on a structural break in the rms cost of nancing. While we can empirically
support that nancial development has aected the rms cost of debt nancing, we cannot claim the same
for the government cost of debt nancing. Therefore we would unsoundly model the impact on a leg of
the credit spread, missing the fact that nancial development aects both the cost of risky rm and safe
rms. Secondly, we can safely arm that Aaa corporate bonds and Treasury Bills are dierent securities.
Apart from sharing the same rating class, they do not have much in common: they display dierent market
microstructure, taxation, and they are exposed to dierent sources of risk12. All these aspects translate in
an average credit spread between Aaa bonds and Treasury Bills amounts to 84 basis points (bp) over the
period 1950-2012, which cannot be explained by a simple default risk story we are proposing here13.
Figure 3.2.2 plots our series of credit spreads, measured in basis points. We can observe how credit spreads
were low in the 1950’s and 1960’s, before peaking up to 232 bp in the 1982. From the 1980’s on, credit
spreads have been declining to values comparable to the one of 1950’s and 1960’s. Concomitant with the
last nancial crisis, credit spreads hike up to 199 bp in the 2009.
As above, we apply the Bai and Perron [1998]’s test to check for structural changes in the credit spreads.
Again, to comply with the assumption of the Bai-perron test, we proxy the credit spreads process as a rst-
12First, Corporate bonds are (an order of measure) less liquid than Treasury bill. The Treasury bill Av-
erage Daily Trading Volume in the U.S. Bond Markets in 2001 amount to 297.9$ billions compared to only
17.9$ billions for the whole corporate bond sector. In 2006 the volumes of T-bill almost doubled (524.7$),
while the volumes of corporate bonds raises only to 22.7$, see Bessembinder and Maxwell [2008], p. 29. Sec-
ond, Corporate bond yields are subject to state taxation, while U.S. Treasury securities are exent. Longsta
[2011] shows that tax risk is an important determinant in the pricing of assets. Third, other than the com-
mon default risk and liquidity risk, sovereign bonds present a sizeable recovery rates risk. Due to the high
uncertainty which characterise enforcement of international debt contracts sovereign bonds display a size-
able heterogeneity in the recovery rates. For example, the credit loss of the 1983-1986 debt restructuring
in Argentina was 30%, while the one of the 2001-2002 crisis amounted to 72%. The other major sovereign
default crisis, which involved Russia in the August of 1998, was characterized by a credit loss of 63%. On
the contrary, recovery rates of Moody’s Aa and Baa corporate bonds are stable around 40%, see Moody’s
[2012], p.26.
13Huang and Huang [2012] show that the expected Aaa-Treasury Bill spread should be around 1 bp,
given the 0.03% expected 5-year average cumulative credit loss of Aaa corporate bonds.
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Figure 3.2.2: Corporate Credit Spreads
Note: this graph plots the annual corporate credit spread (in basis points) in the United States from 1950
until 2012. The circle line plots the average annual corporate credit spread from 1950 until 1983, while the
dashed line plots the average annual corporate credit spread from 1984 until 2012. Shaded area denotes
recession.
order autoregressive model plus a constant, and - in conclusion - we test whether there is a break either
just in the constant or both in the constant and the autoregressive parameter. Table 3 shows that we cannot
reject the null of no break in either cases. Controlling for lagged GDP growth rates14 and lagged stock
returns volatility, testing for breaks using quarterly data and using the Chow test with 1983 or 1984 as pre-
determined break date does not alter our nding15. Table 4 reports the mean values of the credit spreads over
the two periods of interest, 1950-1983 and 1984-2012. From the 1950’s to the 1970’s, the average value of the
credit spread was 91 bp. This average barely changed over the following three decades, reaching 102 bp. On
the ground of the evidence provided by the break tests, we interpret this 11 bp increase as not statistically
signicant. To check whether these 11 basis points are economically signicant, we follow Giesecke et al.
[2011] by using a back-to-the-envelope to estimate the average annual credit losses, assuming 50% recovery
rate16. We nd that a 1.4% increase in default rates should have pushed up credit spreads by 70 bp instead
of the 11 bp observed in the data. Secondly, despite default rates have increased to a record number of 5.45%
in the recent nancial crises, the credit spread reached a peak of 199 bp. Yet, the global maximum over the
over-all period in consideration, equals 232 bp and was reached in 1982 with a default rate of only 1.16%.
14Gomes and Schmid [2010a] investigates the endogenous link between macro aggregates and credit
spreads.
15We apply the Chow test to quarterly data using as a pre-determined data any quarter between 1982:1
and 1984:1, and in all cases we reject the presence of a break at the 5% signicance level.
16The back-to-the-envelope estimate multiplies the physical probability of default to the expected loss
upon default. We consider a 50% recovery rate, which is the average senior unsecured recovery rates on
investment grade bond for the period 1982-2011, see Moody’s [2012], p. 9. As a result, a 1% default rate
translates into 50 basis points.
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Table 3.2.3: Break Test for Credit Spreads
Spreadt = a + ρSpreadt–1 + t
H0: No Break in a H0: No Break in a and ρ
SupLR Stat 5.68 5.62
5% Critical Values 8.22 10.98
Null of No Break Accept Accept
Estimated Break Date - -
Note: this table reports the results of the Bai and Perron [1998] structural break
test on annual credit spreads, measured as the dierence (in basis points) be-
tween Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields. We assume that credit spreads fol-
low an AR(1) process and we test two null hypotheses: either no break just in
the constant or no break in both the constant and the autoregressive param-
eter. The table reports the test statistics (SupLR stat), the 5% Critical Values,
whether the test reject or accepts the null hypothesis, and the estimated date
of the break in case the null is rejected.
This over period max-max comparison provides further economical support of our claim that something has
structurally changed in the dynamics of default rates and credit spreads. As a conclusion, the change in aver-
age credit spreads over the two periods is insignicant from both an economic and a statistical point of view.
3.2.3 Diverging Trend
In summary, starting from the early 1980’s default rates rose by 467% while credit spreads kept constant. We
refer to this evidence as the diverging trend between default rates and credit spreads. Longsta et al. [2005]
nd that default risk explains 71% of the Baa bond yields. Therefore, a 467% increase in default rates should
come at a neat rise in the credit spreads. In addition, even if actual average default rates in both periods
are low in absolute value, such a steep increase in default rates should be mirrored in credit spreads for two
reasons. First, Almeida and Philippon [2007] show that the risk-adjusted cost of default is four-ve times
larger than what the physical bankruptcy rates would suggest. Indeed, default is more likely to occur in bad
times, which makes risk-averse agents to care more about nancial distress than is suggested by physical
credit losses. Second, though the average default in the last thirty years equals 1.7%, now nancial distress
has become more likely for the median rm too. In this sense, the rise in default rates cannot be diversied
away and should, therefore, be translated in the pricing of debt.
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Table 3.2.4: Average Credit Spreads
1950-1983 1984-2012 ∆ 1984-2012/1950-1983
91 bp 102 bp +11 bp
Note: this table reports the average of annual credit
spreads, measured as the dierence (in basis points) be-
tween Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond yields, over two dif-
ferent periods, from 1950 until 1983, and from 1984 until
2012.
3.2.4 Financial Development
In this paper we quantitatively investigate how nancial development can aect average default rates and
credit spreads, by inuencing the economic decision of all the rms. Following the seminal papers of King
and Levine [1993] and Rajan and Zingales [1998], a vast literature attempted to study the interaction between
nancial development and the real economy, an idea that actually traces back to Schumpeter (1911).
We focus on the process of deregulation and innovation that characterized the nancial sector during the
1970s. This decade saw the introduction, among others, of ATMs, phone transfers for savings balances at
commercial banks, the International Banking Act, the modication on the Regulation Q on the banking
system, the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Control Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
the 1979 Bankruptcy Reform Act, NOW (negotiable order of withdraw) accounts, the securitization of debt
collateralization, the introduction of the Securities Protection Act and the introduction of Asset Backed
Securities (ABS), which has recently became the rst source of funding for U.S. corporate rms, undertaking
corporate bonds.
The deregulation in the nancial sector has improved the access to credit for corporate rms, especially the
small ones, and decreased the cost of external nancing. Nowadays rms can borrow more and cheaper
than 30 years ago. This view is supported by the empirical evidence provided by Jayaratne and Strahan
[1996] and Demyanyk et al. [2007], among others. Accordingly, in our analysis we will model nancial
development in a reduced form, as an exogenous reduction in the xed costs of borrowing.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Environment
In the economy there are two types of agents: rms and credit intermediaries. Firms have decreasing returns
to scale production technologies and experience in each period a persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock
and an i.i.d stochastic xed cost of operation. They are run by risk neutral managers which maximize the
expected discounted stream of dividends. Firms articulate in two types: incumbents and entrants. At each
point of time, there is a distribution of heterogeneous incumbents, which are dened as the producing
rms of the economy. Incumbents nance investment and dividends using internal and external funds:
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retained prots, new equity issuance and one-period non-contingent loans from the credit intermediaries.
Incumbents can renege on their obligations and default. The presence of default risk generates endogenous
borrowing constraints for the rms and makes loans’ interest rates to be rm-specic. Less ecient rms
and/or rms with less collateral face tighter borrowing constraints and access to loans at higher interest
rates than more ecient rms and/or rms with more collateral.
Every period a mass of rms enters the economy and starts the production with a time-to-build lag. Entrants
solve a problem identical to the incumbents with the dierence that they resort uniquely to external funds.
There is also a competitive nancial sector. Each nancial intermediary oers a menu of loan sizes and
interest rates to rms wherein each loan makes zero expected prots. When a rm defaults, creditors can
seize its assets and prots net of a liquidation loss.
3.3.2 Firms
In the economy there are two types of rms: incumbents and entrants. Henceforth we denote with the i
subscript an incumbent rm, while e stands for an entrant rm. We omit the subscript when the distinction
is not necessary.
Firms use capital k ∈ K ⊂ R+ to produce an homogeneous consumption good y ∈ Y ⊂ R+ using a
decreasing returns to scale technology17,18
y = xkα (3.3.1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of concavity of the production function and x is an uninsurable id-
iosyncratic shock. The idiosyncratic productivity x ∈ X ⊂ R+ follows a rst-order Markov processes
whose transition function is px (x′|x). In each period rms incur in a stochastic xed cost of operation. The
operating prots before interest and depreciation are dened as:
pi = xkα – χ (3.3.2)
where χ ∈ χ ⊂ R+ is the i.i.d. xed cost of operation drawn from the cumulative distribution H (χ). This
shock is intended to create a link between negative cash ows and the rms’ decision of going bankrupt.
Without this feature, rms would always have non-negative prots. However, in the data defaulting rms
experience negative prots. Physical capital depreciates at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and accumulates with the law of
motion
k′ = (1 – δ)k + i (3.3.3)
where k and k′ denotes, respectively, the actual and next period stock of physical capital and i is the capital
investment.
Entrants nance dividends and investment with one-period non-contingent loans and new equity issuance.
Incumbents can resort, in addition, to retained prots. Because of limited enforceability, rms can renege
17Diminishing returns to scale at the rm-level may be explained with the span of control models of
Rosen [1982] and Lucas [1978].
18Decreasing returns to scale technologies and perfect competition prevent the most productive rms
from taking over the market completely and allow for the existence of heterogeneity in equilibrium. Since
rms can be replicated, returns to scale are constant at the aggregate level.
3.3 The Model 125
on their debt. Then, loan contracts depend on those rms’ characteristics that are informative about the
default probability and the loss given default. When an incumbent rm defaults, it partially meets its obli-
gations with the creditors. In such a case, the rm is liquidated and the creditors seize both its prots and
undepreciated capital
L(k, x) = max{(1 – ψ) (pi + (1 – δ)k) , 0} (3.3.4)
suering a liquidation clearance loss ψ ∈ (0, 1). The recovery rate is then L(k, x)/b, where b refers to the
rm outstanding debt.
Every period, after observing the realization of the shocks, incumbents choose whether to enter into a one-
period non-contingent loan contract. A contract formalizes in a 4-tuple
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
, which delivers a loan
l′i whose repayment value is b′i =
(
1 + r ′i
)
l′i , to rms with idiosyncratic eciency xi and future stock of
physical capital k′i . Contracts
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
belong to a set of debt schedules Ω
(
xi , k′i , l′i
)
. This specication
highlights the dependence of interest rates on three rms’ key characteristics: 1) the productivity, 2) the
size of assets and 3) the size of the loan. If the actual productivity is high, next period productivity is more
likely to be high19. This decreases the probability of default and the interest rates. Similarly, rms with
more capital have a larger collateral and therefore lower interest rates. Finally, larger loans increase the
probability of default, implying a higher interest rate. It is worth noticing that the future levels of capital
and outstanding debt are chosen at the same time, and they jointly determine the interest rate required by
the credit intermediaries. Entrants face the same loan contracts with the dierence that their debt schedules
and interest rates do not depend on the idiosyncratic shock xe .
Firms issue new equity when their dividends d are negative. The equity issuance comes at an additional
proportional cost, γ > 1. The total cost of distributing dividends d ∈ R is then
g(d) = dI{d≥0} + (γd)I{d<0}
where I{y} is an indicator function that takes value 1 when y is true. The implication of the issuance cost is
twofold. It prevents rms from distributing dividends and raising equity at the same time and it does not
allow rms to issue as much equity as they need to circumvent the nancial frictions due to bonds’ limited
enforceability20. Then, the equity issuance cost makes rms to prefer the use of retained prots and debt to
equity, in accordance with the pecking order theory.
Firms can also save in the market portfolio of corporate bonds (l′ < 0). Since the idiosyncratic uncertainty
washes out in the aggregate, the gross return on the market portfolio of corporate bonds is the risk-free rate
1 + rF . Thus, the repayment value b ∈ B ⊂ R, is
b =
(
[1 + r]I{l>0} + [1 + rF ]I{l<0}
)
l
19This argument holds as long as rms’ idiosyncratic productivity shocks are persistent. In case of i.i.d
productivity shocks the interest rate would not depend anymore on the actual x, as it happens for the xed
cost shock χ.
20The presence of the equity issuance cost and the bankruptcy deadweight loss make the Modigliani and
Miller [1958] theorem not to hold in this framework.
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Incumbents
An incumbent begins with an amount of net-wealth ωi ∈ W ≡ X × K × χ × B ⊂ R3+ × R, which is a
by-product of its holdings of physical capital and outstanding debt, that is
ωi = pii + (1 – δ)ki –
(
[1 + ri] I{li>0} + [1 + rF ] I{li<0}
)
li
At each point of time, there is a large measure λ of incumbents, which are dened as the set of rms that
either were operating or entered in the previous period. λ is the probability measure over (ωi , xi), dened
on the Borel algebra J generated by the open subset of the product space J = W× X ⊂ R4+ × R.
We assume that an incumbent rst observes the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock xi and
the stochastic xed cost of operation χi , and then produces. At this point, each rm maximizes the ex-
pected present value of future prots in a two stage decision problem. First, a rm decides whether to
default or not. The default implies the exit of the rm and an outside opportunity of not operating equals
zero. Therefore, rms default whenever their continuation value is negative. Second, if the rm does not
default, it nances the entire value of its outstanding liabilities (1+ri)li , and decides the amount of dividends
to distribute di , the new level of physical capital k′i , and the new level of debt l′i , given the debt schedules(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω (k′i , l′i , xi). Figure 3.3.3 summarizes the timing of the model.
Figure 3.3.3: Timing of the Model
The states of the economy for an incumbent rm are, therefore, (ωi , xi). The incumbents’ problem can be
written as
Vi(ωi , xi) = max
φD,i∈{0,1}
(1 – φD,i)V ci (ωi , xi) (3.3.5)
where φD,i = φD(ωi , xi) is an indicator function that takes value φD,i = 1 in case of default, and V ci (ωi , xi)
denotes the continuation value of an incumbent rm which does not default,
V ci (ωi , xi) = max
di ,k′i ,l′i
di + βEH (χ′i ),x′i |xi
[
Vi(ω′i , x′i )
]
(3.3.6)
s.t. g(di) = ωi + l′i – k′i
ω′i ≡ ω′i (k′i , l′i , x′i ,χ′i) = pi′i + (1 – δ)k′i –
( [
1 + r ′i
]
I{l′i >0} + [1 + rF ] I{l′i <0}
)
l′i (3.3.7)(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω(k′i , l′i , xi) (3.3.8)
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where: 1) β denotes the subjective time discounting rate of the rm’s manager; 2) EH (χ′i ),x′i |xi denotes the
expected value over the independent processes of χ′i and x′i , where the realization of x′i is conditional on xi;
3) equation (3.3.7) denotes the law of motion of rm’s net worth. ω′i is a random process which inherits the
rst-order Markov property from the idiosyncratic productivity shock x′i , augmented by the independent
i.i.d process of χ′i . Formally ω′i follows the transition function p(x′i |xi)H (dχ′i)21.
Analogously to the analysis of entry and exit in Hopenhayn [1992], we can describe the optimal default
policy as a threshold on the idiosyncratic productivity shock. Here the denition of the threshold is com-
plicated by the dependence of the continuation value of the incumbents on both22 the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock and the wealth. Using the weakly increasing property of the continuation value on both
arguments, Khan et al. [2012] prove that for each level of ωi there exists a schedule xi = x(ωi) such that a
rm with net-wealth ωi defaults if and only if its productivity is lower than xi . Such a threshold xi is dened
as the value of x wherein V c(ωi , xi) = 0.
Likewise, it might be shown that when rms default, their net-wealth is negative. Intuitively, when the
net-wealth is non-negative, a rm is always able to pay back the debt without resorting to any additional
external fund. In turn, this implies that the liquidation value (3.3.4) which the creditors seize out of defaulted
rms is always less than the due repayment values of the loans. This result guarantees that creditors always
incur in a loss when rms default.
Before concluding, it is worth noticing that the negative net-wealth is a necessary but not sucient condition
for the rm to default. Indeed, a rm with negative net-wealth can nd optimal not to exit and decide to
issue equity and roll over debt to fund its operations.
Entrants
The model features exogenous entry. At each point of time there is a mass Ξt of rms which enters in
the economy, merely substituting the measure of rms which default. Production takes place with a lag,
as a time-to-build restriction. The entrants begin the period with an amount of physical capital ke . They
then decide the amount of dividends to distribute de , the new level of physical capital k′e , and debt l′e (or
savings if l′e < 0) with (k′e , l′e , r ′e) ∈ Ω
(
k′e , l′e
)
to maximize the expected present value of future prots. The
entrants can also decide to raise equity at the proportional cost γ. Once entrants have solved for their
optimal choices, they draw next-period idiosyncratic shock x′e from a cumulative distribution G
(
x′e
)
. The
state of the economy for an entrant is then ke . Hence, the entrants’ problem can be written as
Ve(ke) = max
de ,k′e ,l′e
de + βEH (χ′e),G(x′e )
[
Vi(ω′e , x′e)
]
(3.3.9)
s.t. g(de) = ke + l′e – k′e
ω′e ≡ ω′i (k′e , l′e , x′e ,χ′e) = pi′e + (1 – δ)k′e –
( [
1 + r ′e
]
I{l′e>0} + [1 + rF ] I{l′e<0}
)
l′e (3.3.10)(
k′e , l′e , r ′e
) ∈ Ω(k′e , l′e) (3.3.11)
21Where we assume that the pdf of H (χ′i) exists and it is atomless.
22In Hopenhayn [1992], the continuation value depends only on the productivity shock.
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3.3.3 Credit Intermediaries
In the economy there is a competitive nancial sector which lends to rms (or borrows from rms, in case
they save). The credit intermediaries oer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates, wherein each loan makes
zero prots. For each loan the intermediaries have to pay a xed cost ζ . As suggested by Arellano et al.
[2012], the xed credit cost can be interpreted as any nancial intermediation cost that creditors incur
when issuing a loan, as costs to obtain information about rms’ default probability and overhead costs. The
higher the value of ζ , the larger the costs rms incur in borrowing from the credit intermediaries, the less
developed is the nancial sector of the economy. Following Arellano et al. [2012], we consider this cost as
a proxy for nancial development.
The credit intermediaries price rms bonds by dening debt schedules which contingent on rm character-
istics. The latter captures the probability of default and the amount of insurance in case of default. Formally,
the credit intermediary oers a set of incumbent-specic contracts
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω (k′i , l′i , xi) which read:
in absence of arbitrage opportunities, the incumbent-specic (xi , k′i ) interest rate r ′i associated to a required
amount of loan l′i is dened by the zero prot (break-even) condition of the intermediaries Ω
(
k′i , l′i , xi
)
:(
l′i + ζ
)
(1 + rF ) = EH (χ′i ),x′i |xi
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,iL(k′i , x′i )
]
(3.3.12)
where ζ denotes the xed cost of borrowing and L(k′i , x′i ) is the liquidation value of the rm in case of default,
as dened in (3.3.4). In case of an entrant, the mapping is identical but for the expectation, which is taken
unconditionally over the idiosyncratic shock xe .
The availability and the interest rates of each loan depend on the default risk, on the amount of insurance
provided by the expected liquidation value and on the borrowing costs ζ . While the rst two channels
generate endogenous borrowing constraints which are rm specic, the presence of xed credit costs limits
all rms access to credit. As pointed out above, the xed cost has a further asymmetric eect: small and less
ecient rms suer disproportionately more from it.
3.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium
3.4.1 Denition of Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in this economy is given by the optimal choices of the incumbents (φD,i , k′i , l′i , di),
optimal choices for the entrants (k′e , l′e , de), an exogenous risk-free rate rF and the rm-specic contracts(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e , l′e , r ′e
)
, such that:
1. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF , the rm-specic contracts
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e , l′e , r ′e
)
satisfy the
zero ex-ante prot condition of the credit intermediary (3.3.12)23, for any choice of (k′i , l′i ) and (k′e , l′e);
2. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF and the rm-specic contracts
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
, the incumbent
rms choose (φD,i , k′i , l′i , di) to maximize their problem described in (3.3.5);
23Recall the variant of the zero ex-ante prot condition of the credit intermediary (3.3.12) for the en-
trant requires to use in the expectation the unconditional distribution G(x′e) to determine the next period
idiosyncratic shock.
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3. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF and the rm-specic contracts
(
k′e , l′e , r ′e
)
, the entrant rms
choose (k′e , l′e , de) to maximize their problem described in (3.3.9);
4. given the exogenous risk-free rate rF , the rm-specic contracts
(
xi , k′i , l′i , r ′i
)
,
(
k′e , l′e , r ′e
)
, the optimal
choices of the incumbents (φD,i , k′i , l′i , di) and the optimal choices for the entrants (k′e , l′e , de), the law
of motion of the distribution of rms is given by
λ(ω′i , x′i ) =
∫ (
1 – φD,i
)
Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi , xi)
)
H (χ′)px
(
x′i |xi
)
λ(dωi , dxi)
+
∫
φD,iQe
(
ω′e , x′e
)
H (χ′e)G
(
x′e
)
λ(dωi , dxi)
where Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi , xi)
)
denotes a transition functions such that
Q
((
ω′i , x′i
)
, (ωi , xi)
)
=
{
1, if ω′i (ωi , xi) = ω′i , x′i (xi) = x′i
0, if otherwise
The same applies to Qe(ω′e , x′e).
3.4.2 The Role of Financial Development
In this section we investigate analytically the eect of changes in the borrowing cost ζ . The idea is to
isolate in the simplest framework the eects of nancial development on the borrowing constraints, and the
leverage in the economy. We consider a simple economy without uncertainty, where there is a continuum
of rms which are born with dierent idiosyncratic productivity x¯i , henceforth constant. Incumbents do
not suer stochastic xed cost of operation. Entrants are endowed with no capital and debt. Output is
produced using capital, which fully depreciate each period. Firms cannot save or issue equity. The following
Propositions follow the results in Arellano et al. [2012]. The interested reader can refer to Appendix 3.A for
the detailed proofs.
Proposition 3.4.1. In this economy there is a unique equilibrium which is characterized as follows. In equi-
librium:
1. The policy functions of the rms are constant, (φ∗D,i , k′∗i , l′∗i , d∗i )
2. Firms do not default. φ∗D,i = 0
3. Firms can borrow at the risk free rate, corrected for the xed cost of borrowing. In formula:
(1 + r∗i )l∗i = (1 + r∗)l∗i + (1 + r∗i )ζ (3.4.13)
4. Firms demand capital up to equalize their marginal product to the risk-free interest rate. Let me name
this level of capital as the rst-best level of capital, kfb,i :
kfb,i =
(
αx¯i
1 + ri
) 1
1–α
(3.4.14)
Notice there is a one-onto-one increasing relationship between kfb,i and x¯i .
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5. Firms are subject to endogenous borrowing constraints.
The endogenous borrowing constraints arise from the necessity of making incentive compatible for the rms
not to default. In particular:
Proposition 3.4.2. A no defaulting equilibrium strategy for a rm i is sustained for level of debt l∗i ∈ [0, lD,i],
where lD,i represent the equilibrium rm-specic debt limit and it is dened as:
lD,i =
1 + ri – α
riα
kfb,i –
(1 + ri)
ri
ζ (3.4.15)
We name this level of debt, rm specic debt-limit, and it is dened as the level of debt for which it is incentive
compatible for the rm not to default.
The endogenous nature of the debt-limit rationalizes the label endogenous borrowing constraint. Propo-
sition 3.4.3 investigates the sensitivity of lD,i to nancial development and (through the optimal choice of
capital), to the level of idiosyncratic productivity of the rms.
Proposition 3.4.3. In equilibrium:
•
∂lD,i
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
< 0: the debt-limit is increasing in the level of nancial development. The lower the level
of nancial development (the higher is ζ), the lower is the level of debt for which the rm is indierent
whether to default or not.
•
∂lD,i
∂kfb,i(x¯)
= 1 + ri – α
riα
> 0: the debt-limit is increasing in the optimal choice of capital, which depends
uniquely on the original idiosyncratic eciency. Then, the higher is the idiosyncratic productivity, the
higher is the debt limit.
In equilibrium the leverage evaluated at the debt-limit can be expressed as:
levi =
lD,i
kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
riα
– (1 + ri)
ri
ζ
kfb,i
(3.4.16)
Similarly to what we have just done, Proposition 3.4.4 explores the sensitivity of the leverage, levi , to nan-
cial development.
Proposition 3.4.4. In equilibrium:
•
∂levi
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
1
kfb,i
< 0: the leverage is strictly increasing in the level of nancial development. The
more developed is the credit intermediation (the lower is the ζ), the higher is the equilibrium leverage of
the rms.
•
∂levi
∂kfbi (x¯)
= 1 + ri
ri
ζ
(kfb,i)2
> 0: the leverage is strictly increasing in the amount of capital. The higher is
the productivity of a rm, the higher is the optimal level of capital, the higher is the equilibrium leverage.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we study the quantitative implications of nancial development on the joint behavior of
default rates and credit spreads and on other relevant dynamics of the US economy. To that end, we compute
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two equilibria whose parameters dier only for the value of the xed borrowing costs. The rst equilibrium
is calibrated to proxy the behaviour of some relevant facts of the US economy over the period 1950-1983. The
second equilibrium approximates the US economy over the period 1984-2012; it takes as given the estimated
and calibrated parameters from the rst period but for the xed costs of borrowing, which are lowered. In
line with the calibration strategy adopted by Buera and Shin [2013], we discipline this cut by matching the
higher leverage of the rms over the period 1984-201224. As mentioned above, the decline in the xed cost
of borrowing is a reduced form way of modelling nancial development25. This modelling strategy allows
us to isolate and study the implications of nancial development, and to test whether it might have been a
relevant structural explanation of the diverging trend observed in the data.
3.5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model over the period 1950-1983. In the model, one period corresponds to one year.
Uncertainty in the Economy
In order to proceed we need to impose more structure on the stochastic properties of the uncertainty in the
economy: the idiosyncratic productivity shock and the stochastic xed cost of operation. The idiosyncratic
productivity shock of the incumbents follows an AR(1) process, such that
xt = ρxxt–1 + et , et ∼ N (0,σ2e ) (3.5.17)
In the context of the calibration, we transform (3.5.17) into a discrete-state Markov chain, with 2 points
in the support, using the standard Tauchen [1986] algorithm. Then, we assume the distribution G(x) from
which the entrants draw their rst realization of the idiosyncratic shock is a Pareto distribution with expo-
nent c. The choice of such a distribution is in accordance with the empirical evidence that the rms’ size
distribution is very heavy tailed, see Gabaix [2011] among others. Finally, we assume that the stochastic
costs of operation follows an i.i.d. process, where H (χ) is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable which
takes the value χ with probability pχ and the value 0 with probability 1 – pχ.
Estimated Parameters
Table 3.5.5 reports the estimated parameters and the source whence they are taken. Following Gomes and
Schmid [2010b] and Arellano et al. [2012], we set the parameters governing the decreasing returns to scale
of the rms’ production function to α = 0.6526. The depreciation rate of capital is set to 10% per year. The
risk-free interest rate is set to rF = 0.04 according to the actual value of the annual real interest rate in the
United States from 1950 to 1983. As in Arellano et al. [2012], we set the subjective discount rate parameter to
β = 0.9605 per year. This value is slightly lower than its frictionless equilibrium value of 11 + rF
, as a proxy of
24Buera and Shin [2013] studies the role of nancial frictions on the so-called miracle economies. In their
calibration, the authors pin down the exogenous size of nancial development by matching the evolution
of external nance to GDP ratios in the data.
25Other examples of models where nancial development is modeled as an exogenous reduction of the
economy’s nancial frictions are Buera et al. [2011] and Arellano et al. [2012].
26This value is on the lower bound of reasonable parameters for the Cobb-Douglas production function
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Table 3.5.5: Estimated Parameters
A. Firms
α = 0.65 Production Function Returns to Scale Arellano et al. [2012]
δ = 0.10 Capital Depreciation Arellano et al. [2012]
ψ = 0.30 Bankruptcy Deadweight Loss Gomes and Schmid [2010a]
rF = 0.04 Real Risk-Free Interest Rate Data (see Appendix B.4)
β = 0.96 Time Discounting Parameter Arellano et al. [2012]
ρx = 0.80 Idiosyncratic Shock Persistence Foster et al. [2008]
γ = 0.35 Equity Issuance Cost Cooley and Quadrini [2001]
B. Incumbents
pχ = 0.06 Probability Operational Cost Armenter and Hnatkovska [2011]
C. Entrants
c = 2 Pareto Exponent Axtell [2001]
Note: this table reports the values, the description and the source of the estimated parameters.
the impatience of the risk neutral manager. This feature supplements the absence of nontax deducibility of
interest rate payments in providing the rms with an incentive to borrow. As in Gomes and Schmid [2010a]
we set the bankruptcy deadweight loss to ψ = 30%27. The value of the equity issuance costs γ = 0.35 is
borrowed from Cooley and Quadrini [2001]. We take the value of the autoregressive parameter ρx = 0.80,
from Foster et al. [2008], who estimate the production function and the Solow residual at the rm level. In
line with the evidence of Axtell [2001] and Gabaix [2011] that the distribution of rm size is heavy tailed, we
choose a Pareto exponent of 2. Finally, we set the probability of receiving a positive operational cost to 6%
to match the transition rate from positive to negative cash ows for US public rms estimated by Armenter
and Hnatkovska [2011].
Calibrated Parameters
There are four parameters to be calibrated: 1) σe , the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity
shock; 2) χ, the magnitude of the stochastic costs of operation; 3) ζ , the borrowing xed cost; and 4) ke , the
27Warner [1977] estimates that the direct and indirect costs associated to corporate bankruptcy equal
30% of the book value of the rm.
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physical capital endowment of an entrant. Accordingly, we need (at least) four targets. Consistently with
the structural break observed in the data, we calibrate our model economy to statistics computed over the
period 1950-1983. In principle, these targets should capture relevant information about the process driving
the default phenomenon in the US economy. In this spirit, we choose: 1) the average debt to asset ratio, bi/ai ,
where the assets in the model are given by ai = xikαi + (1 – δ)ki; 2) the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the average ratio of debt over asset; 3) the average default rate from 1950 to 1983; and 4) the growth rate of
entrants. Apart from the last target - which is taken from Arellano et al. [2012] - the statistics are computed
using Compustat data. Appendix 3.B describes in the detail the construction of the data.
Results of the calibration. Table 3.5.6 reports the value of the calibrated parameters while Table 3.5.7
compares the targets in the data with the one computed in the model. The stochastic operational cost is
calibrated to χ = 9. In relative terms, it represents 9% of the assets of the median rm. As far as the targets
are concerned, on one hand, the average debt to asset ratio in the model is slightly overestimated at 0.29,
compared to the actual value in the data of 0.24. In the model, rms borrow a little too much. On the other
hand, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the ratio is much closer to the actual one, with a value of
0.17 compared with the 0.16 in data. The average default rate is perfectly matched: in the model the 0.3%
of the rms defaults, as it is in the data. This is a successful matching since it is well known that models
with equilibrium default struggle in providing quantitatively reasonable amount of default in the economy.
As instance, in Arellano et al. [2012], the average default rate implied by the model is zero. Conversely, this
model does not suer the same weakness. The reason of this relevant dierence rests on the introduction
of the stochastic xed cost of operation. Finally, we perfectly match the growth rate of the entrants.
Table 3.5.6: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description
σe = 0.65 Standard Deviation Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock
χ = 9 Stochastic Operational Cost
ζ = 0.60 Borrowing Fixed Costs
ke = 145 Capital Entrants
Note: this table reports the values and the description of the
calibrated parameters.
3.5.2 Results: Financial Development and the Diverging Trend
We study the quantitative implications of nancial development on the dynamics of default rates and credit
spreads. To that end, we exogenously cut from 0.6 to 0.4 the xed borrowing costs calibrated in the rst
equilibrium. We discipline this reduction by matching the higher ratio of total debt to asset observed over the
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Table 3.5.7: Calibration Targets
Target Data Model
Average Debt to Asset Ratio 0.24 0.29
Standard Deviation of Debt to Asset Ratio 0.16 0.17
Average Default Rate 0.3% 0.3%
Growth Rate Entrants 0.95% 0.95%
Note: this table reports the targets of the calibration exercise.
The Debt to Asset Ratio is computed in the model as the total
amount of debt over the sum of rm’s prots and undepreci-
ated capital, and in the data as the book value of assets over
the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
period 1984-2012. This structural change leads a median rm leverage ratio of 0.36 in the second equilibrium,
close to the 0.33 measured in the data. To conrm the plausibility of the magnitude of these values, note that
the ratio of the xed borrowing costs over the loan value for the median rm is 0.5% in the rst equilibrium
and 0.13% in the second equilibrium. Those gures are in line with the results in Altinkilic and Hansen
[2000], which study a panel of 628 industrial rms from 1990 until 1997 and nd that the xed cost of
debt issuance for public debt equals on average around 0.1% of the debt principal. As a byproduct, this
result provides a robustness check of the consistency of our calibration. Hereafter, we refer to the (rst)
equilibrium with borrowing xed costs of ζ1 = 0.6 as the pre-1984 steady-state, and the (second) equilibrium
with borrowing xed costs of ζ2 = 0.4 as the post-1984 steady-state.
Table 3.5.8 reports the quantitative predictions of the model and the eects of nancial development on
default rates and credit spreads. The model successfully explains the dramatic rise in default rates. The
post-1984 steady-state is characterized by an average default rate of 1.2%, implying a 300% increase between
the two periods. Therefore, nancial development accounts for the 64% of the total increase of default rates
observed since the early 1980’s. This result uniquely stems from the interplay between nancial development
and the stochastic xed cost of operation. On one hand, the reduction in the xed cost of borrowing tempers
the non-linearities of the value function of the rms28, making the debt a cheaper source of nancing. As
a result, ecient rms can nance through debt investment and build a more ecient size; conversely,
inecient rms can disinvest part of their capital, without being penalized as much as before due to the
lack of collateral. Then, the reduction of the xed cost of borrowing increases both the average level and
volatility of rms’ debt. On the other hand, given the higher collateral value of capital, rms can borrow
more debt against the same amount of capital, implying an increase in leverage. Together with a higher
28In particular, it decreases the marginal utility cost of increasing debt, where utility is measured in terms
of expected discounted feature prots.
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Table 3.5.8: Predictions of the Model
Moment pre-1984 post-1984 ∆ post-1984/pre-1984
Fixed Borrowing Cost Model 0.6 0.4 –33%
Data - - -
Median Debt to Asset Ratio Model 0.29 0.36 24%
Data 0.24 0.33 37%
Aggregate Default Rate Model 0.3% 1.2% 300%
Data 0.3% 1.7% 467%
Aggregate Credit Spread Model 75bp 77bp 2bp
Data 91bp 102bp 11bp
Median Expected Recovery Rate Model 37% 46% 24%
Data – – –
Note: this table reports the results of the model in two equilibria. The rst one, labeled as “pre-
1984”, denotes the version of the model with high xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.6. The second one,
labeled as “post-1984”, denotes the version of the model with low xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.4.
The Median Debt to Asset Ratio is computed as the median value among rms’ total amount of
debt over the sum of rm’s prots and undepreciated capital. The Median Expected Recovery Rate
denes the median across rms of the sum of rms’ prots and undepreciated capital over the total
amount of debt over the states in which the expected probability of default is positive.
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volatility of debt, this implies a higher volatility of leverage. Indeed, the leverage of the median rm goes
up from 0.29 to 0.36, while its volatility rises from 0.17 to 0.20. Thence, it becomes more likely that rms
end up in states of the world where they nd optimal to default, pushing up the overall default rate of the
economy.
Yet, the idiosyncratic productivity shock alone is not sucient to imply the default of the rms because of
the persistency property of the idiosyncratic productivity shock process and the forward-looking nature of
the borrowing constraint. Indeed, the persistent nature of the shock makes it highly predictable. A fortiori
since the shock is highly persistent, the intermediary anticipates that a low-ecient rm will keep being
inecient in the next period, and, therefore, curtails the amount of loans for which the rm might nd
tempting to default. Intuitively, this is the reason at the base of the failure experienced by equilibrium
default models in providing default in equilibrium. On the other hand, the rare event (small probability) and
unpredictable (i.i.d) nature of the stochastic operational cost provides a modeling expedient for introducing
a signicant amount of unpredictable uncertainty in the economy, which eventually produces defaults in
equilibrium.
On the other side of the picture, Table 3.5.8 reports a 2 bp increase in the credit spread, in line with the
empirical evidence. With respect to the level, in both equilibria average credit spreads are around 20 bp
lower than the real ones, which are around 90 bp. This result is not a surprise. Traditionally, macro-models
have been having hard time in provide quantitatively reasonable credit spreads. Indeed, Chen et al. [2008]
stress how models which are not able to provide sizable equity premium would never be able to predict the
right amount of credit spreads, linking the equity premium puzzle to what they call the credit spread puzzle.
In order to overcome these diculties and match the level of credit spreads, we should add aggregate uncer-
tainty in the model, as in Chen [2010]. In this way, we would add a countercyclical default, countercyclical
price of risk and procyclical liquidation values, which, in turn would deliver sizable credit spreads.
Table 8 shows that the model does predict the dramatic rise in default rates and the constancy of credit
spreads. What is the rationale for this result? The answer to this question is purely quantitative, and stems
from the magnitude of three counteracting eects that nancial development has on credit spreads. To
clarify this point, let us restate Equation (3.3.12) as
l′i (1 + rF ) + ζ(1 + rF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed Cost Channel
= EH (χ′i ),x′i |xi
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default Risk Channel
L(k′i , x′i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance Channel
]
When pricing a debt, the credit intermediaries evaluate the xed cost of issuing a loan (xed cost channel),
the probability of default of the rm (default risk channel) and the amount of insurance provided by the
liquidation value in case of default (insurance channel).
As seen before, nancial development increases (on average) the probability of endogenous default. There-
fore, in absence of any form of insurance in case of default, credit spreads would have to increase, tracking
monotonically the rise in default rates observed in the data. Nonetheless, there are two channels through
which nancial development reduces the credit spreads: the xed cost of borrowing and the loss given de-
fault. First of all, nancial development reduces by construction the xed cost of borrowing, and therefore
the interest rate charged on the loan. The impact on the interest rate is stronger the higher is the expected
probability of default of the rm, contributing to the reduction of the credit spread. Secondly, nancial de-
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velopment increases (on average) the liquidation value. Because of the reduction in the nancial frictions
in the economy, rms behave more optimally (literally, rms are less constrained in their optimization de-
cisions) and increases their size of operation. As a consequence, rms (on average) produce higher prots
and have a larger size. To attach some numbers on these dynamics, in the model rms’ median prot and
median size increase, respectively, by 21.73% and 9.34% when passing from the pre-1984 to the post-1984
equilibrium. Both these two components enter the denition of the liquidation value L(k′i , x′i ), and increase
the insurance component of the credit spread. Indeed, the expected recovery rate hikes up by 24%, from a
value of 37% in the rst equilibrium to a value of 46% in the second one. Ergo, nancial development pro-
duces (on average) a dramatic increase in the liquidation value which osets the increase in the probability
of default, producing just a 2 bp increase in the credit spreads in the second equilibrium.
3.5.3 Further Results
In the model, nancial development is able to account for a number of trends - other than the rise in default
rates - which characterized public rms over the last decades. Namely, the model gives relevant predictions
on the number of rms distributing dividends, the way rms decide to smooth these dividends over time,
and the level of rms’ volatility.
Dividend Payout.
First of all, the way public rms pay dividends has substantially changed over time. As reported by Fama
and French [2001], the number of publicly traded non-nancial non-utility rms distributing dividends was
66.5% in 1978 compared to only 20% in 1999. The decline in percentage of dividend payers is attributed with
equal importance to both a tilt of the publicly traded population towards rms with characteristics of rms
that have never payed (low earnings, strong investment and small size), and to a general lower propensity
to pay. Our model adds insights to both these channels. Secondly, Leary and Michaely [2011] document a
steady and substantial increase in the degree of dividends smoothing over the past century. In the model,
nancial development account quantitatively for these changes in the dynamics of dividends.
As explained above, although the objective function of the rms is linear, due to the presence of endogenous
borrowing constraints (and price schedules) their value functions are strictly concave. Therefore, when
deciding the value of dividends to distribute, rms trade o level with volatility. In the model - as in the
data - the rms distributing dividend are large rms. In the rst equilibrium, credit frictions are tight and
rms cannot smooth dividends as they wish. This extra volatility is then compensated by a higher level of
dividends. When nancial development tempers the credit frictions of the rms, they become better able at
insuring dividends from the eects of the persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Hence large rms change their
payout policy by increasing the smoothing of dividends while reducing their average level. At the same time,
nancial development allows for the presence of a higher number of small rms, therefore further reducing
(through the distribution) the ratio of dividend payers. As shown in Table 9, nancial development makes
the number of rms distributing dividends to shrink down by 34%. This mechanism explains the 73% of the
decline in the number of rms paying dividends observed in the data.
Meanwhile even the degree at which rms smooth dividends rise substantially. For measuring the degree
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of dividend smoothing, we follow Lintner [1956] by estimating the following regression
∆di,t = di,t – di,t–1 = α + β1di,t–1 + β2yi,t + i,t
where di,t denotes the dividend of the i-th rm in time t, while yi,t is the value of the rm’s sales. We then
estimate the speed of adjustment of dividends by –βˆ1. When this value equals 0, dividends are perfectly
smoothed and follow a random walk. As reported in Table 9, in our model nancial development makes
the estimated speed of adjustments to decline from 0.43 to 0.22, which implies a substantial increase in the
degree of rms’ dividend smoothing. These values provided by the model are remarkably close the estimates
of Leary and Michaely [2011], which nd an estimated speed of adjustment of about 0.3 during the 1960’s
and 1970’s and about 0.2 for the most recent years. Moreover, the theory we propose is corroborated by
(one of) the main ndings in Leary and Michaely [2011]. After testing several extant explanations of the
smoothing motive29, the authors nds smoothing to be prevalent among rms that appear to have the least
constrained access to external capital and highest dividend levels, which have all the characteristics of the
large rms described in our model.
Firm Volatility.
Campbell et al. [2001] provide evidence on an upward trend in the volatility of public rms’ return, which
has more than doubled from the 1960’s to the late 1990’s. Comin and Mulani [2006] and Comin and Philip-
pon [2005] complement this nding by documenting an increase in idiosyncratic volatility of rm’s real
variables, such as real sales and employment. All these papers conjecture the origin of such trends and
suggest that increased competition, R&D innovations, changes in the corporate governance of the rms and
the institutionalization of equity ownership could have spurred the volatility of rms.
Here we show that nancial development could have been another source of such steep increases of volatil-
ity. Actually, in the model the rise in the volatility of rms’ sales and returns is the other side of the coin
of the evidence reported above on dividends. Indeed, rms achieve a higher degree of dividend smoothing
by increasing the volatility of their debt, which in turn spurs the uctuations in investment, and eventually
rms’ sales and returns. We compute our measure of volatilities as in Comin and Mulani [2006], as
σ(xi,t ) =
√∑t+5
τ=t–4 (xi,τ – x¯i)
2
10
where x¯i, is the average of the variable xi,t between the periods t – 4 and t + 5. In what follows, we compute
the volatility of two variables:rms’ sales yi,t and rms’ cum dividend returns reti,t =
V (ωi,t , xi,t ) + di,t
V (ωi,t–1, xi,t–1)
. The
bottom of Table 9 shows that, in the model, the median volatility of sales rise from a value of 0.14 to 0.24,
and the one of returns from 0.12 to 0.20. As a further robustness check, one of the implications of our theory
is that the increase in volatility is pervasive across all the quantiles of the size distribution, as observed by
Comin and Mulani [2006]. Therefore, nancial development causes an increase in the volatility of rms’
sales and returns which equals 72% and 67%, respectively.
29Theory based on asymmetric information, agency considerations external nancing costs and tax plan-
ning.
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Table 3.5.9: Results on Dividend Payout and Firm Volatility
Variable pre-1984 post-1984 ∆ post-1984/pre-1984
A. Dividend Payout Policy
N. Firm Paying Dividend 58.2% 38.4% -34%
Degree Speed of Adjustment 0.43 0.22 -49%
B. Firm Volatility
Median Sales Volatility 0.14 0.24 72%
Median Stock Return Volatility 0.12 0.20 67%
Note: this table reports the results of the model in two equilibria. The rst one,
labeled as “pre-1984”, denotes the version of the model with high xed costs of bor-
rowing, ζ = 0.6. The second one, labeled as “post-1984”, denotes the version of the
model with low xed costs of borrowing, ζ = 0.4. The Degree Speed of Adjustment
denes the degree at which rms smooth dividends over time. We take the simulated
data of the model, run the regression ∆di,t = di,t – di,t–1 = α + β1di,t–1 + β2yi,t + i,t ,
and consider –βˆ1 as the estimate of the speed of adjustment.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we document a diverging trend between default rates and credit spreads in the US economy
over the last 60 years. On one hand, we nd evidence in favour of the presence of one structural break in the
unconditional mean of default rates in 1984. This date splits the series of default in two samples with very
dierent characteristics. Indeed, the average corporate default rate rose from an average of 0.3%, during the
period 1950-1983, to a value of 1.7% over the period 1984-2012. On the other hand, the average credit spreads
barely moved, recording a 11 basis point increase. We run a battery of tests to show that this movement in
credit spreads is statistically insignicant. Therefore, over the last three decades, default rates experienced
a 467% increase, while credit spreads kept constant. Hence, nowadays corporate bankruptcies are more and
more frequent than thirty years ago, but this came at no eect on the average borrowing cost.
We present a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms where the development of credit mar-
kets and limited enforceability of debt contracts can be accounted for the diverging trend between rising
default rates and constant credit spreads. We model the development of credit markets through an exoge-
nous reduction of xed costs of borrowing, as a reduced form for the development of the U.S. nancial
system during the 1970’s and 1980’s. The predictions of the model are quantitatively appealing. Financial
development accounts for the 64% of the rise in the default rates, which is accompanied by an increase in
credit spreads of just 2 basis points. Indeed, the reduction in the xed borrowing costs make debt cheaper:
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Firms can access larger loans to invest more in capital and grow up in size. At the same time, rms that
become inecient can disinvest without being as penalized as before in their interest rates, due to the lack
of collateral. So, the volatility of investment goes up, just because debt becomes more volatile too. Hence,
nancial development increases the level of debt, its volatility and makes eventually default more likely. On
the other hand, credit spreads barely move because the insurance channel due to the nancial development
prevails on the default risk channel. Indeed, if on one side the cut in the borrowing xed costs increases
(on average) the endogenous probability of default in the economy, on the other side it reduces (on average)
the wedge between the actual rms’ optimal choices and the frictionless ones. As a consequence, nancial
development increases both the median size of capital by 9.34% and median prots by 21.73%. The upsurge
in the expected liquidation value of the rms osets the dramatic rise in default rates, leaving the credit
spreads unchanged.
Furthermore, we show that in the model nancial development can account for a number of trends - other
than the increase in default rates - that characterized public rms in the last thirty years. First, we show that
the reduction of the xed credit costs changes rms’ optimal decisions of dividend payout. Since rms are
now better able to smooth dividends over time, they can trade o this reduction in volatility with a decrease
in the level of dividends. As a result of nancial development, the measure of rms distributing dividends
shrinks down by 33%. This number accounts for the 73% of the decline documented for the U.S. by Fama and
French [2001]. Furthermore, in the model the median degree of dividend smoothing increases of a magnitude
which is remarkably close to the values estimated by Leary and Michaely [2011]. Second, we study the
volatility of rms’ returns and sales. Indeed, Campbell et al. [2001], Comin and Mulani [2006], Comin and
Philippon [2005] show the presence of a secular upward trend in the volatilities of rms. We suggest that
this empirical evidence can be (at least partially) accounted for by nancial development. Indeed, the model
is able to reproduce a 72% in the volatility of sales and a 67% for rms’ returns.
Appendix
3.A Appendix: The Role of Financial Development
Assumptions 1. Let us assume the following:
1. δ = 1: full depreciation. This assumption implies that capital is not anymore a state.
2. ψ = 1: full clearance loss which implies no liquidation value.
3. xi = x¯i: each rm initially experiences (is endowed with) a dierent idiosyncratic shock, henceforth
constant. For example, rms are born of a particular type, where the type captures dierent levels
of productivity.
4. Firms do not suer the stochastic xed cost of operation.
5. Firms cannot issue equity.
6. Entrants are endowed with no debt and no capital.
7. The subjective time discounting parameter β equals 11 + rF
.
Under these assumptions, operating prots and the rm net-worth reduces to:
pii = xikαi
wi = pii – (1 + ri)li
Let us now characterize the equilibrium properties of this economy. Since there is no uncertainty in the
model, in equilibrium the rms optimal policies are constant, (φ∗D , k′∗, l′∗, d∗). In principle there are two
putative equilibria where rms choose with probability one to default (φ∗D = 1) or not to default (φ∗D = 0).
On one hand, we can show that the defaulting equilibrium is not an equilibrium for the rm. The proof is
trivial and is made by contradiction.
Proof. Let us assume that a rm defaults in equilibrium; this means that it exits without distributing any
dividend. This strategy violates the prot maximizing condition. We can nd a feasible strategy that delivers
a higher payo. In particular not defaulting, producing at the rst best level of capital each period, distribut-
ing the rest in dividend (without using debt) is a feasible strategy with constant policies which provides a
higher payo.
On the other hand we can show that the No-Defaulting equilibrium holds only for a bounded set of loans.
Despite the proof is more involved, the intuition is straightforward. An increase in the accorded level of
debt increases the incentive for the rm to deviate from the equilibrium policy of not defaulting, distributing
a big dividend in the current period and defaulting the period later. In particular in what follows we will
show that there exists a threshold value of debt, l∗D,i above which rms will nd optimal to deviate from the
no default equilibrium strategy. Let us prove it.
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Proof. The proof articulates as follows:
1. Proposition 3.A.1 states the zero-prot condition of the intermediary under Assumptions 3.A
2. We plug the result of Proposition 3.A.1 in the problem of the incumbents and we nd the optimal
policy of capital
3. We dene the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm given the above policy functions
4. We dene from the incentive compatibility constraint of the rm the debt-limit
Proposition 3.A.1. Under Assumptions 3.A, the equilibrium zero prot condition (l∗i , r∗i ) ∈ Ω(l∗i , x¯i;λ) can be
rewritten as:
(1 + r∗i )l∗i = (1 + r∗)l∗i + (1 + r∗)ζ (3.A.1)
Proof. The credit intermediary zero prot condition reduces to:
l′i + ζ =
Ex′ |x
[
(1 – φD,i)(1 + ri)l′i + φD,iL(k′)
]
1 + r
l′i + ζ =
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i + φD,iL(k′)
(1 + r)
l′i + ζ =
(1 – φD,i)(1 + r ′i )l′i
(1 + r)
The rst step is a result of the absence of idiosyncratic uncertainty while the second one comes from the
absence of liquidation value. Since we showed before that the rm does not default in equilibrium, the
equilibrium level of debt obeys:
l∗i + ζ =
(1 + r∗i )l∗i
(1 + r∗) (3.A.2)
which concludes the proof.
Hence the rms in equilibrium can borrow at the risk free rate, corrected for the xed cost of borrowing.
This result stems from the fact that rms do not default in equilibrium.
However, this result does not imply that rms can borrow as much as they want. This point is made clear
following the proof.
In order to derive further insights on the rms optimal behaviors let’s analyze the problem of the incumbents.
Under Assumptions 3.A it reduces to:
Vi = max
{k′i ,l′i }
di +
1
1 + r Vi(x
′
i ;λ′)
s.t di = x¯ikαi – k′i + l′i – (1 + ri)li(
l′i , r ′i
) ∈ Ω(l′i ,λ)
Substituting the zero prot condition (3.A.1):
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V = max
{k′i ,l′i }
di +
1
1 + r Vi(x
′
i ;λ′)
s.t di = x¯ikαi – k′i + l′i – (1 + r)li – (1 + r)ζ
The rst order necessary conditions reads:
rCl1 = αx¯i(k
′
i )α–1
1 + r (ki)
1 = 1 + r1 + r (bi)
from which we obtain:
rCl1 + r = αx¯i(k′i )α–1 (ki)
Hence in equilibrium rms can equal their marginal product to the risk free rate, choosing the rst best
level of capital:
k∗ = kfb,i =
(
αx¯i
1 + r
) 1
1–α
(3.A.3)
Notice that the rms still suer a dead-weight loss due to the x-cost of borrowing ζ , but this burden does
not aect the optimal choice of capital which is taken at the margin. At this point we can dene the rm
incentive compatibility constraint as the feasible set of policies strategies for which the rm does not want
to default. In equilibrium:
Φ(ω∗i , x¯i;λ) =
{
(d∗i , l∗i , k∗i ) ∈ R2 × R+ : ω∗i + d∗i + l∗i – k∗i ≥ 0
}
(3.A.4)
Given the monotonicity properties of the rms value function there exists a rm specic debt limit lD,i , such
that any accorded level of debt higher than this debt limit, will provide an incentive for the rm to deviate
and default. This interpretation rationalizes the label endogenous borrowing constraint.
The debt limit is dened as the level of debt for which the optimal policy functions deliver a zero-net worth:
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i + lD,i – (1 + r)lD,i – (1 + r)ζ = 0
which simplies to:
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i – rlD,i – (1 + r)ζ = 0 (3.A.5)
Proposition 3.A.2. A no defaulting equilibrium strategy for a rm i is sustained for level of debt l∗i ∈ [0, lD,i],
where lD,i represent the equilibrium rm-specic debt limit and it is dened as:
lD,i =
1 + r – α
rα
kfb,i –
(1 + r)
r
ζ (3.A.6)
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Proof. Substituting (3.A.3)
lD,i =
x¯ikαfb,i – kfb,i – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
x¯i
(
1+r
αx¯i
) α
α–1 –
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1 – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
x¯
– 1
α–1
i
( 1+r
α
) 1
α–1 +1 –
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1 – (1 + r)ζ
r
=
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
[
1+r
α – 1
]
– (1 + r)ζ
r
=
(
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
[
1+r–α
α
]
– (1 + r)ζ
r
=
[
1+r–α
α
] (
1+r
αx¯i
) 1
α–1
r
– (1 + r)ζ
r
= 1 + r – α
rα
kfb,i –
1 + r
r
ζ
Now, we can easily derive the following derivatives:
rCl
∂lD,i
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
< 0
∂lD,i
∂kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
rα
> 0
reported in Proposition 3.4.3. First, the debt-limit is increasing in the level of nancial development. The
lower the level of nancial development (the higher is ζ), the lower is the level of debt for which the rm
is indierent whether to default or not. Second, the debt-limit is increasing in the optimal choice of capital,
which, in this context, is function uniquely of the original idiosyncratic shock. The higher is the idiosyncratic
shock (quality of production), the higher is the debt limit, i.e. the threshold of debt for which a rm is
indierent whether to default or not.
Let us now dene the leverage at the debt limit as:
lD,i
kfb,i
= 1 + ri – α
riα
– 1 + ri
ri
ζ
kfb,i
(3.A.7)
From which we can easily derive the following derivatives:
rCl
∂
lD,i
kfb,i
∂kfbi
= 1 + ri
ri
ζ
(kfb,i)2
> 0
∂
lD,i
kfb,i
∂ζ
= –1 + ri
ri
1
kfb,i
< 0
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reported in Proposition 3.4.4. First, the leverage is strictly increasing in the amount of capital. The higher is
the productivity of a rm, the higher is the optimal level of capital, the higher is the equilibrium leverage.
Second, the leverage is strictly increasing in the level of nancial development. The more developed is the
credit intermediation, the lower is ζ , the higher is the equilibrium leverage of the rms.
3.B Appendix: Data
3.B.1 Firm Characteristics
Data on rms characteristics are taken from Compustat, fundamental annual data from 1950 to 2006. Com-
pustat includes public rms listed on the three US exchanges, NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq, with a non-foreign
incorporation code.
Following Covas and Den Haan [2011], we exclude: 1) American Depository Receipts (ADRs) - securities
created by U.S. banks to permit a U.S.-based trading of stocks listed on foreign exchanges; 2) nancial rms
(SIC classication between 6000 and 6999); 3) utilities (SIC classication between 4900 and 4949); 3) rms
involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB30); 4) rms with missing value for the book value
of assets.
Entrants are dened as rms which are showing up on Compustat for the rst time.
The assets, (a ≡ kit + xkαit ), in the model, are computed as the book value of assets (Compustat data item 6
- mnemonic AT).
The total debt, (bit ) in the model, is computed as long-term debt (item 9 , mnemonic ) plus debt in current
liabilities (item 34, mnemonic), since there is no distinction among the two in the present model.
3.B.2 Default Rate
Data on corporate default rates are taken from Giesecke et al. [2011].
3.B.3 Credit Spreads
Data on credit spreads are taken from the St Louis FRED. Credit spreads are computed using the monthly
seasonally not-adjusted Moody’s Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield, from 1950 to 2012. The series follows an
investment bond that acts as an index of the performance of all bonds given a specic rating by Moody’s
Investment Firm. Annual series are constructed by averaging the monthly percent bond yields. The spread
is then computed as the dierence of the natural logarithm of BAA and AAA bond yields.
3.B.4 Ex-post Real Risk Free Interest Rate
The ex-post real risk free interest rates are computed using data on 1) the Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
bill, from the St Louis FRED, and 2) the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Chain-type Price Index,
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
30Compustat assigns a footnote AB to total sales if sales increase by more than 50 percent in response to
a merger or an asset acquisition.
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The ex-post real risk free interest rate is computed as the dierence between the three-month Treasury bill
rate minus the realized ination in the subsequent quarter.
We use the three-month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, at monthly frequency. We then build annual data
averaging (equal weights) the monthly rates.
For the ination, we use the seasonally adjusted quarterly rate of the Personal Consumption Expenditures
(PCE) Chain-type Price Index. The annualized growth for PCE deator is computed by taking 400 times the
rst dierences of the natural logs of the PCE deator. The series of ex-post real interest rate so constructed
goes from 1950 to 1985.
3.B.5 GDP growth
We take the data on real GDP from St Louis FRED. We compute the GDP growth from 1949 until 2011 as
the log dierence of the raw GDP data. As a robustness check, we also use HP-ltered data (λ = 6.25).
3.B.6 Stock Returns Volatility
We take daily data on stock returns from CRSP. We compute the annual volatility from 1949 until 2011
by computing the standard deviation of returns within a year. Since the measure is computed over non-
overlapping spans of time, the measurement errors are uncorrelated and do not bias the estimates of volatil-
ity.
3.C Appendix: Computational Algorithm
The computation adopts the discrete choice method. Grids on bond and capital consist of 200 grid points.
The computational algorithm articulates as follows:
1. It starts with the guess of: 1) the continuation value function of the incumbents; 2) the default policy
function of the incumbents; 3) the debt schedules of the incumbents. In line with Arellano et al.
[2012] the initial guess of the debt schedules is the risk free interest rate.
2. It iterates over the continuation value function of the incumbents in the xed point algorithm till
convergence.
3. The implied continuation value function is used for updating, through the optimal default decision
rule (3.3.5), the default policy function. Clearly the convergence of the value function implies the
convergence of the default policy functions, but not viceversa.
4. The implied default policy functions are used to update the endogenous probability of default, which
in turns is used for updating the feasible correspondence Ω-set and, therefore, the debt schedules
(3.3.12).
5. Points 2, 3, 4 are iterated till convergence of the debt schedules.
Technical Details:
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• The levels of tolerance for the convergence of the value function and of the debt schedules are set to
1e-6.
• The grids are controlled not to be binding in equilibrium.
• The statistics reported in Table 3.5.8 are obtained using the (ergodic) distribution at period T=1000,
obtained simulating 15000 rms over 1000 periods, .
• The Tauchen [1986] algorithm truncates the ± inf values of the support of the normal distribution
at ±20σlog(x).

Bibliography
Adlera, B. E., C. Vedran, and L. A. Weiss (2010). Destruction of Value in the New Era of Chapter 11. NYU
Journal of Law & Business, 1–47.
Aghion, P., O. Hart, and J. Moore (1994). The economics of bankruptcy reform. In Transition in Eastern
Europe, Volume 2, pp. 215–244.
Almeida, H. and T. Philippon (2007). The risk-adjusted cost of nancial distress. Journal of Finance 62(6),
2557–2586.
Altinkilic, O. and R. Hansen (2000). Are There Economies of Scale in Underwriting Fees? Evidence of Rising
External Financing Costs. Review of Financial Studies 13(1), 191–218.
Arellano, C., Y. Bai, and P. Kehoe (2011). Financial Markets and Fluctuations in Uncertainty. Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Sta Report 2(April), 1–31.
Arellano, C., Y. Bai, and J. Zhang (2012). Firm Dynamics and Financial Development. Journal of Monetary
Economics 59(6), 533–549.
Armenter, R. and V. Hnatkovska (2011). The Macroeconomics of Firms’ Savings.
Axtell, R. L. (2001). Zipf distribution of U.S. rm sizes. Science (New York, N.Y.) 293(5536), 1818–20.
Ayotte, K. M. and E. R. Morrison (2009). Creditor Control and Conict in Chapter 11. Journal of Legal
Analysis 1(2), 511–551.
Bai, J. and P. Perron (1998). Estimating and testing linear models with multiple structural changes. Econo-
metrica 66(1), 47–78.
Bai, J. and P. Perron (2006). Multiple Structural Change Models: A Simulation Analysis. Economic Theory
and Practice: Frontiers of Analysis and Applied Research, 212–237.
Baird, D. G. (1986). The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations. Journal of Legal Studies 15(1), 127–148.
Baird, D. G. and R. K. Rasmussen (2003). Chapter 11 at Twilight. 191(July), 1–49.
Barseghyan, L. and R. DiCecio (2011, sep). Entry costs, industry structure, and cross-country income and
TFP dierences. Journal of Economic Theory 146(5), 1828–1851.
Benmelech, E. and N. Bergman (2008). Liquidation values and the credibility of nancial contract renegoti-
ation: Evidence from US airlines. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(4), 1635–1677.
Bessembinder, H. and W. Maxwell (2008, mar). Markets: Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market.
Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2), 217–234.
150 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Biais, B. and T. Mariotti (2009). Credit, Wages, and Bankruptcy Laws. Journal of the European Economic
Association 7 (5), 939–973.
Bris, A., I. Welch, and N. Zhu (2006). The costs of bankruptcy: Chapter 7 liquidation versus Chapter 11
reorganization. The Journal of Finance 61(3), 1253–1303.
Buera, F., J. Kaboski, and Y. Shin (2011). Finance and development: A tale of two sectors. American Economic
Review 101(August), 1964–2002.
Buera, F. and Y. Shin (2013). Financial frictions and the persistence of history: A quantitative exploration.
Journal of Political Economy 121(2), 221–272.
Campbell, J. Y., J. Hilscher, and J. Szilagyi (2008). In Search of Distress Risk. Journal of Finance 63(6), 2899–
2939.
Campbell, J. Y., M. Lettau, B. G. Malkiel, and Y. Xu (2001). Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?
An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal of Finance 56(1), 1–43.
Carvalho, V. and X. Gabaix (2013). The Great Diversication and its undoing. American Economic Re-
view 103(5), 1697–1727.
Chatterjee, S., D. Corbae, M. Nakajima, and J.-V. Rios-Rull (2007). A quantitative theory of unsecured con-
sumer credit with risk of default. Econometrica 75(6), 1525–1589.
Chen, H. (2010). Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure. Journal
of Finance 65(6), 2171–2212.
Chen, L., P. Collin-Dufresne, and R. S. Goldstein (2008). On the Relation Between the Credit Spread Puzzle
and the Equity Premium Puzzle. Review of Financial Studies 22(9), 3367–3409.
Comin, D. and S. Mulani (2006). Diverging Trends in Macro and Micro Volatility: Facts. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 88(2), 374–383.
Comin, D. and T. Philippon (2005). The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences. NBER
macroeconomics annual 20, 167–201.
Cooley, T. F. and V. Quadrini (2001). Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics. American Economic Review 91(5),
1286–1310.
Corbae, D. and P. D. D’Erasmo (2015). Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynam-
ics.
Covas, F. and W. J. Den Haan (2011). The cyclical behavior of debt and equity nance. The American Economic
Review 101(April), 1–26.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
Demyanyk, Y., C. Ostergaard, and B. E. Sorensen (2007). U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and
Interstate Insurance of Personal Income. The Journal of Finance LXII (6), 2763–2801.
Erosa, A. and A. H. Cabrillana (2008). On Finance as a Theory of TFP, Cross-Industry Productivity Dier-
ences, and Economic Rents. International Economic Review 49(2), 437–473.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2001). Disappearing dividends: changing rm characteristics or lower propen-
sity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60(1), 3–43.
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson (2008). Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Eciency: Selection on
Productivity or Protability? American Economic Review 98(1), 394–425.
Gabaix, X. (2011). The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica 79(3), 733–772.
Gennaioli, N. and S. Rossi (2010). Judicial discretion in corporate bankruptcy. Review of Financial Stud-
ies 23(11), 4078–4114.
Geva, E. Z. (2012). The Trajectory of Labor Relations Under Chapter 11. DePaul Business & Commercial Law
Journal.
Giesecke, K., F. A. Longsta, S. Schaefer, and I. Strebulaev (2011). Corporate Bond Default Risk: A 150-Year
Perspective. Journal of Financial Economics 102(2), 233–250.
Gilchrist, S., J. W. Sim, and E. ZakrajËĞ (2013). Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Irreversible Investment.
Gomes, J. F. and L. Schmid (2010a). Equilibrium Credit Spreads and the Macroeconomy. The Wharton School
Research Paper (42), 1–46.
Gomes, J. F. and L. Schmid (2010b). Levered Returns. Journal of Finance 65(2), 467–494.
Harris, M. (1987). Dynamic Economic Analysis.
Hennessy, C. A. and T. M. Whited (2007). How Costly Is External Financing? Evidence from a Structural
Estimation. Journal of Finance 62(4), 1705–1745.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992). Entry, exit, and rm dynamics in long run equilibrium. Econometrica 60(5),
1127–1150.
Huang, J.-Z. and M. Huang (2012). How Much of the Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread Is Due to Credit Risk?
Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2(2), 153–202.
Jayaratne, J. and P. Strahan (1996). The nance-growth nexus: evidence from bank branch deregulation.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 639–670.
Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2008). Financial Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility. NBER Working
Paper w12308(12308).
152 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2012). Macroeconomic Eects of Financial Shocks. American Economic Re-
view 102, 238–71.
Khan, A., T. Senga, and J. K. Thomas (2012). Default Risk and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Economy with
Production Heterogeneity.
King, R. and R. Levine (1993). Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth. Journal of Monetary economics 32,
513–542.
Klasa, S., W. F. Maxwell, and H. Ortiz-Molina (2009, jun). The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in
collective bargaining with labor unionsâŸĘ. Journal of Financial Economics 92(3), 421–442.
Knot, O. and O. Vychodil (2005). What drives the optimal bankruptcy law design? Czech Journal of Economics
and Finance ( . . . 8, 110–123.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1997). Legal determinants of external nance.
Journal of Finance 52(3), 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of Political
Economy 106(6), 1113–1155.
Leary, M. T. and R. Michaely (2011). Determinants of Dividend Smoothing: Empirical Evidence. Review of
Financial Studies 24(10), 3197–3249.
Lintner, J. (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes.
The American Economic Review 46(2), 97–113.
Livshits, I., J. MacGee, and M. Tertilt (2012). Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies. American
Economic Journal Macroeconomics 2(2), 165–193.
Longsta, F., S. Mithal, and E. Neis (2005). Corporate Yield Spreads Default Risk or Liquidity. The Journal
of Finance 39(5), 2213–2253.
Longsta, F. A. (2011). Municipal Debt and Marginal Tax Rates: Is There a Tax Premium in Asset Prices?
Journal of Finance 66(3), 721–751.
Lucas, R. E. (1978). On the size distribution of business rms. The Bell Journal of Economics 9(2), 508–523.
Martin, J. B., K. Nelson, E. Rudenberg, and J. Squires (2009). FREEFALLING WITH A PARACHUTE THAT
MAY NOT OPEN: DEBTOR-IN- POSSESSION FINANCING IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION.
University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 63(4).
Matsa, D. A. (2010, jun). Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining. The
Journal of Finance 65(3), 1197–1232.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
McConnell, M. M. and G. Perez-Quiros (2000). Output uctuations in the United States: What has changed
since the early 1980’s? American Economic Review 90(5), 1464–1476.
Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-ÂŘindustry reallocations and aggregate industry productiv-
ity. Econometrica 71(6), 1695–1725.
Michelacci, C. and V. Quadrini (2009). Financial Markets and Wages. Review of Economic Studies 76, 795–827.
Midrigan, V. and D. Y. Xu (2010). Finance and misallocation: Evidence from plant-level data. National Bureau
of Economic Research. (w15647), 1–40.
Miller, H. R. (2007). Chapter 11 in Transition - From boom to bust and into the future. American Bankruptcy
Law Journal 81, 375–404.
Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest-
ment. American Economic Review 48(3), 261–297.
Moll, B. (2014). Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-Financing Undo Capital Misalloca-
tion? American Economic Review 104(10), 3186–3221.
Monacelli, T., V. Quadrini, and A. Trigari (2011). Financial Markets and Unemployment. NBER Working
Paper 17389(September), 44.
Moody’s (2012). Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates , 1920-2011.
Onésimo, H.-L. and J. B. Lasserre (1996). Discrete-Time Markov Control Processes: Basic Optimality Criteria.
Peri, A. (2015). A Quantitative Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy.
Quadrini, V. and Q. Sun (2015). Credit and Hiring.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998). Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review 88(3),
559–586.
Rosen, S. (1982). Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings. The Bell Journal of Economics 13(2),
311–323.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2011). Fire sales in nance and macroeconomics. NBER Working Paper .
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002). Has the business cycle changed and why? NBER macroeconomics
annual 17 (1999), 159–218.
Stokey, N. L., R. E. Lucas, and E. C. Prescott (1990a). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Volume 23.
Harvard University Press.
Stokey, N. L., R. J. Lucas, and E. C. Prescott (1990b). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics.
154 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tauchen, G. (1986). Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector autoregressions.
Economics Letters 20(2), 177–181.
Tauchen, G. and R. Hussey (1991). Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate Solutions to
Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models. Econometrica 59(2), 371–396.
Warner, J. B. (1977). Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. Journal of Finance 32(2), 337–347.
Warren, E. (1999). The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37 (1/2),
189–204.
Warren, E. and J. Westbrook (2003). Secured Party in Possession. American Bankruptcy Institute Jour-
nal (September).
